Iraq Strategy: A Sensible Use of Benchmarks
By BrooksRob Posted in Foreign Affairs — Comments (4) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
It's frustrating and sad to see the partisan, bi-polar debate regarding our continued involvement in Iraq. Almost all agree, on both sides of the aisle, that the possibility of avoiding an ultimate, full-scale civil war and its potentially catastrophic consequences rests on the Iraqi government making progress toward key political and military/security benchmarks conducive to reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis.
These benchmarks include an oil revenue-sharing deal, substantial reversal of de-Baathification, new elections and constitutional reform to give Sunnis an opportunity gain proportionate political representation and secure minority rights, establishing effective, non-sectarian militiary and security forces, and some reasonable degree of amnesty for insurgents who have not targeted non-combatants. Without making substantial progress toward achieving these benchmarks, full-scale civil war is only being delayed, not prevented. Yet the Iraqi government (which is to say Shiite leaders -- politicians, along with the veto-wielding religious leader Sistani) has made little progress toward such benchmarks.
Many/most Democrats' desired policy and message to Iraqi leaders: We're leaving whether or not you meet key benchmarks. This sends the message to our "friends" there that they can't count on us, so they better focus on winning the civil war. Shiite leaders will align themselves more strongly with (and feel more dependent on) violently sectarian and anti-American Shiite militas like the Mahdi Army, and Sunni communities will be less inclined to reject the Sunni insurgents or even al Qaeda (since “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”). And this policy sends the message to our enemies that they can wait us out, and encourages them to maximize deaths among American soldiers to drive politics toward ensuring or hastening implementation of a withdrawal.
Many/most Republicans' desired policy and message to Iraqi leaders: We're staying in full force whether or not you meet key benchmarks. This sends the message to Shiite leaders that they don't have to make any progress on anything (politically or militarily) and that they can continue using us to fight the Sunnis indefinitely.
My suggested policy and message: We're staying as long as you start & continue meeting key benchmarks, but we're substantially reducing our objectives and role if you don't. In particular, we're not going to continue policing your sectarian fight in Baghdad if you refuse to try to get your act together. We won't even go after the Baathist insurgents in Anbar. We'll limit our mission to disrupting al Qaeda operations and deterring a regional war. If, on the other hand, the government starts and continues to meet these key benchmarks and therefore shows promise of producing a much better outcome than if we leave or substantially reduce our role, why would we still abandon them if our continued support is necessary to achieve that outcome, considering the stakes involved (potential genocide, regional war, instability of "moderate" arab states, increased Iranian power, bases for al Qaeda, much higher oil prices, loss of our credibility around the world, etc.)?
As a note (separate from the above point), I also favor moving toward greater regional autonomy ("soft partition" federalism as proposed by Democrat Joe Biden and Les Gelb, also advocated by Republican Sam Brownback), but if somehow they can meet key benchmarks without it, that may suffice to justify our continued full support. The Biden/Gelb soft partition idea (a weak central government, autonomous ethnic regions with their own security forces, and shared oil revenues), while it would not be easy to implement (particularly in ethincally-mixed Baghdad) and while ethnic separation conflicts with our ideals, makes intuitive sense to me, at least as a Plan B if reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis continues to look unlikely (and it already looks like the odds are against it being successfully negotiated, let alone implemented and maintained). Facilitating the separation of Sunnis and Shiites in a relatively orderly way and allowing Sunnis their own security forces to police and defend the Sunni population is better than letting the militants on each side escalate the slaughter of members of the other, including non-combatants who seem to be the majority of the victims of bombings and death squads.
For those who disagree with my preferred policy -- preferring either the current Democratic approach (pulling out regardless of whether or not the Iraqis achieve benchmarks) or the Bush approach (continuing full support without making it contingent upon achievement of benchmarks) -- I would pose the following questions.
(1) My understanding from closely following this issue is that the consensus among analysts across the political spectrum is that, if we left prior to the Iraqis achieving key benchmarks (political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis and building an effective, non-sectarian military and security forces), their is a strong likelihood of full-scale civil war and, in turn, at least a significant risk of catastrophic consequences including genocide (on a scale that would dwarf the sectarian killing today), a stronger Iran, a stronger al Qaeda (although it can be argued that staying in Iraq is a more effective recruiting tool for al Qaeda, they would benefit from more secure bases in Iraq and my person opinion is that success in "driving the infidel out of Iraq" would be an even greater recruiting tool worldwide than if we stay), general loss of credibility that we need to address other threats (e.g., North Korea, Iran), regional war that could destabilize "moderate" arab regimes, most notable Saudi Arabia, which have large radical Islamist segments of their populations, and a huge increase in oil prices. Do you agree that such is the consensus and do you agree that leaving soon carries those grave risks?
(2) If we stay, do we have some reasonable chance of preventing or at least substantially mitigating the risk or magnitute of the catastrophic consequences listed above? If not, why stay? If "yes", don't we have a moral obligation to stay, either with the current strategy or with some better strategy that would have this effect?
(3) The other assumption on which I believe there is consensus among analysts across the political spectrum (and which I agree with) is that, if these political and military/security benchmarks are NOT met, then full-scale civil war at some point is highly likely.
(4) Which policy is most conducive to the Iraqis meeting those key benchmarks, (a) setting a timeline under which we will leave regardless of whether or not they achive the benchmarks, (b) committing to continued full support WITHOUT making it contingent upon their meeting benchmarks (or at least making a good faith effort), or (c) committing to continued full support as long as we are needed to avoid catastrophe, but contingent upon the Iraqis achieving those benchmarks (or at least making a good faith effort)?
(5) Is there a different strategy, aside from the question of benchmarks, that would be more effective? I happen to think that the Biden/Gelb proposal of a federalist system with great regional autonomy makes sense. It is imperfect: it would face real implementation challenges, particularly in ethnically mixed Baghdad, and ethnic separation runs contrary to our ideals, but if -- IF -- it comes down to a choice between violent ethnic cleansing and relatively orderly separation, the latter seems better to me. So at the very least I think such a policy should be a Plan B if we get to the brink of full-scale civil war. (Of course, I prefer it be done prior to that point.)
(6) If our continued full support is made contingent upon the Iraqis meeting benchmarks, or at least showing a good faith effort, there is the danger that the specific benchmarks that are set (the achievements and their associated deadlines) will be too aggressive to be realistic and/or fair (given our limited foresight, limited insight and the fluidity of the conflict), but does that mean that we should dispense with the idea of contingency on benchmarks altogether or is it possible that we could set benchmarks wisely enough that the benefits of such contingency (assuming you agree with me that such contingency would make benchmark achievement more likely) would outweigh the risk? A related question is: Do you believe that the Shiite leaders – the political leaders in the Green Zone and the veto-wielding Sistani – intend to make a good faith effort to achieve these benchmarks and achieving reconciliation with the Sunnis, or are they just using us to fight (primarily) the Sunnis for as long as we’re willing to do so until an inevitable full-scale civil war?
Obviously I accidentally posted this comment here (while trying to post a new blog entry. Please disregard this comment here and comment on the Iraq post if you wish. I look forward to your comments.
BrooksRob, the problem is that there too many groups that have no interest in a politically stable and unified Iraq and will continue to work to undermine efforts towards these ends. Specifically, I have a nation you mentioned, Iran, and another Saudi Arabia. It doesn't seem that the Iranians want a disintegrated Iraq because of the possible negative consequences for Iran, namely the destabilizing flow of refugees etc. But at the same time it seems that a weak but not disintegrated Iraq works to the benefit and calculations of Iran.
A weak, divided Iraq will serve as a vassal state that the Iranians can use as a proxy weapon against the U.S. Most particularly they can use it as a base to train jihadist terrorists against the U.S. and other regional enemies. What's more, recent media reports indicate that the majority-Sunni Saudis appear to have been trying to undermine the government of Shiite Prime Minister Maliki.
It may ultimately prove impossible or suboptimal to have a unified Iraq as envisioned under our current strategy, which is why I lean toward a federalist "soft partition" as I explained, at least as a Plan B (and we are quite possibly at that point of needing to move to Plan B).
Yes, Iran will meddle and seek (successfully) to expand their influence no matter what strategy we pursue. And the Saudis will be concerned about their fellow Sunnis. But I don't see how anything you've said is a counterargument to my suggested policy re: making our support contingent upon progress toward reconciliation or to the idea of soft partition (which are seperate ideas, not dependent on one another). If you are presenting a counterargument, I'll need you to elaborate for me to understand your objections.
The President, all the presidential candidates of both parties, and just about every Senator and Congressman are aware of two realities: (1) Our nation is heading for a fiscal train wreck over the next couple of decades due to our current debt-to-GDP ratio and the predictable explosion in the entitlement-eligible segment of our population (per current eligibility rules) relative to the segment of workers who face the burden of supporting them, and (2) No politician will propose a serious solution to avert this disaster unless there is an abundance of political cover.
The reason they will not act responsibly is not just because they are irresponsible, but also because they are rational and they know that voters are irresponsible. They know that any serious solution will require real, unpopular sacrifices in terms of substantially higher taxes and/or substantially lower Medicare and Social Security benefits (e.g,, drug coverage, something Congress recently expanded) and/or eligibility restrictions (raising the retirement age by several years; means testing that would reduce benefits of many in the middle class, etc.).
Congressmen can talk all day about "eliminating waste" like the infamous "bridge to nowhere", but eliminating such wasteful discretionary spending projects, even if achieved, would barely put a dent in the problem. They can talk about simply "growing our way out of the problem" but that would require growth rates well beyond what economists consider realistic, and the growth argument is often used as a justification for enacting tax cuts or opposing tax increases (such as allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire), despite the fact that even supply-side economists (including the President's Council of Economic Advisors, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Bruce Bartlett, Gregory Mankiw, Bernanke, Greenspan, CBO, and others) agree that, given current tax rates, lower taxes result in much lower revenue than would otherwise be recieved. So they either offer unrealistic painless solutions or they acknowledge in the abstract that we need to "fix" or "reform" or "save" Social Security and Medicare without coming close to concrete, but politically-toxic, proposals. And the result is a perversion of Darwinism: survival of the least responsible.
As painful as the solutions will be, all agree that the pain will be less if we act sooner than if we act later, so we must provide the necessary political cover immediately. Congress must establish a non-partisan study group (a commission) to develop several alternative plans with various trade-offs among sacrifices in spending and taxation to achieve prudent ratios of debt-to-GDP and unfunded liabilities-to-GDP, using dynamic scoring with conservative assumptions. Then the political fight can proceed over which sacrifices should be made, politicians will be compelled to choose among alternative fiscally-responsible plans rather than skirt the issue, and an informed public can vote accordingly, based on each voter's priorities among overal taxation, progressiveness of tax rates, investment vs. labor income tax rates, overall spending, budget allocations, etc..
This study group should be chaired by a figure who is highly respected by both parties and the public, such as Alan Greenspan, and members of both parties should lend strong, public support to this group in advance of its presentation of alternative plans.