Politics As Warfare: Lessons From History The GOP Must Learn! Part I
By aceintx Posted in History — Comments (60) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
This is the first of a series of Articles as inspired by E Pluribus Unum at RS and at TMR comparing Politics to war.
Wars are made up of many battles. Wars can be dominated by one side over another yet lost in the long run if there is not a proper respect for strategy and tactics and/or a proper respect for the lessons taught by the enemy. Most importantly one battle can decide the whole war in positive and/or negative ways!
The first one I will profile is the Battle of Gettysburg, in 1863.
A brief overview of the battle:
The Battle of Gettysburg actually happened by accident since General Lee’s plan in marching into Pennsylvania was to march on the Capital City of Scranton in order to demoralize the North by demonstrating that the Army of Northern Virginia could march on any northern capital at will and could not be stopped from doing so. The fact that this pivotal battle happened at Gettysburg is due in large part, to a twist of history that so often happens during deciding events in matters of war. Many Southern soldiers were in woeful need of shoes…and one of General Lee’s divisions ignored orders to avoid engaging Northern forces and entered Gettysburg which had the unique lure of a shoe factory.
The first day began with a few small engagements between Federal and Southern pickets and escalated in intensity throughout the day.
The battle was set up and decided over the course of three days. As already stated, day one is basically a series of minor engagements as both sides set up the initial lines of battle punctuated by a victory of Southern forces, late in the day, who pounded Meade’s Union forces and drove them from Seminary Ridge where the Union forces had set up a hasty defensive line.
As a result of this initial victory for Lee, Meade was forced to set up a second defensive line along Cemetery Ridge which had the distinction of being a far more defensible position being that it was the high ground in the area allowing the Union commander to observe southern forces as they moved about the field. The new Union lines overlooked the field over which any southern attack must march and it’s flanks were protected by the terrain on either end. The line was in the shape of a fish hook and reinforcements and re-supply could be accomplished quickly and with incredible efficiency because of the nearly circular shape of the position.
The second day was pretty much a stand off with Lee making attacks on different sections of the Union line, primarily the flanks, while the Union successfully held them back.
Day three was the key to the Battle of Gettysburg and ultimately set the stage for the eventual Union victory. Lee drew up a battle plan that we all know was doomed to failure. I believe his General Staff knew it would fail based on the Union’s superior defensive position on the high ground. General Longstreet in particular begged Lee not to order the attack. Most of Lee’s general staff were concerned in that Jeb Stuart had not made his whereabouts known in the prior two days of battle and the lack of intelligence from Stuart, which Lee had benefited from in his many victories was woefully absent. One of the things I believe was the greatest factor in Lee’s seeming invincibility up to this point, was Stuart’s many legendary rides around Union positions which gave Lee enormous advantages in previous battles since he knew what kind of force he was dealing with, where they were located, and the greatest weaknesses of the enemy to exploit for victory.
Lee was above all a brilliant defensive tactician normally picking a superior defensive position, luring Union forces to attack him, and destroying them in a counter attack aided by the afore mentioned intelligence gained by Stuart along with the individual initiative of Stonewall Jackson who had recently died as a result of wounds received at the Battle of Chancellorsville.
Longstreet recommended they move to a better position between Meade and the Union Capital of Washington DC where their forces would have the advantage. This would also give General Stuart and his Cavalry an opportunity to find them and give them crucial intelligence as to the Union’s disposition and over all strength.
In the end Lee didn't listen to Longstreet nor did he listen to the rest of his General staff...and fought the battle where they were. As a result, he sealed their fate and the eventual doom of the Confederacy with the decision to order what would later be known as Picket’s Charge.
Lee's plan was to send an entire division against the center of the Union Lines aided by an artillery barrage from his massed artillery. His plan might have succeeded were it fought on different ground...but this was Gettysburg and it was the field upon which they fought.
The key to it's success or failure was Lee's plan for the afore mentioned artillery barrage against the Union line. The general idea was to pound a hole in the Union line for Picket's division to assault. Again the field of battle proved the deciding factor. As mentioned before, The Union forces were in a line along Cemetery ridge and were generally above the artillery batteries engaged in the bombardment. This position posed a problem for Lee's strategy because the majority of the shelling went over the heads of Union forces and landed harmlessly in the valley behind...damage was done to be sure...but not nearly enough.
Then General Picket began his charge. Possessing the high ground, General Meade had the advantage because he could see the entire field separating the two armies. His artillery could sweep the entire field across which Picket would march, and finally, once the southern forces came within rifle range and were ready for the final bayonet charge against the Union line, Union troops had the advantage of being able to fire down upon a mass of men charging up hill, all this from fixed positions behind stone walls or hardened trenches which they had had three days to perfect.
In the end, Lee lost Picket's entire division and was never again able to mount another offensive Campaign.
The lessons for the Republican Party?
Lesson 1)
Winning a short and immediate skirmish may be satisfying…but if you fail to anticipate your enemy’s tactics and strategy, you will lose! Lee essentially lost the battle on day one by winning the initial skirmish of the battle by forcing the Union to a far more superior and defensible position. He further compounded the problem by insisting on staying engaged in a battle which was far more favorable to the enemy rather than fighting on a field of his choosing.
As someone who has followed politics over 20 years, my greatest frustration is that Republicans continually fight on Democrat ground. Democrats are allowed to choose the ground upon which we will fight, and they are always allowed by our leaders to define the terms of battle.
Lesson 2)
When your closest advisers are telling you you are making a mistake…Listen to them! For the life of me, I can’t figure out what was going through Lee’s mind during this battle unless he was tired of the war, and wanted to lose. I can’t help but wonder how things would have been different were Jackson around because in all of Lee’s major victories, it was Jackson who delivered the master stroke. Additionally, Jackson had proven in the past that he could and would tell Lee he was wrong and even refused to participate in a battle around Richmond a few short years earlier. Had Lee listened to his Generals, and moved to another position between Meade and Washington as Longstreet suggested, he once again would have been able to set up a battle on his own terms, in a position of his choosing, and potentially destroyed Meade who would have been forced to attack him in order to protect Washington. Had such a scenario played itself out, it is my belief that the Civil War might have been settled then and there in the South’s Favor.
In this, 2008 promises to be Republican’s greatest defeat in decades. We now have a Party who is hell bent on ignoring it’s base and those who love her most. We are beset by a candidate who not only insists on fighting the war on the enemy’s terms, he is insistent that we surrender the high ground to the enemy. Not only that, having set the stage for an un-winnable battle, he insists that we charge across a wide open field, under the guns of the enemy firing from a superior position thereby destroying ourselves and the Party that we love.
Lesson 3)
Intelligence! Had Lee waited for Stuart, he’d have known the strength of the Union position. He’d have known the futility of the numerous assaults that were attempted on days two and three. He’d have recognized the wisdom of his General staff and might have moved his army to a more defensible position and won yet another victory for the South.
Where does the Republican Party fit in this? Where is the intelligence that we need to listen to? 70 years of the same strategy, the same tactics, and the same battle plans and attacks upon our Party. We don’t have to guess what the enemy is doing, or going to do…they never change…their mode of operation is as consistent and discernable as the sun rising each morning. Yet we go into every battle as if we have no clue what to expect. It’s time we became not only the party of ideas, (which we are no longer), but we must become the party of strategy and tactics. It’s well past time to learn the lessons the enemy has taught us for 70 years. We need to look to what they have done in the past and use it to counter their every move.
There is so much more I could add to the narrative of this battle and what we should learn from it…but space won’t permit it. I have made a beginning here, and hope you and our party leadership can take what I have started and carry it on!
That having been said, the 2008 Presidential elections and our nominee present us with a choice. I have made this statement before and don’t wish to repeat myself, but the subject of this article begs the question, “Do we follow this leader and make the charge that could be the death of our Party for years to come, or do we heed the lessons from the battle of Gettysburg. Do we charge with Picket, or do we retreat to more favorable ground with Longstreet?
These are questions that must eventually be answered by the Party, but today it is each of us separately that must answer these questions. I am writing this partly in response to a statement I have heard repeated over and over again that you can’t win a war by retreating and/or losing. By losing the skirmish for Seminary Ridge, Meade proved this assumption to be false…you can lose the skirmish…or the battle for Seminary ridge and retreat to a winning position for the overall battle of Gettysburg. On the flip side, Lee fought the wrong battle on the wrong field. Had he retreated to a better position the outcome of the war could have been completely different.
The questions we now face is, “Do we vote for McCain and win the skirmish?” If we win the skirmish do we lose the overall battle? If we win the skirmish and lose the overall battle, is the war over for us?
I’m not advocating not voting for McCain, but this is the elephant currently in the tent, and we all need to decide for ourselves the answer to this perplexing question and may God give us the wisdom to make the right choice in the end!
would have won the '64 election and ended the war with the CSA intact.
Five Canadas could not have stopped the Kaiser or Stalin.
Mike DeVine’s Charlotte Observer columns
http://thehinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
www.race42008.com
"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson
Pickets Charge has traditionally been known as the high point of the Confederacy for a reason IMHO!
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
Their grandfathers and great-grandfathers were quite different when it came to war. It's just that there weren't ever enough of them.
The Fuzzy Puppy of the VRWC. I've been usurped!
but I really think the most boring theory is the one that rings most true. Three Union Generals won the war:
1) Winfield Scott devised the Anaconda Plan. By blockading the Southern coasts and finally acheiving control of the Mississippi, the South was virtually (but not completely) cut off from trade and split in half. If you were not east of the Miss when Vickburg fell, you simply became irrellevant.
2) Although it took a long time to find them, Lincoln finally found a winning combination with Grant and Sherman. The utter simplicity and brilliance of their combined efforts finished off the South. Grant knew his advantage in men and material was growing with time as Lee was losing both. Grant grabbed on to Lee and did not let go, attack after attack, wearing down the isolated Southerners.
Sherman, the much vilified General, actually a man ahead of his time, drove through the breadbasket of the South and took the war to Lee's only source of supplies, and even to the homefront.
Lee was taking losses he could not afford on his front, and his country was being destroyed to his rear. The key to Union victory was the key to all true victories. You must apply such increasing pressure to an enemy he loses his will to continue the fight.
I apply this test to all wars I study now. This is why we have had no total victories since WW2. Our nation, mainly for political and press reasons, is not willing to apply such immediate pressure to force an enemy to surrender. We usually end hostilities to soon or just drag them on until our populace tires.
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Molon Labe!
Mike DeVine’s Charlotte Observer columns
http://thehinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
www.race42008.com
"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson
though he was the Wesley Clark of his day doing out to defeat Lincoln and "Pull out now".
his roll in building up the Army of the Potomac can't be ignored...It was his logistical skills as well as his constant drilling taking the Union from nearly manless to having the ability to sustain the long months of Grant's war of attrition was crucial as well...As with everything...when writing on something, space and time causes an oversimplification of facts and events and my article is not an exception. Your post is definitely true...I would just add McClellan as a side note since his later betrayal of the Union cause is problematic to say the least.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
because he threatened to bomb Russians based in Bosnia? I'm not sure that McClellen ever threatened to fire upon any Confederate!
Mike DeVine’s Charlotte Observer columns
http://thehinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
www.race42008.com
"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson
Clark joined that crowd when he ran for office...and McClellan ran against Lincoln on a peace platform (I think as a Democrat).
I couldn't tell you didly about what Clark did in Bosnia because I've never cared enough about him or anything he ever had to say to educate myself about him!
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
instead of enemies.
Mike DeVine’s Charlotte Observer columns
http://thehinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
www.race42008.com
"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson
And McClellan was a good garrison general . But I think the three I first mentioned ended up acheiving final victory. I actually think we are overstating the idea of French and English recognition. The chances of them actually entering the war I would say was slim. The war was won/lost when one army put so much pressure on the other that they lost the will to continue the fight.
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Molon Labe!
take no prisoners take the enemy to the mat strategy that finally won
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
I don't see how you figure Antietam was the decisive battle for Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia since Lee on several battles between Antietam and Gettysburg...Whether one or the other was more I believe Gettysburg was the decisive battle at least in the eastern theater because Lee was on the defensive pretty much from that point on.
Vicksburg was the decisive battle in the west, and arguably since the taking of Vicksburg split the south on two...Atlanta was a big deal from a Marale standpoint as well...but for Lee and his Army Gettysburg was the fotune changing battle of the war IMHO.
All this is a side show however, my main point is that by losing the battle for Seminary ridge, and retreating to Cemetery Ridge, Meade gained the uper hand in the battle, and arguably the war.
BTW, the wall where Pickets charge was stopped is called the high point of the Confederacy for a reason!
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
After Antietam, the CSA had no real hope of getting victory through external diplomatic pressure; and after Gettysburg it had no real hope of getting victory through force of arms. Which was the more important consideration is still up for debate. :)
The Fuzzy Puppy of the VRWC. I've been usurped!
only ones when Lee was on the offensive by attacking the north instead of letting the battle come to him...and as I said, Vicksburg and Sherman's march to the see can't be ignored, nor can the naval blockade by the north. All are crucial to the overall victory of the north...but IMHO...Gettysburg holds the key to Lee's eventual surrender IMHO...(that and Grant's strategy of locking Lee in a death grip and finally defeating him through attrition which is part three of my series)
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
heck, I wrote "bin" for been in one post lol.
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Molon Labe!
Prior to Antietam the south was able to trade with England this allowed them to equalize their material shortcomings when fighting the north.
Without the cotton trade for manufactured goods the south was woefully under equipped. What did you point out forced the battle of Gettysburg ? They abandoned their battle plan for the hope of getting shoes ?
If the south had of been able to maintain trade with England the shoe problem wouldn't have been of such sole importance.
"Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it."
-Thomas Paine: The American Crisis, No. 4, 1777
Good points...and valid to be sure...but the loss of an entire division can't be ignored as significant. I agree with your analysis from a supply perspective and the diplomatic affects of Antietam...but there was plenty of fight left in the south after that as well. And don't forget the naval blockade!
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
know that the CSA never lost a battle that Texans led?
Mike DeVine’s Charlotte Observer columns
http://thehinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
www.race42008.com
"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson
Guess Texas was #1 even then...LOL
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
name started with the letter Q. Texans did not really lead that many battles per se. There were lots of Texans serving with Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia. We know Hood led Texans though he was not from that state, and he lost a lot. The reality is after Vicksburg fell in 1863, not much west of the Mississippi mattered.
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Molon Labe!
Let's take the military analogy a step further.
McCain is our General. General McCain.
His close advisors (whoever they are) are his General Staff.
We are his armies.
Of course the analogy breaks down quickly, because he can only suggest that we do certain things, he can't order us. So we're more like the Free French underground was with Eisenhower: fighting for him as an incidental matter, but primarily fighting to preserve our way of life and liberty. This puts us in a position to ignore his mistakes while we try to execute a better battle plan.
We have no idea how good is the advice that Gen. McCain is getting from his Staff. It seems to be either very weak advice, or he's ignoring good advice to follow his own instincts.
From those of us hidden over here in the Howe Caverns, he can have some free advice.
When somebody asks you a question, SPEAK UP! I heard you an TV today (maybe a tape of a recent event), and you sounded like Deputy Dawg trying to serve an arrest warrant. If someone has advised you to hold your temper that's OK, but don't lose your backbone doing it. Get mad if it's appropriate--people respect that. At least, LOOK ALIVE! Your age is enough of a handicap without emphasizing it by mumbling quietly when you talk.
TAKE THE INITIATIVE! We all agree on this one. Drill here, drill now, pay less, and START THE PROCESS TOWARDS ENERGY INDEPENDENCE. Introduce something in the Senate "tomorrow" to show you mean it.
In fact, why not introduce several Senate Bills to prove just exactly what you intend to do if elected? Too restrictive for you? That's what they would all say. (This is probably the key reason it's so hard for a Senator to be elected President--he claims to want to do a lot of things he never tried to do while in the Senate.)
STAND UP FOR YOUR SUPPORTERS! You may think you don't need the conservatives, but you do. Without their votes, we might be talking about General Giuliani or Thompson right now. Talk nice about other Republicans. Save the criticism for the Democrats.
DON'T LISTEN TO THE POLITICAL PRESS PUNDITS! They know less than we do. When the public polls conservative, they think the public is stupid, instead of just being right. We may be stupid, but we also recognize it when a candidate hits us between the eyes with the truth. Why do you think that President Truman, who was practically driven out of office, was able to rehabilitate his public image almost immediately? Because the people may have disagreed with him, but they never thought he was deceiving them about his motives or behavior. Understand the issues, then do right by the people.
DON'T FIGHT AN 80% MAJORITY. Get on the right side of the illegal immigration debate after you study it enough to understand it. The right side is the one with the 80% majority.
In the meantime, the Underground will be doing its own thing. Since you've only told us to "Play nice," we're pretty much on our own. If some of us try to help you, don't cut us off at the knees again, OK?
Pluto, the Ninth Planet - Forever!
OK??? not sure if any of that applies to Gettysburg...but you're not far off the mark with much of it as far as I'm concerned.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
I didn't try to make it apply to Gettysburg, just to the military analogy.
That, and the fact that McCain is likely to ignore good advice, or not get it in the first place from his Staff.
If he tries to win with weak tactics, were screwed. If he emphasizes the overall philosophy, the belief in Liberty and human initiative and personal rights, government as a defense and not a support, we shouldn't lose.
I wasn't kidding about the Deputy Dawg voice, though. It has to go.
I thought you handled the analogy to Gettysburg very well. The lessons were there to be learned.
Pluto, the Ninth Planet - Forever!
It is one thing to bring up politics here, but when you bring up the Civil War, you know, or should know, there is going to be controversy. I think you attacked Robert E. Lee about 20 times in that diary and most of your comments were wrong!
Ok, they were not totally wrong, you did have about 80 percent of the basic battle right, but your opinions are just a regurgitation of "The Killer Angels" and the movie "Gettysburg", which were based almost entirely on Longstreet's biased memoirs.
Longstreet was a good general, but he became the most unpopular Confederate general after the war. He made two serious blunders; he became a Republican, and a Catholic! And even worse, he criticized Lee, the patron saint of the South. He became embittered, and this affected his memoirs. Just like Scott McClellan, this stuff did not come out 'til years after it mattered.
Ok, the Longstreet side is one side, one opinion but not the only one out there, just the one that has become popular based on "The Killer Angels". Here are some counter arguments to this meme.
1. Lee did not just win the initial skirmish on day one, his Army routed the Union troops driving them out of Gettysburg, and if Ewell had taken Culp’s Hill, when the Union forces were in chaos, the day would have been a total victory for the South.
2) The Second day, Longstreet dithered and launched the attack some 6 hours later than Lee had ordered. Also, the South almost took Little Round Top and flanked the Union Army. It took heroics on the Northern side and poor coordination to end the day in another stalemate.
3) Although the third day was not a particularly great plan, Pickett's charge was not necessarily foolish. Lee knew his army did not have time on its side, he knew his army had accomplished similar feats before, he knew he almost won each day of battle, and he knew a flanking movement against an enemy in an over watch position would be extremely dangerous.
Ok, that is basically the counter-argument to the often told Longstreet view. The real problems I have with your account are these:
1) It had nothing to do with Lee "waiting" on Stuart, Stuart was negligent and broke the line of communication with Lee's army, even Longstreet agreed with this.
2) You keep saying "most of Lee's general staff agreed with Longstreet"; I do not think this has been proven at all.
3) You said: "I can’t help but wonder how things would have been different were Jackson around because in all of Lee’s major victories, it was Jackson who delivered the master stroke."
I say: This is an absurdity. Jackson was a great General, but he never showed any temperament for command above the Corps level. If anything, it was Lee's ability to lead that allowed Jackson to flourish. And Jackson failed Lee more than once. You mention his refusal to engage once (Seven Days) as a positive? He failed his commander. By the way, Jackson was killed at Chancellorsville, not Fredericksburg.
It seems you think that Lee should have listened to his Generals. You said this several times. I think the problem was exactly the opposite. Lee should have forced his General's to listen to him and follow his orders. Lee was so successful in the first few years of war because of his aggression. On each day he was failed by a lack of aggression by his generals, particularly on the first two days.
Lee was greatly disturbed by the loss of Jackson. In fact, he split his two corps into three and added two new corps commanders prior to the battle, they were Ewell and Hill. Both of these commanders were inferior, and Longstreet was borderline insubordinate (in this one battle). If this battle teaches us anything negative about Lee, it is that he gave his commanders too much discretion. He learned from this and did not make that mistake again.
One last thing, I am not saying Lee did not make many mistakes in the war, he did. Pickett's Charge was a Hail Mary, but I think Lee new that. When you said "I think he wanted to lose", you lost all credibility with me. That was the worst thing you said and showed a total lack of knowledge about R.E. Lee. Lee made a similar charge at Malvern Hill that wasted a lot of men, although that battle was a tactical success for the South.
There was only one man that could have fought that war for the South so well, it was not Jackson, it was not Longstreet, both men had inflated egos, only Lee could have kept that Army together for so long. And lastly, Gettysburg was in no way the end of the war, it actually continued for two more bloody years.
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Molon Labe!
OK...I don't believe Lee wanted to lose...It's always been a question that perplexes me and has always perplexed me...I meant it as a rhetorical flourish not as a true accusation that Lee wanted to lose. I don't think a man who would turn down the post as supreme commander of the Union forces at the beginning of the war because he didn't want to take up arms against Virgina, and the other principles he stood for would purposely lose a battle and consign 10s of thousands of his troops to the grave because he was tired. In that it was a stupid statement and I apologize.
You do miss read me though, I hold Lee in great regard...I don't mean to put Jackson above him either...With the exception of his Shenandoah campaign, it was Lee that put Jackson in the position to deliver the master strokes that he became so famous for, so I wouldn't take that away from him. Actually, I think Jackson shows how inadequate Lee's other Generals were. None of them could be counted on to see the opportunities presented to them and seize the moment as Jackson did time and time again. I must also confess a bias in favor of Jackson because I grew up within 40 miles of Jackson's Mills WV :>)
And thank you for correcting me on Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. I have a tendency to mix them up since I've spent time at both battlefields which are pretty close in proximity. I'll change my post to correct the error. I should have double checked my facts before posting this and admit my laziness in this instance.
You obviously have a better grasp of the personalities involved, and I am well aware that Longstreet was not blameless in the affair. My understanding is that he was less than enthusiastic throughout the battle and his performance and execution of Lee's commands were less than desirable.
I will also admit that my take on the battle is taken in large part from popular opinion as influenced by "The Killer Angels, and I do have quibbles with the portrayal of events from that tome, but space and the overall point I was trying to make precluded going into these arguments in detail and little would be accomplished by including them beyond making this so long so as to be unreadable. Ditto the reason I didn't go into the failure of Ewell to take Culps hill, or the near victory of the attacks on both flanks of the union position on day two.
As for Stuart, I did not say who was responsible for breaking off of contact with Stuart, and I agree he was the reason for the disconnect, not Lee...My point isn't that anyone was to blame...but Lee made his attacks in ignorance because he lacked crucial intelligence due to Stuarts absence and he grossly underestimated the strength of the Union position as a result! Had Lee had the benefit of this intelligence, I don't think he'd have made the attacks on day three.
As I stated, I grew up in West Virginia and lived in Norhten VA for several years and I love the legend of Lee as much as anyone. My purpose in what I wrote here was not meant as an attack on Lee or any of the General's involved with the exception of Lee not listening to his Generals...Longstreet if you will...In that...the fact remains that had Lee disengaged after the first day, Gettysburg would have been a Southern Victory beyond measure, and if Longstreet is right...Moving between Meade and Washington I believe would have had enormous implications for the outcome of the war.
As in all things, Hind site is 20/20 and entire books and even libraries have been written about this one battle. I could hardly do it justice with my less than extensive grasp of the subject matter. Again, my focus was intended to be on narrow points to be applied to the politics of today.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
that hurt me, and you apologized. If you really beleive that, and you say you don't, then even that is fine, we can all have our opinions. I do applaud you for the diary and analogy even if we don't particularly agree on the details. And btw, The Killer Angels is one of my favorite books.
I would actually enjoy continuing this discussion in this thread or another based solely on the history involved. I would never call myself an expert because I bounce too much around history to solely focus on one country or era. I have done quite a bit of study of the Civil War, and I have spent time at the battlefields you mention as well.
I also do not completely throw away Longstreet's opinions, I just wanted to point out that they have gone from heresy to orthodoxy based on a few popular retellings. I don't care much for the "myth of Lee", I just want to talk about the truth. Even if you look at him warts and all, he stands as one of the most admirable men in American history.
I mean this not as a talking down reference, but knowing we all have much to learn, I would recommend Stephen Sears book on Gettysburg and this book by Porter Alexander, the man who commanded the artillery barrage on the third day. This book is held in very high esteem because of its frank opinions and first hand experience. It was written by the General to his family and not supposed to have public distribution.
http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Confederacy-Personal-Recollections-Alexan...
I have not read this book yet in totality, but know its reputation. I have read many books on Lee, Longstreet, Stuart, and Jackson. I do respect Longstreet, but know now that he was no Lee, as a soldier, or a man. Then again, in one way he was ahead of Lee in that he had a greater grasp of the idea of "strategic offense and tactical defense".
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Molon Labe!
Ditto Me on being an expert...I'm a ammeter historian in name only...I've read a lot about the civil war including Shelby Foote's 3 volume library on the political, combat and biographical data the war...If you haven't read it, you should...he's a novelist and brings a novelists approach to writing the history...it's a very good read as well as being a historical account.
As for my comment about Lee...I should have known it would strike a nerve. I do venerate Lee in a big way. As a leader I only but one man above him in anything approaching adoration and that would be Washington. I put Ronaldus Magnus a close third behind Lee...so there it is.
The reason for the comment is more frustration than anything because, standing on that field, and looking at the great distance that those men marched across, I can't get passed trying to get what Lee had in his head...I know it's not that he wanted to lose...I know...but it just seems so obvious to me looking at the field that it was a fools errand. But then, I have the benefit of hind site!
BTW, I know the war lasted 2 more bloody years...Obviously there was no surrender at Gettysburg...But IMHO Gettysburg determined the rest of the war. Lee's offensive capability and killing power obviously wasn't diminished as evidenced by Cold Harbor...but he was never again able to mount a truly offensive campaign from that point and was forced into fighting defensive action after defensive action, (granted that was because of Grant) in a desperate attempt to not lose the war as opposed to winning it.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
Joliphant is more right than wrong in asserting that Sharpsburg (I don't use the Yankee names for battles) was decisive. Britain was on the verge of recognizing the CSA and France would have followed. On that recognition, the cotton trade could have resumed and it is an interesting question as to how the USA would have maintained the blockade against British and French flagged vessels; in '62, they weren't very effective in maintaining the blockade generally. The fact that Lee's thrust into Pennsylvania was stymied in Maryland gave the British pause and then it became a war that would be decided by which nation ran out of will and resources first.
Gettysburg may have been a mistake, but it was NOT an accident. Heth's meeting battle with Buford was an accident, sorta', in that Heth sent infantry in against unknown opposition. That said, the ANV had been opposed frequently by both Pennsylvania militia and US cavalry and had brushed them aside with alacrity. Generally, a front rank ANV infrantry unit had nothing to fear from cavalry and they knew it. A combination of Buford's troops being equipped with repeating rifles and Buford's dogged determination sucked first a whole division and then the better part of the III Corps into the clash. By the time it developed to a Corps level encounter, Lee well knew what he had and chose to let the battle develop then and there. By late morning on the First Day, it was evident that Union infantry was assembling and Lee not only threw in troops in hand but recalled the II Corps from its adventures towards Harrisburg. The First Day was a resounding tactical victory for the ANV but in hindsight a strategic defeat as the AOTP was left in control of the high ground on Cemetery Ridge. Not for the last time, Early was late, and by the time the histories were written Stuart was dead, so he was easy to blame. Though Stuart's failure to communicate was important, it was not decisive; Lee knew that he had the AOTP on his front. He could have backed away or repositioned, but he CHOSE to have the battle on that field.
Most of the conventional canon on the Second Day is simply myth-making coming out of the memoir wars of the '80s, the one time that Early was, indeed, early. The Lost Cause mythologists sought to fix blame for ANV failure on, first; anyone not named Lee, second; anyone not from Virginia, and third; anyone dead and preferably not from Virginia. They were remarkably successful and interestingly the Yankees bought off on the Virginia version since it made them look better as well.
It is simply untrue that Longstreet dithered and acted in a passive-aggressive manner against a plan that he opposed. It is true that he opposed an offensive battle in a campaign that was predicated on what von Clauswitz would later style the "strategic offensive, tactical defensive" form of warfare. He and Lee had agreed on this before the Pennsylvania Campaign began; they would place themselves where the AOTP could not stand for them to be, on the railroad links to Washington, and force the AOTP to meet them on the open field. Nonetheless, when it was apparent that they had met the AOTP on the open field, Longstreet agreed with Lee that the enemy was here, thus the battle must be fought. Lee well knew that he had to fight this battle at this time and on this ground because he also well knew that it was unlikely that he would get another chance. The Lost Cause mythologist sieze on Fremantle's writings to assert that the decisions and dispositions were made in the very early hours of 2 July; they were not. Though taken in vain, Fremantle never mentions the time of the meeting he saw from his perch in the tree, but it could not have been earlier than mid-morning. Yes, Lee and other commanders had been up before the roosters, but that time had been spent reconnoitering and disposing troops which were still assembling. The very earliest the final decisions as to dispostions for the attack could have been made was eight or nine o'clock, probably somewhat later. Longstreet then had to move two-thirds of his division some miles to the ANV right and array them for battle. Though the ANV was justly famous for its energy and speed in the attack, it can also be justly criticized for being painfully slow in assembling those attacks mounted with such alacrity, and not just a Gettysburg. We can remember, Lee's greeting to Jackson, then two days late, at the Seven Days, "General Jackson, so glad you could join us." In any event, the battle was not joined until almost mid-afternoon. the Round Tops were pivotal only in the minds of Chamberlain and Jeff Shaara, though Chamberlain's defense of them was, indeed, heroic. Lee envisioned a blocking attack by the II Corps on his left and an en eschelon attack by the I and III Corps on his right. The object was to hold as much of the AOTP in place on the left as possible and then suck as much of it as possible to the right so as to weaken the center so that either the left-most units of the I Corps or the right-most units of the III Corps could penetrate the AOTP center. And, it came within an eyelash of working late in the evening of 2 July. If you're looking for failure, you need look no further than Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill commanding III Corps, Mj. Gen. R.H. Anderson, and Bg. Gen. William Mahone and his gallant Virginians. The last units to actually attack Cemetery Ridge on 2 July were Wright's Georgians and Wilcox's Mississippians. Wilcox got tangled up in deploying to Wright's left and only some of his brigade came forward interspersed with Wright's Brigade. These units broke the AOTP line on Cemetery Ridge and held it for some minutes as they tried desperately to secure support on their left in the face of an AOTP counterattack. No one can really account for Hill at this fateful time and his most favorable biographer titles the chapter on G'burg, "Bystander to Defeat." It is not clear just what Anderson was doing either though the rumors are legion and Anderson's alcohol problems are well known. It is clear that "Little Billy" Mahone absolutely refused to move his troops even in the face of a direct order from Anderson. Mahone's excuse was that he had been ordered to that place by Anderson personally and he would not accept an order to move from a courier or aide. Had Hill or Anderson actually been commanding their troops and, like the energetic Jackson, had they been applying the flats of their swords to some of their brigadiers, the story of the Second Day would have been written with a different accent.
The pivotal failure of intelligence was within the ANV itself. Lee was not adequately made aware of how weak many of his units actually were after the first two days. We, at least some of us, call it Pickett's Charge, but that's because the Virginians wrote the story. Pickett's troops were actually only a minority of the attacking force on 3 July. Pickett's Division was one of the very few, perhaps the only, fresh division in the ANV, not having been up in time to engage on 2 July. Fresh is good, not having been in combat since Fredericksburg was maybe not so good. The other I and III Corps units, notably Pettigrew's, that joined in the attack on 3 July were significantly under strenght, so much so that most of the left side of the attacking force was in single lines. Consequently, the force Lee threw against Cemetery Ridge as at only one half to two-thirds of its nominal strength, plus there was significant skulking. This was the most experieced combat force in the World at the time; they knew the odds. Shelby Foote (RIP) had a great line when Ken Burns asked him why they would go at all and Foote replied, "because it would have taken more courage not to." Well, somewhere between ten and twenty percent of those troops had the "courage" not to.
The cannon volleyed and thundered but were largely ineffective having fired too high. Lest anyone think I have disparraged the Virginians, give them their due; by dint of personal courage in the face of massed muskets and double-shotted cannister, they took that damned stone wall beneath the copse of trees, but, like Wright's Georgians the night before, there were not nearly enough follow-on troops to make good the sacrifice and after a few minutes, they either died where they lay or tumbled back down the hill.
So, what else do you want to know about Gettysburg?
I don't think there's much to learn from Gettysburg for the modern World beyond the basics about how brave men behave in deadly battle. I really don't think that I could charge wheel-to-wheel cannon because I don't share that predestinarian Faith that most men of that era had; I like better odds. So, the only lessons I take from the WBTS into the modern World are from a much less conventional and far less politically correct commander, Gen. N. B. Forrest; you "hit 'em where they ain't" and "get thar fustest with the mostest." Forrest was the one that Guderian and Patton looked to. Those are dicta that might be helpful to McCain.
For the record, my g/grandfather, among other ancestors, was on that hill the afternoon and evening of 2 July with Wright's and Semmes' brigades. My g/grandfather was with Wright's Brigade and took a .69 ball in his left shoulder in the Yankee counterattack on Cemetery Ridge. He was treated in a field hospital and walked back to Richmond, fighting in the battle at Manassas Gap along the way. He was admitted to Chimborazzo Hospital in Richmond on 16 July, a full two weeks after his wound. He died of his wounds in 1914 - tough guy.
In Vino Veritas
Antietam, (or Sharpsburg if you prefer) was decisive...I don't take anything away from your arguement or Joliphants...there were obviously many factors that determined the ultimate fate of the confederacy including as I've already mentioned, Vicksburg, and Sherman's murderous march to the sea...It's an opinion that Gettysburg was the deciding battle and I contend that it was decisive at least where the Army of Northern Virginia was concerned and I'm backed up by historians that are far more qualified to decide that issue than I am.
The battle was an accident and your time line proves the point...Lee didn't plan to fight there! As you say, and I stated in my Article, it began as advanced units from both sides ran into each other and as you say, Lee let it develop from there...the battle was contrary to Lees stated goal of marching to Scranton.
And how you can argue that Longstreet didn't dither is beyond me...I'm on Longstreet's side of things for the most part as pointed out by Doc, but his failure to launch his attack on Culps hill till 6 hours after he was ordered to commence can hardly be considered being prompt and dutiful in following Lees orders.
As for how much more I'd like to know about Gettysburg...Number one...there's no limit to what I would like to know...If your point is to prove how much you know about the battle good job, you did a fine job and I would encourage you to make this a post of it's own...If your point with that comment is to belittle me with that comment then take a hike. I could write as much and it would like strikingly like your commentary...As I told Doc, I didn't go into all the detail you did because there wouldn't be enough room to cover all the detail and still focus on the overall points I wanted to communicate.
As for whether there is anything we could learn from Gettysburg, I think there is plenty to learn some of which I put in my article. If you don't see it, or disagree with my conclusions...then fair enough...but I don't see how anyone can say there is nothing to be learned from it.
Your family history is cool...I wish I knew as much about my family...there were 16 children from that one generation in my line, with I thin 12 of them being boys...I don't know which side each of them fought on and have always wanted to go find out where my GG Grandfather fought since I'm from WV, (a border state usurped from VA by Lincoln so he could win the 1864 election), so he could have fought for either side...I've just never bothered to look it up.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
of belittleing you, Ace; your knowledge of the conventional textbook canon is comprehensive. It just isn't what the battle was really about. The CW is that it was an accident and it definitively was not; Lee had choices and the choice he made was to join battle with the AOTP at that time and place. G'burg was far from the only encounter that the ANV had with Union troops, it was just the one where Lee chose to throw in his troops and give battle.
The effect of Stuart going missing is gravely overstated in the CW as well. While Lee did not know precisely where the AOTP was, he was well aware that he could steal only so much of a march on them before it was discovered and they would pursue; that was the whole point of the campaign, to get them to come out from their camps around Aquia Creek and give battle. The whole AOTP was not at G'burg, merely some cavalry videttes; the AOTP came at a run to G'burg as did the rest of the ANV. The CW is that Lee accidentally ran into the whole Union Army and it isn't true any more than it is true that Buford ran into a whole division or the whole ANV. Each army gathered at G'burg for the express purpose of fighting it out there.
If it was six hours, and I believe it was considerably less, it was not dithering. Only some of I Corps was even at G'burg until after midnight of 1-2 July, Pickett's division much later, so much so that it was not engaged on 2 July. (I'm working from memory, so I don't have the precise times, but much of it is in the OR.) A whole corps, some thiry thousand men, had to be assembled, marched several miles in the case of the rightmost brigades, and arrayed for battle. The originally recconoitered route of march had come under union fire, so the lead brigades had to backtrack and take another route. It was not the ANV nor Longstreet's finest moment, but it was not the willful dithering of which he was accused by the Lost Cause mythologists.
And I maintain that there really is nothing beyond those things we already know about basic manly virtues to be learned. G'burg was perhaps the most conventional Napoleonic-style battle of the WBTS. Both Army commanders rose to their task and made a plan that could work, both were failed in some instances by their subordinate commanders' inability or unwillingness to carry out their assigned roles. On the whole, I think Lee's plan of an en eschelon attack was the best plan, but he was ill-served by his newly appointed Corps commanders, Hill and Early, neither of which performed their assigned tasks and Hill, especially, was for all intents and purposes MIA - in his defense, he was deathly ill, but he should have gone to Lee and stepped down from his command - or Lee, who had to have known Hill's condition, should have relieved him. Here we get to the "What if Jackson had still been alive?" issue. There is no way the hyper agressive Jackson would have allowed the center and left brigades of Hill's Corps to sit idly by; there would have been swords on brigadiers' backs if necessary to get them to move to cover Wright and Wilcox's left. This was the turning point really, the great chance to break the AOTP line was on the evening of the Second Day. Wright's Georgians and Wilcox's Mississippians did it, but couldn't hold it for lack of support. Wright is one of the very few commanders from the Second who is known to have discussed the days events with Lee and tells that he related his observation that the trick was not getting to the Union center but staying there. Lee's response was that if Wright could take it with a brigade, he would take it and hold it with a division, thus the legendary charge of the Third Day. Unfortunately, and apparently unknown to Lee, only Pickett's division was at anywhere near its nominal strength, and there simply was not enough strength to the attack. And thus ends the last great musket and cannon battle. While the British and French clung to many of the same tactics in WWI, the machine gun made them even more deadly than did the rifled musket and all the advantage went to the defense in conventional tactics. The US and the Germans took lessons from the American Civil War and the infantry that appeared under both US and German flags in the 20th Century looked and acted far more like the ANV of the second half of the war than either the AOTP or the ANV of the early war; far more widely spaced troops, three to five man fire teams in the sharpshooter/skirmish lines tasked to bring the cannon under fire, interspersed artillery, etc.
Anyway, it was all grand and glorious and gallant, truly the last great battle of the smoothbore cannon era, but nothing more in a history making or changing sense. Most WBTS books spend the first three quarters getting to Gettysburg, and simply gloss over the remaining almost two years of war because none of it was grand, glorious, or gallant, it was merely a bloody, brutal slog in which Grant planted a thousand men a mile to get from the Rapidan to the James and then it became just what Lee had predicted before the Pennsylvania Campaign, merely a matter of time.
Again, to the extent that military analogies work at all in politics, I like Forrest and his modern progeny; fast, light, mobile, and possessed of superior weaponry, and utterly ruthless. That's where we so often fail; that ruthless part.
In Vino Veritas
Lee did have choices and his choice was to engage the battle with all his forces and to continue the enguagement to the bitter end. Again hind site is 20/20, but my contention, and Longstreet's at least is that had Lee broken off the engagement after day 1 he could have fought a rear guard action to terrain that was more favorable to him, and forced Meade to attack him from a position of weakness.
I would also argue that Stuarts absence was as crucial here as it was in any other battle Lee fought with or without him because with the exception of Antietam, this was the only battle Lee fought where the Union troops had the home field advantage.
I'm sure, from your knowledge of these things that you've toured the eastern battlefields and one of the things that usually goes unsaid when putting the eastern theater and the battles involved were fought in Lee's back yard. Modern day Alexandria was Lee's plantation and his home from birth and the other Battlfields where the ANV fought were incredibly close to one another.
I'm aware of the strung out nature of Longstreet's division...but 6 hours is a considerable time and had he made the attack as order I believe Culps hill would have been taken even with half his force due to the disarray of the union forces. That's a matter of opinion and the answer can never be know...and as Doc points out...there was plenty of reason for Southerners. particularly those from VA, and Lee's camp to criticize because they wante3d to protect Lee. again, my post is more sympathetic to Longstreet than Doc was happy with...and your not happy that I agreed with Doc that he appeared to dither....I really don't know what else you want me to say here you have a point as does Doc.
As to Jackson's absence, I wholeheartedly agree...I believe he'd have shot Hill on the spot and led the charge himself...but we'll never know for sure!
Finally, my points about the battle aren't directed to how manly soldiers were then compared to now...I know they'd have to shoot me on the spot before I'd charge a battery of artillery with one shot in my rifle and a bayonet to use for an attack if by some miracle I made it to the Cannon! My points are the tactics and the mistake of fighting on a field of the enemies choosing where the enemy has the advantage...There are significant lessons to be learned and we'll just have to agree to disagree on this point.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
is with your premise that there is something to learn politically from the battle; I reject this assertion. First, your argument is premised on an understanding of that battle with which I do not agree and which I do not believe is supported by the facts, albeit the common understanding of the battle. Since I do not believe that the fundamental premise is true, the argument that follows from it cannot be valid.
Lee was as much, perhaps more, politician as general. Whenever he got Yankee or British papers the first thing he looked to was the price of gold and the Pound Sterling v. the US dollar and much of what he did was calculated to influence that relationship. Much of his intent in both Pennsylvania Campaigns was to relieve Northern Virginia from Yankee occupation so that the CSA rather than the USA could harvest the crops in the fall. Both his Pennsylvania Campaigns were successful on this count and the second one that culminated at Gettysburg probably significantly prolonged The War.
We simply live in a different World today. Today, not even clerks or scum-sucking lawyers and politicians would show an adversary the respect and courtesy that general officers of both sides, and particularly Lee, showed their adversaries in the WBTS. The World turned to a new, hard-handed man typified by Sherman and N.B. Forrest. If you're going to fight todays battles, whether political or military, those are the men you look to. Or better yet, look to some of the Muslims and Communists; they know how to make war all Hell.
In Vino Veritas
army fights can affect the battle then we'll just have to agree to disagree Achance...History is full of examples where battles were effected or decided by the battlefield.
Did I buy to much into the conventional wisdom...probably...nothing is ever as simple as the conventiona wisdom paints it to be. As a matter of fact, it's the conventional wisdom that Meade fought this battle from a position of strength and therefor won the battle that lead me to choose the battle to illustrate my political points. I could have selected any number of battles...but this wone provided the best example using the conventional wisdom to demonstrate that by losing on day one, he ultimately one because he was forced to move to the more defensible position.
I can't match you with details because you obviously have a better grasp of those details and I have little interest in arguing them with you. From what you've written here, I'm looking forward to getting my hands on what you plan on writing and am formally requesting that you notify me as soon as it is available but the details are beside the point. It's the terrain and the principle of not fighting the enemy on his terms that are my main points in this. It's a lesson the Republican Party has refused to learn for 70 years now.
I will acknowledge you have a point beyond what I'm saying about the terrain when I went off into what Lee's General's counseled and whether Longstreet dithered but again, I'm relying on conventional wisdom which fits perfectly with the points I made.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
confident much? You views are appreciated and a great addition to the thread, but are not authoritative, and could be a bit less well, self assured.
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Molon Labe!
that they're not. If the moderators don't mind the waste of bandwidth and if I didn't mind the waste of my time, I can source every assertion I made.
I've walked that hill twice, read every readily available book and a lot more that aren't readily available, seached high and low for manuscripts and unpublished research, spent endless hours querying the OR, had my own maps of the 2 July dispositions drawn, etc. to try to establish what really happened on the ANV left late on 2 July. Coddington, whose "Study in Command" is considered magisterial, dismisses Wright's claim of having pierced the Union line as fantasy and even goes so far as to claim that the Union line's extra muskets on 3 July were .69 smoothbores thrown down by Wright's Georgians the evening before. Well, that's nice, but Wright's Georgians had .58 Enfields almost to a man (some men liked the .69 and carried it as a personal choice loaded with buck and ball so it could be used as a shotgun). The .69s were left behind by Penn. and NY troops forced from the field by Wright and Wilcox's troops. More modern scholarship, including my research, validates Wright's claims, though not all of his rather fanciful description of the events, a description that contributed to Anderson having court martialed him after the battle.
Anyway, you can read the whole thing in a year or so when my history of Wright's Brigade gets published. And, well yes, I am self-assured.
In Vino Veritas
many times, and me read books too. I would rather you just not be disrespectful to others, since there are some very bright people on this site, and you never know what knowledge they might have.
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Molon Labe!
But if we had to notate posts according APA rules or any of the other common citation standards redstate really would be a ghost town.
"Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it."
-Thomas Paine: The American Crisis, No. 4, 1777
The post just came off to me as saying "here is what happened, and all these other posts are crap". He was not even replying to me, but that is how I read it at the time. I am long over it, no biggie to any and all involved.
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Molon Labe!
I would like to first welcome you back, aceintx. I am happy they didn't ban you permanently.
As a Civil War and WWII junkie, I enjoyed your article throughly... until I got to the end. I sort of guess where you were going, but my hope died.
Sorry, I'm not recommending this article.
when you have some on your own team decide not to vote on bill because two of the enemy senators aren't there. This type of "courtesy' will keep us in the minority and will cost us this war.
Jindal in 2012!
To the guys pointing out the Antietam thing - OK fine, whatever -- but that is a side issue. Address how Gettysburg is an analogy to the 2008 campaign and something of the larger picture.
Ace, I'm there. But I would disagree with your final point (and strongly). We have to vote for McCain. Obama's presidency will kill us. But it doesn't mean we have to obey McCain when he tries to keep conservatives from fully engaging Macho Bambi on both the merits and that long list of racist, corrupt, and/or anti-American slimebags Bambi seems to always associate with.
We can and shall engage the enemy on our own terms - in spite of what our current 'General' would have us do. While he urinates away his capital on dumb campaigning, we'll make sure Americans know the difference between just-barely-tolerable, and screaming Marxist idiot.
Unfair. Unbalanced. Unmedicated. -- IMAO
That's a decision for each of us to make individually and according to the dictates of his or her conscience...
I'm simply raising the considerations that I am struggling with in my decision. I've committed to voting for McCain, though not enthusiastically but I'm having trouble settling the conflict I am in as to whether I am letting short term considerations, (i.e. that McCain must win to stop the Socilaist/Marxist Democrat) or whether a McCain victory could cause the later destruction of our long term goals (i.e. rolling back 70 years of leftist activism accumulation of Power to the Federal Government which will require a long term war to dismantle)? In short, is 2008 the Republican's version of Pickets charge?
I will do more with my next article chronicling the battle of Guilford Courthouse near Greensboro NC during the Revolutionary war where Conrnwallis won a decisive victory but destroyed his chances at Yorktown by killing his own troops. McCain's recent refusal to meet with Billy Graham being the latest instance of McCain showing his contempt for Evangelicals and the base along with his throwing of Haggee under the bus being an example of shooting your own troops to win a short term victory...and losing the overall war as a result.
As I say...whether or not each of us vote for McCain this November is a matter of conscience for most of us...but the Party and Republican voters as a whole are foolish to make up their minds on this without considering the strategic and tactical effects a McCain victory would bring to the Republican Party, both positive and negative, as well as the strategic and tactical advantages of a McCain victory or defeat.
We see eye to eye on most issues EPU, I can't think of one at the moment that we disagree on...and I don't disagree with your post...it's why I've committed to vote for McCain...but I don't want to ignore the elephant in the tent either and we need to be thinking about what happens next no matter what happens in Novemeber.
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
Unfair. Unbalanced. Unmedicated. -- IMAO
It may be a skirmish, but if we lose this skirmish we might lose the battle and the war. There may be no place to retreat to for the next campaign. We are perilously close to losing the cultural war and having a socialized medicine system. We can't afford to let the Dems get a hold of everything.
McCain's a flawed general, deeply flawed, but he replaces a deeply flawed general. In my opinion, Bush is a lot like McClellan. Gradious plans, troops who were well-drilled and loved him fiercely, but he constantly let them down by not fighting, constantly retreating. Bush had visions of reforming social security, but waved the white flag beform the skirmishing ever started. Harriet Miers was a retreat on a par with McClellan's in the Penninsula campaign. He had a detached attitude toward Democratic lies about the Iraq war on a par with McClellan's detached, aloof battle management at Antietam. Yet like McClellan, there is still some mysterious affection for Bush that, it seems to me, exceeds any justification based on his political leadership.
But Lincoln didn't give up, he fired the general and went through several more before he found Grant. We'll have to make due with the flawed McCain, if we are so fortunate as to get stuck with him, and hope to fight him when he's wrong and support him when he's right, which will certainly be a lot more frequently than when Obama is right. Then we'll need to find someone to replace him. Hopefully we won't have to go through as many generals as Lincoln did before he found Grant.
I am not singling you out, I have heard a lot of that end of the world, apocalypse now, war metaphor.
Look, you ought not to live in fear.
you ought not to let the political situation effect your life that much.
The nation will not end because of the democrats
They will not end capitalism and institute a new Comintern.
They will not begin serving babies in the congressional cafe.
Who knows they might actually do a few things better than the Republicans have in recent years, after all that would not be hard to do.
I am not saying it would be great, but it's not the end of the world.
"Nothing works like freedom, Nothing succeeds like liberty"
Kyle
the thing that's so perplexing to me about McCain is his ability to make me do constant backflips from one day to the next as to whether I can vote for him or not.
Loving GWB is not on my agewnda either btw...I'm bitterly disappointed in his second term in particular in that we gave him an opportunity that no other Republican President had had in 70 years by giving him control of both hoses of the Congress and he did NOTHING with it! As a result we've got a choice between bad or worse come november and the Party is in pieces!
I could punch the wall when I think about how he let us all down! It makes me sick!
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
I've had similar feelings.
I could punch the wall when I think about how he let us all down! It makes me sick!
Then I relax a bit and ask myself just how much can one man do. The GWOT took a lot of energy and attention--still does. I don't know if it's reasonable to expect him to have excelled in everything else that we wanted. Yet, isn't that what the Cabinet Secretaries are for? Where (and who) was the Secretary of Energy when we had the majorities in both houses of Congress and a chance to open up ANWR.
I have one name in mind that might have handled it all better, but who really knows. GWB had the tenacity we needed at the time, and I'm grateful for it.
I don't expect an improvement with McCain, unless he turns out to be a superb delegator.
Pluto, the Ninth Planet - Forever!
There is the GWOT...but even that could have been handled better. Why he stuck with Rummy so long and replaced him only after we lost the midterms is perplexing...oh...it is what it is...maybe next time....or the time after that...or the time after that...sigh
"A political party cannot be all things to all men."--Ronald Wilson Reagan
Gettysburg was important but Antietam was the decisive battle.
It also demonstrates that wars aren't just fought on the battlefields. If Lincoln did not gain a major victory he would have been unable to issue the emancipation proclamation. Without the emancipation proclamation the British would have gone on playing the north against the south and fueling the southern armies with the cotton trade. By making the issue slavery Lincoln cut off the south from their allies/trading partners.
"Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it."
-Thomas Paine: The American Crisis, No. 4, 1777