Iraq: Probably Time for Soft Partition

By BrooksRob Posted in Comments (133) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

Months ago I mentioned my belief that “soft partition” is probably the best strategy in Iraq, and should at least be our “Plan B” if the Iraqis weren’t showing progress on national political reconciliation and security. While the surge has produced improvements in security, at least in some areas and by some measures, and probably overall (on balance), and has gained cooperation by some tribes on a local level in the fight against AQI, there has been no real progress toward national political reconciliation, nor even evidence of a good faith effort by the key players, most notably the Shiite leaders at the top, in the pariliament, and apparently veto-weilding Sistani (the latter at least as of last spring when he, in effect, vetoed a new de-Baathification proposal). And as Petraeus and others have said, without national political reconciliation, there will be no “sustainable security”. And as the latest National Intelligence Estimate states, even the local progress only has the possibility of leading to national reconciliation (i.e., “bottom up”) if it has acceptance and support from the national government.

It’s looking increasingly like time to pursue that Plan B.

To elaborate, please let me take the liberty of copying and pasting a paragraph from my post of several months back http://www.redstate.com/blogs/brooksrob/2007/apr/29/iraq%5fstrategy%5fa%...

I ... favor moving toward greater regional autonomy ("soft partition" federalism as proposed by Democrat Joe Biden and Les Gelb, also advocated by Republican Sam Brownback), but if somehow they can meet key benchmarks without it, that may suffice to justify our continued full support. The Biden/Gelb soft partition idea (a weak central government, autonomous ethnic regions with their own security forces, and shared oil revenues), while it would not be easy to implement (particularly in ethincally-mixed Baghdad) and while ethnic separation conflicts with our ideals, makes intuitive sense to me, at least as a Plan B if reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis continues to look unlikely (and it already looks like the odds are against it being successfully negotiated, let alone implemented and maintained). Facilitating the separation of Sunnis and Shiites in a relatively orderly way and allowing Sunnis their own security forces to police and defend the Sunni population is better than letting the militants on each side escalate the slaughter of members of the other, including non-combatants who seem to be the majority of the victims of bombings and death squads.

Tom Friedman of the New York Times has a column today advocating this approach. And please, no knee-jerk rejection of Friedman simply because he’s with the NYT. Remember, he supported going to war in Iraq, and with the neoconservative rationale that spreading democracy and liberty in the arab world was the key to the GWOT.

Traveling around the central Baghdad area the past few days, I saw little that really gave me hope that the different Iraqi sects can forge a social contract to live together. The only sliver of optimism I find here is in the one region where Iraqis don’t live together: Kurdistan.

Friedman then details all of Kurdistan’s economic progress, press liberty (imperfect but “vibrant”), tolerance, stability and security, goodwill toward America, and the fact that not a single American soldier has ever been killed there. And while Kurdistan is “not a democracy” (de facto), “it is democratizing, gradually nurturing the civil society and middle class needed for a real democracy.”

He continues:
Iraq is a disaster in so many ways, but at least America’s invasion midwifed something really impressive in Kurdistan. And in the best way: we created the opening and the Kurds did the rest. But while the Kurds liberated their region from Saddam’s army in the 1990s — with U.S. air cover — their current renaissance was only possible, they say, thanks to the overthrow of Saddam, their mortal enemy.

“Saddam’s eyes were always on this region,” said Nechirvan Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan regional government. Once he was toppled, “it gave us psychological hope for the future. Those who had even a limited amount of money started to invest, start small businesses or buy a car, because they thought they could see the future. The uncertainty was removed. ... We have to thank the American people and government. But we are a lover from only one side. We love America, but nothing in response. They don’t want to give the perception that they are helping us.”

Added Hoshyar Omar, a 23-year-old student-translator: “My father was buried alive (by Saddam’s men) when I was 3. I want to thank Mr. George Bush personally. ... He may have made some bad decisions, but freeing Iraq was the best decision he has ever made. ... We had nothing and we built this Kurdistan that you see.”

He concludes:
The Kurdish autonomous zone should be our model for Iraq. Does George Bush or Condi Rice have a better idea? Do they have any idea? Right now, we’re surging aimlessly. Iraq’s only hope is radical federalism — with Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds each running their own affairs, and Baghdad serving as an A.T.M., dispensing cash for all three. Let’s get that on the table — now.

The “ATM” must be referring mainly or solely to the sharing of oil revenue.

Months after Saddam’s capture, a story made the rounds that he was asked, “If you were set free, could you stabilize Iraq again?” He supposedly said it would take him only “one hour and 10 minutes — one hour to go home and shower and 10 minutes to reunify Iraq.” Maybe an iron-fisted dictator could do that. America can’t.

“No one here accepts to be ruled ever again by the other,” Kosrat Ali, Kurdistan’s vice president, told me. “If you get all the American forces to occupy all of the towns and the cities of Iraq, you might be able to centralize Iraq again. That is the only way.” Otherwise, “centralized rule is finished in Iraq.”

For anyone interested, I came to favor “soft partition” after reading several contributions in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs by various “experts”, each proposing a different strategy, and subsequently commenting on the others’ proposed strategies. Even though it’s a year old, I highly recommend this reading if you have the time http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faresponse85412/larry-diamond-jame...

...we need to get out now, change plans, let the Iraqi's take care of it, anything but win. We can't have that. It would be unacceptable. (heavy snark - but with a silly smile)

Wubbies World, MSgt, USAF (Retired):
public static void main(String[] args) {
System.out.println("An argument is a sequence of statements aimed at demonstrating the truth of an assertion.); }

we need to get out now, change plans, let the Iraqi's take care of it, anything but win. We can't have that. It would be unacceptable.

Yeah, all that would be unacceptable. What that has to do with what I said in my post I have NO idea.

Odd, isn't it? by Socrates

Just when it appears that civil war has been averted, Realists wants to start a new one.

I might be able to agree with you, Brooksrob, if you did anything to make the case that A) the surge has run its course, providing its full benefit and B) it had insufficient impact to avoid partition and C) partition, soft or otherwise, was our call to make in the first place.

Because in C, if you assume that it is our place to impose a partition, soft or otherwise on the sovereign nation of Iraq, then Iraq is not sovereign.

If we impose a partition, soft or otherwise, will that require no American presence thereafter?

--
Gone 2500 years, still not PC.

As for the surge, (A and B) first of all we will have to start drawing down around April 2008 simply due to manpower and other resource constraints. Second, the objective of the surge was to provide security to provide an opportunity for national political reconciliation, but there seems to be little real interest (or, to be charitable, little capability) on the part of the Iraqi leaders, particularly the Shiites, in such reconciliation, nor interest by the Sunnis on unreasonable tersm, within the framework of an intended strong central government. So the clock is ticking. We can't sustain current troop levels indefinitely (nor would we want to, given other security threats in the world and the finite resources of our military), and as Petraeus said, sustainable security is impossible without national political reconciliation. We've got to find a solution because we can't keep a lid on this boiling pot forever (to borrow Colin Powell's metaphor for the situation and our efforts in Iraq). So (C) it's probably time to pressure the Iraqi leaders to accept soft partition as I've described. Not to "impose" it per se; Iraq is indeed a sovereign country (although that has apparently turned into a talking point that some drop without really thinking about it), but it is a country that is largely dependent upon on us and a country for which we are sacrificing greatly, which enables us and entitles us to use our leverage to get a bunch of guys who are being unreasonable to start being reasonable so the lives of our troops and our hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars are not ultimately all wasted.

If we impose a partition, soft or otherwise, will that require no American presence thereafter?

This seems to be a rhetorical question, but as is often the case (unfortunately), it would have been better asked as a real question, because it wouldn't come across as presumptuous -- putting words in someone's mouth. Who said anything about requiring no American presence? Who? Certainly not me.

since last April. NOW is the time to push to victory.

Mike Gamecock DeVine @ The Charlotte Observer
www.race42008.com
www.hinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
"One man with courage makes a majority" - Andrew Jackson

I desire success there as much as you do. We are talking about strategy here -- which strategy is most likely to lead to achievement of our goals, given the situation, the dynamics and trends, strengths/weaknesses and opportunities/threats, etc. What I'm proposing is a change in strategy, not a diminishing of desire or commitment to achieving our goals.

I think you have an exaggerated sense of how much the surge has accomplished relative to what is needed -- militarily AND POLITICALLY (and again, the "big picture" objective of the surge was to create more opportunity for national political reconciliation) -- to establish sustainable security and stability and achieve our goals (disrupting AQI operations, preventing regional war, mitigating Iranian influence, preventing genocide, preventing instability in "moderate" Arab nations, perhaps a liberal democracy that can inspire such reform elsewhere in the Arab world plus Iran, etc.). I'm NOT belittling the achievements of the surge, so don't get me wrong on that (and please, no one trot out some "that's what the left says" talking point). I'm just saying that relative to what is needed, we are still far from the achievement of the military and PARTICULARLY THE POLITICAL progress necessary. And as I said, we will have no choice but to scale back our troop presence starting in April due to manpower and resource constraints. We will still be able to maintain a substantial presence, but it won't be as strong as it is today, even if the political will here at home is sustained (another uncertainty we need to consider, by the way, as we consider timeframe and choose policy). I would like to see us continue the Petraeus military/counterinsurgency strategy (including the co-opting of local tribes), and what I'm sugesting doesn't preclude a continuance of that strategy, and indeed could fit well with it.

...and a country for which we are sacrificing greatly

No.

The military is sacrificing much, the families who have lost or received back an incapacitated soldier have sacrificed greatly.

America has sacrificed almost nothing.

The Marine slogan written on that wall somewhere in Iraq said it well "The Marines are at war, America is at the Mall"

More recently I read, "America is not at war, the military is".

America is not at war, but a great number of them at least appreciate the sacrifices being made by those in the service, thank the Lord.

By my count, we are about 6 years into actually fighting back in this 50-100 year conflict. Pulling out of Iraq before they are stable and self determining, soft partitioning or any other externally imposed (or highly 'recommended') political escape solution is a virtual guarantee in my book that America will eventually be "at war".

Here's a great link for some who want to get a futurist's view of things. Yes, it's fiction, but well written and short enough for folks with short attention spans.

It's a nice link by Whitfox

The problem is that what we're doing in Iraq has little or no relation to it. Creating a strong Muslim-dominated government isn't terribly helpful, regardless of whether it's a democracy.

The idea that we're investing too much doesn't come about because this is such a major war for us. It comes because the expected gains are so small. When did nation-building become a worthwhile use of the military?

Good Story, Yes. by wennejunk

I like to read it now and then to put into perspective what's at stake. It's just fiction, from a guy who makes a living writing about what the future could be like and should be taken mostly as just that.

What he does highlight, and I agree, is that we are not committed enough (he used the word 'ruthless') to the task at hand and that the long term effects of failing to press forward are not acceptable. That was the intended reason for the link.

The military is a tool of U.S foreign policy and it will be used as the leadership sees fit. It has historically been used effectively for both nation crumbling and Nation building. As a veteran of the first trip over and someone whose son deploys in Sept, I have no problem with its use either way.

I agree with you that creating a strong Muslim-dominated government is not in our best interests - if that government is another Caliphate-oriented, 12th Imam seeking government, such as the Taliban or Iran. Otherwise, it is absolutely in our interests.

That is, if it is possible to create another moderate Muslim government in Iraq.

In fact you only get two real choices: Muslim extremist or Muslim moderate. The third choice is not tenable at present: civil war and hard partitioning into Shia, Sunni and Kurdish blocks all fighting over oil and land in a proxy war.

I disagree that the expected gains are small. I see a stable, prospering, peaceful Iraq as a lever to compel internal change in Iran, Syria and even Saudi Arabia. Poor, disenfranchised people gain strength and hope from the success of others like them. That would be a huge - and in the end, relatively inexpensive - payoff for the investment of treasure and lives we (and the Iraqis) - have made.

I totally agree with you that the sacrifice we civilians (without family serving in Iraq) are making, while not small (just to give some very rough idea of scale, if the total costs end up being $1trillion and we assume 200 million taxpayers, that's $5,000 per taxpayer on average) are nothing compared to the sacrifices of the troops and military families. So my use of "we" was, of course, quite broad, and I didn't mean to imply equitable sacrifices. In fact, seeing stays extended, stop-losses implemented, and other disproportionate sacrifices borne by our troops and their families, I have begun to think seriously about if a draft is appropriate, or at the very least would be willing to pay more taxes to enable the military to recruit more to relieve some of the burden on those already serving.

By my count, we are about 6 years into actually fighting back in this 50-100 year conflict. Pulling out of Iraq before they are stable and self determining, soft partitioning or any other externally imposed (or highly 'recommended') political escape solution is a virtual guarantee in my book that America will eventually be "at war".

First, in case it's somehow lost on anyone, I'm NOT suggesting we pull out, and I never have. I've never even suggested that we have less than a major presence and major role there. Second, if you mean that we should just plan on keeping our current level of military presence there for the next 50-100 years, well, I think you should consider the following. (1) We can't afford it, given our current debt-to-GDP ratio combined with demographics and unfunded entitlement liabilities, unless we are prepared to accept a very substantial reduction in the standard of living of many tens or hundreds of millions of Americans. (2) Given the previous point, which means that we will have finite resources for Defense / national security / homeland security, we have to consider the fact that Iraq is not now, nor will it be in the future, our only security threat, and continuing to devote our current level of military, intelligence and other resources to Iraq over the next 50-100 years would mean far insufficient attention to other threats and far less security for us than we'd have if we were able to allocate more of those finite resources to those other threats.

You see any political solution that the Iraqis are pressured to accept as inherently more unstable and prone to eventual conflict requiring our full involvement than any resolution reached organically by the Iraqis themselves. Well, other things equal, I would agree. But other things are not equal. We have a situation in which those in power have shown little real intereste in pursuing national political reconciliation, the necessary ingredient for sustainable security and stability (not just in my view, but explicitly expressed by Petraeus a few weeks ago). So if we aim to achieve our goals without continuing to fight with 130,000 or so troops there for 50-100 years, which, even if it were sustainable politically here would either destroy our economy or force us to neglect other major security threats, we don't have the luxury of choosing some ideal resolution. That choice isn't available. We have to choose the best option from among imperfect ones, each with drawbacks and risks. And I've given my reasons for thinking that soft-partition is probably the best of those options at this point.

I refer to 50 - 100 years starting from 1979, when the embassy was invaded and hostages taken in Iran. We are only now fighting back in a real war that has been going on for a long time and will likely continue for decades.

You precisely make my point on the Nation (not) at war.

You mention the expenditure of resources and the unwillingness of Politicians/people to look at/accept cuts in entitlements and a decreased standard of living. Until the Nation is actually at war and people have to make sacrifices...then what we are doing is perhaps the best we can do. I would rather slowly bleed in Iraq and keep the enemy fixed in the M.E. than suffer another cataclysmic attack back here.

But we can go back on forth on this for ages. Let me ask you:

1. You hold that a partition is better than our current course of action. I believe that is merely an exit strategy and will quickly devolve into a de-facto civil war between Shia,Sunni and Kurd. Is this better for the US or do you believe the partition will hold and peace will break out?

2. I believe that we are in a long term struggle against those in Islam who believe their faith commands aggression against and defeat of non-Islamic peoples. I believe that this conflict will continue until either A) The west gives up and the Caliphate is established or B) The pain, suffering and loss experienced by those in Islamic countries outweighs the fear they have of their radical religious leaders and they take matters into their own hands.

Do you believe the same? If not, what do you believe in this area and how do you see the US (and the West) preserving our way of life and freedoms?

1. You hold that a partition is better than our current course of action. I believe that is merely an exit strategy and will quickly devolve into a de-facto civil war between Shia,Sunni and Kurd. Is this better for the US or do you believe the partition will hold and peace will break out?

I believe the SOFT-partition (you keep saying "partition") is probably more conducive to achieving the goals I've mentioned and doing so sooner than without soft-partition (see my reply to Socrates below, combined with my post and other comments, for elaboration/rationale). As for "exit strategy", while I think any policy change that is more likely to lead to achievement of our goals and to do so sooner is obviously wise in its own right as a matter of policy (i.e., even if there were no threat of losing support for the war at home), the fact that there IS the threat of losing support for the war at home makes it all the more imperative that we not simply assume we can just maintaing a very large force there and wait for however long it takes the Iraqis to come around to reconciliation or to just keep a lid on sectarian tensions for many decades with such a large force.

2. I believe that we are in a long term struggle against those in Islam who believe their faith commands aggression against and defeat of non-Islamic peoples. I believe that this conflict will continue until either A) The west gives up and the Caliphate is established or B) The pain, suffering and loss experienced by those in Islamic countries outweighs the fear they have of their radical religious leaders and they take matters into their own hands. Do you believe the same? If not, what do you believe in this area and how do you see the US (and the West) preserving our way of life and freedoms?

I think (based on the 9/11 report and numerous other sources I consider credible) that the goal of al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists is to establish a caliphate througout the Muslim world (plus Israel) and to kick all infidels out of these lands (or kill them to remove them from these lands), and attacking us, our allies, existing governments in the Muslim world, and anyone else who stands in the way are the means to that end. Now, you seem to think that they view killing infidels as an end in itself. I'm aware that some intelligent, informed people believe that, too. But I think the weight of expert opinion is on the belief I've described. In any case, even if we disagree on that point, the policy implications of our difference (for Iraq and elsewhere) are not substantial, because I think we both agree that these people are evil, they seek to do great harm to us and others who don't deserve it, we cannot give in an inch to these people, and we must pursue them aggressively and wipe them out (as well as doing what we can on defense via "homeland security"). Which is a long way of saying, why is this question relevant?

Is it the same? I thought his calls for withdrawal.

If we leave Iran there to operate freely they will end up with nukes. Israel and Iran going at it? That prospect makes keeping troops there for 50 years look like a better option.

I don't look at the 911 report the same as you. The wording of the report was negotiated in many cases. Hamilton and Baker don't even agree on what some of it means. Not worth a plug nickle IMHO.

As I've said repeatedly, I'M not by any means calling for withdrawal. If someone else is advocating pursuing partition and also withdrawal it doesn't mean there is some inextricable or even natural connection.

Two points regarding the 9/11 Commission report: First, you have it confused with the Iraq Study Group report. Second, it was not my only source.

As for the Iraq Study Group report, you are correct that Baker and Hamilton disagree on a critical aspect of it, both of which relate to what, at best, detracts significantly from its value. That report lays out a timeline for withdrawal, which is stupid for a whole host of reasons. The disagreement is that Hamilton says the timeline was intended as firm timing regardless of conditions existing at those dates (super-stupid) while Baker says the timeline represents goals and that conditions would be considered (less stupid, but still stupid).

Your right by Cowboy

I do have the two confused. I'd still like to know the differences between your plan and Biden's. I know yours but I'm not clear on Biden's.

Biden's plan calls for by BrooksRob

Biden's plan calls for withdrawing most of our troops by the summer of 2008. I think doing that would be stupid, and announcing it ahead of time would be stupid squared.

Mike Gamecock DeVine @ The Charlotte Observer
www.race42008.com
www.hinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
"One man with courage makes a majority" - Andrew Jackson

I would say at most it's WAYYY too early, but not WAYYYY too early. That's just one "Y" too many, IMHO.

Seriously, I'm not saying it's an easy call or that I'm sure I'm right (hence my use of "probably"), but that's how I see it. I don't think it's unreasonable for anyone to disagree.

Mike Gamecock DeVine @ The Charlotte Observer
www.race42008.com
www.hinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
"One man with courage makes a majority" - Andrew Jackson

no reason to confuse by Doc Holliday

ISG and 9/11 commission, both were flawed, both were politicaly motivated, and both are not in the Constitution.

Molon Labe!

Presumptous? by Socrates

While I'm perfectly capable of presumption (and indeed, taking the pseudonym I did required armloads of it), your logic is flawed.

First, you have settled on the idea of partition, and keep saying it's "probably time" for it without saying why. It isn't enough to say that President Bush's policy is wrong-headed, and to explain why you thing that to be so. Even if the current strategy in Iraq is wrong, you have to say why partition would be better.

But as for the American presence in Iraq after partition, it is you who have labeled my question to be "rhetorical" and then decided that made it unnecessary to answer. In this kind of discussion (i.e., rhetoric), all questions are rhetorical.

But perhaps I should rephrase, since it obviously was too obtuse the way it was worded: assuming that there is a need for American involvement in Iraq, would the needed level of presence be lessened by a partition scheme? If so, by how much and why?

If you can't answer that, your strategy is to hope.

--
Gone 2500 years, still not PC.

The "presumptuous" part was just that your rhetorical question seemed to imply that either I was saying that no troops would be required after partition or that the fact that troops would be required somehow invalidates the idea. Not a problem; I was just suggesting that you just ask or state what you want to rather than putting forth a rhetorical question that seemed to presume some assumptions or oversight on my part. It's not the case that "In this kind of discussion (i.e., rhetoric), all questions are rhetorical." A question can be asked as a real question or as a rhetorical question, which is really an argument using just the format of a question. But again, really no biggee.

assuming that there is a need for American involvement in Iraq, would the needed level of presence be lessened by a partition scheme? If so, by how much and why?

At least initially (i.e., at least until greater security and stability is achieved and appears to be firm) I wouldn't want to see us draw down any more than we have to due to manpower and other resource constraints (which will force some drawdown starting around April). But everyone wants to achieve the goals I've mentioned and do so sooner rather than later, and to draw down to the extent possible without putting those gains at substantial risk. I think the best strategy for reaching that point sooner rather than later (or not at all) is probably soft partition, for all the reasons I've given in my post, comments and below in this comment.

As for "saying why" beyond my explanation of why I think the current strategy is probably not as likely to lead to achievement of our goals, the reason I think partition would probably work better is for the simple reason that insecurity (physical and economic), power and pride are largely what the sectarian conflict is all about, and if partition (combined with an oil revenue-sharing agreement with sufficient guarantees for the Sunnis to trust it) can provide the Sunnis with:

  1. Physical security (because they'd have their own regional security).
  2. More economic security (because the Shiites wouldn't be able to control the nation's wealth and rip them off, while denying former Baathists jobs, and because more security and stability would attract more investment).
  3. A restoration of pride and some of the power they have lost, because they'd have their own autonomous regional government.
  4. Even more incentive to combat AQI, because, if the main concerns of most Iraqi Sunnis are adequately addressed in their eyes, why would they want these AQI lunatics continuing to cause trouble in some quest for a caliphate?

And the Shiites, in return, would feel less of a threat from Sunnis who they believe (probably in most cases, correctly) are trying to re-establish national control. And they, too, would benefit economically from increased security and stability.

you have settled on the idea of partition

My deliberate use of "probably" means that I have not completely "settled" on it, but see it as "probably" the best option. I don't claim to be certain or that it's an obvious choice. I didn't say "probably" by accident.

As long as Iraq by Whitfox

needs our military presence to maintain internal order, how sovereign can it really be?

If we're occupiers, we have the right to install the government of our choice - as we have in the past, both in Iraq and elsewhere.

If we're not occupiers, I have trouble understanding the relationship. An alliance implies mutual benefit. It's not clear we're getting much for what we're putting in. Nor do I see a treaty moving towards ratification in the Senate.

I know it's politically correct to claim to be liberators instead of conquerors, but the term "liberators" implies letting Iraq do what it wants. That includes civil war if Iraqis want one badly enough.

Is that something we won't permit? Then let's admit we're not liberators, and stop letting the term handcuff us. This is hard enough and expensive enough that we shouldn't be wasting effort on vanity.

Give me a break. Repeating over and over again that we're occupiers and that the Iraqis don't have a real sovereign government doesn't make it so.

They've had multiple elections, they've written a constitution, they've begun operating under that Constitution.

For crying out loud, if we were geographically adjacent to London in 1789, we'd have needed French troops all over the place to stay independent...

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Did we need by Whitfox

French troops to maintain INTERNAL order? I'm not talking about helping a country maintain its external security. We do that in a lot of places, at no great cost.

Yes, I know combatants are getting support from other nations. This isn't changing the fact that many Iraqi citizens intend to pursue violence. Or that there are better ways of stopping terror-supporting nations than dealing with the terrorists alone. (You'd think Afghanistan was a failure, considering how unwilling we are to use that model.)

But if you believe Iraq is a sovereign nation, fine. Let's draw down our forces to the amount sufficient to assist their border security. (That means spending more time in the Kurdish section, where Iran is actually attacking, and less elsewhere.) Leave internal politics and rebellions alone.

Heh by Neil Stevens

Does it occur to you that the Iraqi state services might be able to contain the Iraqi citizenry wishign to cause trouble, if we could remove the foreign support and leadership within the country?

To me, I think we needed to expand the war to Iran two years ago, if we wanted to win this.

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And let me add by Neil Stevens

To put our troops only on the border NOW is akin to closing the barn door after half the herd has fled. It'll help, but it's insufficient alone to rectify the situation.

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our ally against our common enemies. Plus, it would be stupid to do so. Don't fall into the leftist notion that if a govt isn't perfect now that it should be dumped based on an assunmption that perfection is possible now (or at anytime).

see the US from 1783-1789 and even thru 1866 and even thru...

Mike Gamecock DeVine @ The Charlotte Observer
www.race42008.com
www.hinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
"One man with courage makes a majority" - Andrew Jackson

before it was right?

I think we just need to let the Iraqi gov't alone for awhile - conmcentrate on building up the grassroots and the rest will take care of itself. Let the Iraqi people elect people who will work for them in due time. I don't think us doing anything with the top guys is going to do anything more than cause confusion and more unrest.

exactly - nt by gamecock

Mike Gamecock DeVine @ The Charlotte Observer
www.race42008.com
www.hinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
"One man with courage makes a majority" - Andrew Jackson

that the current government is "our ally against our common enemies." Steve Hadley’s got notes on all of this stuff.

Lets suggest ... by cxxguy

as we withdraw our troops that Iraqis consider partition. It's their decision, and if they create a new government without us involved, that government may have the credibility with Iraqis to actually survive. The current one will always be seen as our puppet, regardless of reality.

their government is NOT a US puppet.

Mike Gamecock DeVine @ The Charlotte Observer
www.race42008.com
www.hinzsightreport.com
www.theminorityreportblog.com
"One man with courage makes a majority" - Andrew Jackson

And while playing by the rules is the highest value in golf and cricket, wouldn't it be nice, after all the blood and treasure we have expended in that land, we had at least as much influence on the free and independent government of Iraq that we helped to shape as Iran has?

Sheesh.

___________________________________
"You know, it's 130 degrees in Baghdad in August." - Tony Snow

No, no it wouldn't (nt) by Neil Stevens

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Neil, are you part by bantamwait

of the Iranian interest group in the USA?

Yup by Neil Stevens

Don't tell anyone, but I'm actually Ayatollah Smackahjomammah of the Iranian Council of Guardians.

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That must make you a close relative of President Ahmanuttajob!

I keep remembering these election thingys. A purple finger or two comes to mind.

And then, I keep seeing these liberal Democrats demanding that we remove al Maliki, and replace him with someone else. Isn't replacing the elected Prime Minister of a country up to the citizens of that country -- through the ballot box -- or parlaimentary elections?

Libs only believe in free elections when they get the results they want. IMPEACH BUSH!

that you voiced here.


...when they see me they'll say, "There goes Loren Wallace,
the greatest thing to ever climb into a race car."

Soft Partition? by GordonTaylor

BR, you have made many intelligent points on many threads here at RedState and while this diary is very well written it takes a wrong turn from the very beginning.

Your entire article is based on an entirely false premise. There is not and should not be any Plan B.

It's not needed, to even think of a Plan B admits that Plan A was not properly thought out and should have never existed.

As with all plans, there are always unexpected delays and snags. The surge is working and will continue to work, just ask our own Jeff Emanuel, he is there reporting on it.

And, just as a bit of friendly advice from someone that reads your blogs often, STOP reading the NY Times.


Gordon Taylor
Managing Editor

Hey Gordo: Sig alert by Neil Stevens

Your sig markup is messed up; you have a dangling font.

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I don't see it Neil.... by GordonTaylor


Gordon Taylor
Managing Editor

Blue, blue everywhere by Neil Stevens

You have a "font" element in your sig without a </font> . Add that before the </p>

Text after your comments is turning blue!

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not seeing it either by David Hinz

and not sure what you mean. That is a gif

<p><IMG SRC="http://www.hinzsightreport.com/images/slogo.gif"></A><BR><font color="navy">Gordon Taylor<br>Managing Editor</p>

That's what's actually there.

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sorry, Neil...still not seeing it


David Hinz
Publisher

are you saying everything is then blue on other posts below it?

Yes that's what I'm saying by Neil Stevens

Broken HTML never looks the same everywhere, because by defintion it's out of spec, so there is no standard way to render it.

Which is why people who use html on Red State should use Firefox AND the Preview Comment... heh.

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Thanks Neil.... by GordonTaylor

I left out the ending tag,, but IE 7 wasn't showing it. When I switched to an inferior browser (FF or Opera) it showed up. I couldn't see the forest for the trees.


Gordon Taylor
Managing Editor

Or... by bs

you couldn't see the forest for the Microsoft-induced haze...


...when they see me they'll say, "There goes Loren Wallace,
the greatest thing to ever climb into a race car."

LOL! n/t by David Hinz

MSIE, in addition to its myriad security problems, misses key W3C specifications, and has long been a blight on the Internet, heh.

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Plan A by Scott742

Yes, I would argue that Plan A should never have existed. But that's certainly open to discussion. I think, at this point, anyone who thinks plan A was "properly thought out" is practicing the worst of "head in the sand" thinking. NOBODY truly believes that this war has been handled well. To suggest that we shouldn't ever be considering a Plan B is the most irresponsible thing I've ever heard.

I might point out that the surge itself is a Plan B operation, substituting for the previous Plan A which was "stay the course" and don't think about plan B. Ridiculous!

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I can't really think of any wars that were handled well. Battles, yes, campaigns, no.

It's been a while since I read military history, but none really stand out.

After the wars are over and the historians summarize things for the students who have to write papers, they start with 'won' or 'lost' and go from there.

When you study the actual ebb and flow details of the conflicts, you find a surprising amount of mishandling of pretty much every one of them.

Compared to historical conflicts, I'd say that the current one is going pretty darn good: Many more of them dead than us, two hostile governments toppled, two budding democracies in progress, changes in position by hostile governments (Libya, and now North Korea apparently).

It could be faster and better, but that's easy in hind sight.

"War is Hell" by Scott742

Agreed. And this is precisely why we always need to keep a "Plan B" in mind, in case things don't go as planned, because they never really do.

I can't imagine any clearheaded person suggesting that we shouldn't consider alternatives. Insane.

Correct across the board, Scott.

a < /font > tag (without the spaces after/before the brackets) to the end of your signature. Then everything will be fine...


...when they see me they'll say, "There goes Loren Wallace,
the greatest thing to ever climb into a race car."

First, thanks for the by BrooksRob

First, thanks for the compliment.

to even think of a Plan B admits that Plan A was not properly thought out and should have never existed.

I think Scott said below what my reply would be to that.

The surge is working and will continue to work.

Yes and no. The surge has made important progress on security by our presence and by co-opting Sunni tribes in some areas. But there has been essentially no progress toward national political reconciliation, nor even evidence of a good-faith effort, particularly on the part of Shiite leaders, and as Petraeus and others have clearly said, without national political reconciliation, sustainable security is impossible and we won't achieve our goals. And as for the potential for "bottom-up" reconciliation without the acceptance and support from the national government, I can't rule it out, but count me skeptical (and the latest National Intelligence Estimate says it is unlikely). It IS possible that this co-optation can spread and strengthen to the point at which the Shiites feel threatened by Sunni forces we've organized and will be ready to deal, but it is at least as likely and probably more so that the Shiites in power (or Shiite militias -- and the line between the government and the militias can get a little blurry) will seek to inhibit development of such Sunni forces if the former sees a growing threat.

And, just as a bit of friendly advice from someone that reads your blogs often, STOP reading the NY Times.

First, I'm flattered and appreciative that you often read my posts. As for your comment, though, I have to say I strongly disagree with that kind of advice. I think it's very important for everyone to get news and opinion from diverse sources and apply his own judgment as to what to take with a grain of salt (or more than a grain).

As for posts on my diary in particular and my particular judgment regarding NY Times sources, I've included excerpts from Friedman (here), who has a great deal of insight into the Arab world and other related issues (although he's not deep on military matters) and whose opinions I take seriously (and who, as I mentioned in my post, favored going to war in Iraq based on the neoconservative rationale of spreading democracy in the arab world), and from John Burns, whom I consider a top-notch reporter after watching and reading him for many years -- some info on him (albeit Wikipedia) here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John%5fF.%5fBurns

Come on, Gordo, not every military situation is the Battle of Thermopylae.

I mean, let's give the surge a chance, but let's not bet the whole farm on Malaki and the rest of those yoyos.

Three words for you, Rob by Neil Stevens

India. Pakistan. Kashmir.

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Hey, I'm not saying it isn't without risk or drawbacks, just probably the best of bad options. As for the partition of India, there are many particulars that may not apply to Iraq, but I take your general point that partition may leave simmering resentments that can flare up.

Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Regarding your untenable position favoring "Soft Partition"...

That "Dead Horse" has been beaten so many times, it's not even suitable for use in "Dog Food".

***

“Well, the trouble with our liberal friends is not that they are ignorant, but that they know so much that isn't so.” – Ronald Reagan

To All on This Thread by BrooksRob

Yo, what's wit da' no recommendas?
Whose shoe does a guy gotta tap in da men's room ta' git a recommendation around here? Ahm hoit.

The Brookings Institution has published a well argued piece by Michael O'Hanlon and Edward Joseph advocating soft partition of Iraq. Their plan differs from Biden et al in that it is not forced upon the Iraqi people, but is offered as a recognition of what is already happening. They say that since it is happening anyway it is better to plan it out in a more equitable fashion. Their plan would use natural ethnic and geographic demarcations to set partition boundaries. It would share oil wealth equitably among all Iraqis. The government of Iraq would help people sell their homes at fair prices and would build new housing where necessary to accomodate relocations. Relocation would be voluntary not forced on anyone. Reports are that relocation is already happening at the rate of 50,000 to 100,000 per month anyway. Planning would allow for schools and other community resources and infrastructure to be built according to the needs of the communities.

They would offer planning assistance to the Iraqi government should they decide that this is a way to have peace in the future.

Al Qaeda would still have to be neutralized. Iranian interference would have to be contained.

One of the arguments for such a plan is that Iraqi identity is first religious, then tribal, then national. By encouraging homogeneous groups to form and relocate into locally governed entities we would reduce the constant strain of sectarian conflict.

Part of the success of the surge is that local tribal leadership is turning against Al Qaeda. Another report indicates that Shia attacks have reduced in Baghdad because the Shia have already dislocated many Sunnis from Shia dominant neighborhoods and taken their homes by force. So a defacto form of relocation/ partitioning has already happened in some parts of Baghdad. The Kurds have shown that by allowing them to live in their own territory they have very little violence - except when Al Qaeda needs to make a big splash. Some Sunnis and Shia have also moved to the Kurdish area to escape the violence.

They recommend troop levels remain steady for the next 12 to 18 months to help implement the plan. Ideally would be to get coalition forces to help thus upping troop levels to 300,000 to 400,000. This is not an immediate pull out plan.

The central government would remain in Baghdad. Local troops and police would provide security for their own communities. This is one of the success points in Anbar province. This also begins to address the sectarian animosities. Sunni/Shia hatred is deep and has long historical roots. By allowing a degree of separation and self rule you can reduce the daily conflicts, but probably not eliminate the animosity.

There are many pitfalls and problems and nothing will work if the Iraqis themselves don't want it. This plan is not perfect but takes a realistic look at the political problems and at least offers some vision of what could be. Right now the political will for reconciliation seems to be non-existent. We must find a way out that doesn't leave Iraq in complete chaos when we are gone. And leave we must. No one wants to be there for the next 50 years.

I encourage you to read a discussion of the plan (pdf doc)at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/events/20070625.htm

And the paper itself is in pdf format at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20070705.htm

Excellent comment. Nicely done. Yes, I read the executive summary of that paper when it came out, and I, too, recommend it. Some folks may simply reject it because Brookings is liberal, but O'Hanlon has written some very sensible stuff over the last year or so, and my understanding is that he considers himself a Sam Nunn-type, strong Defense Democrat.

Executive summary (within the total paper) available here http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/june2007iraq_partition.pdf

One note. Even though you stated clearly that O'Hanlon's plan is NOT a plan for immediate withdrawal, you also said "And leave we must. No one wants to be there for the next 50 years" by which I assume you mean simply that it would cost us enormously (in financial terms, use of finite national security resources, deaths of our troops, etc.) to stay there in large numbers for several decades. I'm just pointing this out because some may focus on that line "leave we must" out of context and misinterpret.

thanks by torrant

Yes, I can't really imagine that anyone on this site would want large numbers of US troops in Iraq for the next 50 years or even 10 years. I am not in favor of an immediate pullout. That would be a failure and contravene the sacrifice Americans have made thus far. Having a strategic base is a different matter, but may inflame matters for years to come and may not be worth it if we can have other bases in the region.

In my opinion if we have to stay there for several decades to maintain peace then we haven't really accomplished the goal of a self governing, peaceful Iraq that is allied with us in strategic matters and trade. Part of the success formula must be a lasting, self governing, self policing, independent Iraq that is able to defend itself against Iran or any other belligerent.

If soft partition leads to hard partition as some argue then that will be a development that the Iraqi people will have to deal with and hopefully we can offer a positive influence.

If a Sunni territory would be a result of soft partition and then Al Qaeda would be welcomed in that territory - then we would have a better chance of defeating them because they are localized and more easily contained instead of being spread out over the larger Iraqi territory. By having homogeneous geographical areas violent groups could be more easily identified. I believe soft partition would make victory over Al Qaeda and other militias easier.

Perhaps some military strategists could weigh in on that opinion.

I would imagine that if there were an autonomous Sunni region under soft partition, al Qaeda would either focus on trying to take power there (to work toward their dream of a caliphate) or would puruse that objective while also continuing violence against the Shiites. In either case, most Sunnis would want more than anyone to get rid of al Qaeda, because (1) most of them wouldn't want to live under the strictness and brutality of Sharia law (not to mention foreigners playing a large role), and (2) if they are reasonably satisfied with the federalist (soft partition) arrangement, they wouldn't want trouble-makers inflaming Shiites and risking that arrangement.

As for in which direction soft partition could lead at some later point, who knows? Could be hard partition, although not in the case of Kurdistan if Turkey can help it -- kind of like how we make it clear to Taiwan that we don't want them declaring independence from China. It's also possible that sectarian tension could, over years and decades, diminish, and/or opportunities for cooperation increase, leading to a stronger bond among the regions.

I agree by torrant

Al Qaeda has made themselves onerous to the Sunni communities they have taken over. That is part of the reason why the tribal and community leaders in Anbar province turned against Al Qaeda. Of course, our giving them money, guns and a renewed sense of local control doesn't hurt either.

I am generally optimistic that most people would prefer to live in peace rather than constant war. Some are easily inflamed by ideology, religious fervor, tribal or racial hatred, or opportunistic lust for power. Part of the goal of spreading democratic values in the Middle East is to give those societies non-violent cultural and political tools to resolve differences rather than resort to violence or oppression. My concern is that so many of the values of the West are still not deeply ingrained in the consciousness of the populations. Values such as freedom of speech, freedom or religion, property rights, respect for the rule of law etc. are essential to a peaceful society using democratic tools to govern itself.

If the Iraqi government can encourage local police to protect their own communities, when they are protecting their own families it makes it more serious for them.

The Iraqi people have consistent expressed a disdain for foreigners trying to rule over them so once a sense of local control and authority is reestablished it will be easier for them to eject Al Qaeda themselves.

Whether they can learn to trust and value a central government is a big question mark. Having lived under Saddam for so long it may take some time for them to not fear a power grab by a strong man or party and oppress the minority.

Bruce Riedel who responded to O'Hanlon's partition speech had this to say in response the idea of the Iraqi leadership's desire for reconciliation, "They’re not interested in it. They never have been interested in it. They weren’t interested in working together when they were in opposition to Saddam Hussein, and they’re not interested in working together today." That assessment, if true, doesn't bode well for the current insistence on Maliki and the legislature working out reconciliation agreements. He adds, "They would all love a united Iraq if they were in charge of it."

He has an insight into Sunni attitude here, "The whole notion of federalism and partition has traditionally been a nightmare for the Sunni Arab community because they have seen it in the past as a way of undermining their dominance of the whole country. Whether they can now be convinced that this is their best fallback position, I think is yet to be established. Sunni Arabs seem to still be in a state of denial, not willing to come to grips with the fact that the 400 years of Sunni domination of Iraq are over."

Regarding Iraq's neighbors, "Anyone who suggests carving up the boundaries of the 1919 settlement of the Middle East throws open all the boundaries of the Middle East." Those countries won't want the idea to spread.

Al Qaeda on partition? "..there is one political party, if we want to call them that, in Iraq who not only supports this idea but has already set in train the process of implementing it, and that’s Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia which last November declared the creation of an Islamic State of Iraq in the Sunni sectors of Iraq: Anbar, Mosul, the city of Baghdad or at least most of it and surrounding provinces." Are we now seeing the people in those communities rejecting this idea?

How about the Shia? "The Shi’ah will need to be persuaded why they should take less than the whole bargain. Why should they settle for something other than all of Iraq at this point?"

Finally, he says, "I think if we do go this route, one of the most important things we could do to make it succeed is, from the beginning, make clear we are not going to stay there permanently to enforce it."

Reidel raises some important concerns. Does the Iraqi leadership have the vision and statesmenship to create a stable Iraq where the people have a sense of citizenship and participation in self determination? How they and the people decide to move forward will tell us much about the propects for peace and democracy in the region in the decades to come.

How about this: by bantamwait

We back the Kurds up to the hilt, with the understanding that they keep their mitts off Turkey, and make nice with their oil. Then we let the rest of those sandflies fight it out, and buy off/contain the winner. "Oh, but that means Iran will be the dominant power in the region!" What makes you think that Iran will have any easier time dealing with all those feuding factions than we have?

I'm just sayin'...

Simple answer... by rbdwiggins

"What makes you think that Iran will have any easier time dealing with all those feuding factions than we have?"

Iran's ROE's won't be hamstrung by a DOD lawyer, and the commanding officers will not stand in judgment before a US federal court for carrying-out orders.

***

“Well, the trouble with our liberal friends is not that they are ignorant, but that they know so much that isn't so.” – Ronald Reagan

Petraeus's plan and go back to Gen. Odierno's doctrine of overwhelming force. Oh-kay. I don't think it would work any better for the Iranians than it did for us.

Worthwhile column by by BrooksRob

Worthwhile column by Krauthammer today (9/7/07), saying that soft partition (he doesn't use that term, but all but says it by referring to "partition" but distinguishing it from "de jure" partition without a central government) is where Iraq is heading, is being facilitated by our local security strategy in Anbar and elsewhere, and is the best of bad options at this point. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/09/the_partitioning_of_ir...

A couple of important points he overlooks, however, in his apparent dismissal of the importance of the central government's role in achieving that soft partition, even if the groundwork is being laid at the local/regional level, are (1) the central government -- meaning primarily Shiite leaders -- and Shiite militias with ties to Shiite political and religious leaders can impede progress toward that point if they fear an armed Sunni region and organized, armed Sunni security forces in Baghdad (in Sunni neighborhoods), so at least their willingness not to fight such a development is important, and (2) an oil revenue-sharing deal at the national level is indispensable. Yes, they are currently sharing this revenue without a formal deal, but the Sunni region without oil revenue from the other regions (assuming Kirkuk would not be in the Sunni region) would really be up a creek economically, and in turn, in terms of security, so they will need some greater assurance (even if nothing can be 100% guaranteed) that some arrangement is more than temporary and subject to the whim of the Shiite (and, secondarily, Kurd) leaders, so a formal deal at the national level with appropriate rules and mechanisms to ensure transparency and enforcement of oil revenue-sharing is very important.

Another important point: A formally agreed-upon soft partition could (and should) include arrangements for voluntary population transfer, which, done deliberately and in an organized and (relatively) secure fashion, would likely be less bloody and economically injurious than letting these population transfers continue as they have -- driven by death squads and other terror.

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Neil, as I said in my post months ago, and pasted in this post as well:

"while ethnic separation conflicts with our ideals, [soft partition] makes intuitive sense to me, at least as a Plan B if reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis continues to look unlikely (and it already looks like the odds are against it being successfully negotiated, let alone implemented and maintained). Facilitating the separation of Sunnis and Shiites in a relatively orderly way and allowing Sunnis their own security forces to police and defend the Sunni population is better than letting the militants on each side escalate the slaughter of members of the other, including non-combatants who seem to be the majority of the victims of bombings and death squads."

First of all, this population transfer -- as I've said -- would be VOLUNTARY (not exactly "ethinic cleansing" right?), and secondly, as for assisting ethnic separation, if the alternative is essentially the same result via much bloodier and more economically harmful means, we should choose the lesser of two evils rather than self-righteously sticking to some ideal that seems unachievable.

Oh yeal, real voluntary by Neil Stevens

"In three months, this area will be a legal, 'ethnic'-based state, and that 'ethnicity' will not be your own. Prepare for hardship or get out."

Some voluntarism.