My Goodness - Part Deux
By docj Posted in Archived | Featured Stories — Comments (30) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Let's just get this one up on the front page, shall we? - Moe Lane
OK, so here it is, as promised in Charles' story.
See below...
A simple web search pulls-up about 3.9M results of varying relevance. Here's the problems with most, if not all, of them:
1) They are, nearly all, clearly of the Monday Morning Quarterback variety - in other words, they draw their conclusions based on things that were not known - and in many cases could not be known - prior to the launch of OIF. They also tend to be really long on problems, really short on solutions, and opposed to the enterprise from the beginning.
2) Their solutions (typically, the CW on the need for 400k troops required to hold the country) are impractical in the extreme for the reasons that a) the troops simply did not exist at the time, b) attempts to obtain them externally were essentially thwarted when the UN got poked in the nose once - once! - and ran away, and c) it ignores precisely our history in - dare I say it - VietNam, where we had plenty of troops and no will to win.
So here I lay down the opportunity for The Dissatisfieds to educate me. Please, do, spell out the mistakes, miscues, blunders, etc. of the Bush Administration in the conduct of OIF. Explain how they could, or should, have been avoided based on information that was known at the time, and what should have been done differently.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
Troop levels overall were OK.
I would have modified the ROE when the insurgency started. Things like, if a mosque is used as a military asset (think Sadr) it gets immediately bombed into oblivion. Fallujah should be a bad memory and rubble. Immediate stronger security on the Syrian and Iranian borders, basically a kill box everywhere off the main roads, shoot first and ask questions later.
We've been too careful about "civilian" casualties and haven't killed enough terrorists.
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If "pro" is the opposite of "con", what is the opposite of "progress"?
Not that I'm necesarily in disagreement in principle, but you do realize this approach is problematic for other reasons, right?
I'll buy Sadr getting away as a legit "mistake" - though not one I lay at Rummy's feet (for we clearly had the DoD components in place in plenty of time, and at multiple times, to send him to the afterlife he so richly deserves).
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
my list of "others" is press coverage of "civilian" casualties. And then there's... nothing else. My opinion, based on nothing but my opinion, is that had we waged more of a "total war", we'd be pretty much done by now. Also, it would serve as an object lesson to Assad for sure and maybe even to the Iranians.
Overall, the operation has been quite successful. The idea that this far into the conflict we've had less than 3,000 casualties is amazing. Also, the rebuilding of infrastructure that was destroyed by Saddam building palaces instead of infrastructure is proceeding, although I think we'd be a lot farther ahead if we weren't so selective about who we kill.
Somebody commented on the information war and I agree that the Administration has done a pathetic job of selling the war and effectively fighting on the home front against the left and the NYT. Bush is also too soft on his homefront enemies.
With respect to Rumsfeld, I only want to see him go if he's going to run for POTUS. If Rumsfeld were to be replaced, it should be with the reincarnation of Attila, not a Beltway politician with no cajones.
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If "pro" is the opposite of "con", what is the opposite of "progress"?
that we heard a lot about at about the time of Fallujah was the initial decision, later reversed, to remove Iraqi generals with any ties to the Baathists from the military, which for obvious reasons did slow the effort to get the Iraq army up and running.
this wasn't Rumsfeld's call, I don't believe, but rather the call of the Provisional Governor at the time, whose name, I'm sorry, escapes me for the momment.
I think the Rules of engagement limitations, the decision not to take down Al Sadr and the hestitation vis a vis Fallujah all rest with the Prov Government, not Rumsfeld.
I would add that this is one of those statements that have been repeated so often by the MSM, the loyal opposition and even the Admin--almost never without elaboration--that it has assumed the status of unassailable truth, for which no explanation need be offered.
Poor communication, and poor advocacy, I think are very valid criticisms of this Admin, but again I don't think that gets laid at the feet of Rumsfeld.
* Not killing Zarqawi before the war (link)
* Failing to secure munitions along the march to Baghdad (link)
* Failing to prevent looting (link)
* Going overboard weeding out Baathists (link)
* Retreating from Fallujah (link)
* Rampant waste of money (link) in a poorly executed reconstruction (link)
* Over-prioritizing mobility at the cost of armor; underprotecting troops (link)
* etc... have to run now but I'll do more later.
with which I'm most intimately familiar first - the last of your points - that being the body armor.
Long and short on the armor - it's overrated (and FWIW, I work on it for a living). The interceptor package, while very, very effective in some instances (not going to go into details for obvious reasons) is sadly highly ineffective in others. It's also 1) expensive, 2) very time consuming to produce, and 3) difficult to use in Iraqi weather (imagine wearing 16-pounds of ceramic for hours when it's 140-degrees in the shade) - causing other very serious and very nontrivial medical challenges - perhaps even making casualties where there would have been none otherwise.
Further, there is little to no evidence that a sizeable number of KIAs/WIAs who would have been spared death/injury with the armor.
Points 6 (waste of money), 7 (poorly executed reconstruction) and 5 (weeding-out the Baathists) are, at best, debatable opinion and, at worst, flat-out wrong. Much the same could be said for Point 2 (securing munitions) as I seem to recall a fair amount of munitions that were indeed tracked-down, secured and destroyed - but I don't have time to track down a link for that one.
The rest require more time and I just don't have the time at the moment as my son's nose just sprung a bloody leak.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
I don't have a link, but I recall reading a year or two ago that there were multiple ammo dumps in Iraq pre-invasion that were each larger than Manhattan.
Being that the US Army didn't have Hercules around to secure them, blaming Rumsfeld for this to me just seems silly.
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Internet member since 1987
Member of the Surreality-Based Community
(which I think are questionable), how many can actualy be considered Rummys responsibilty? The SecDef is not the commander in theatre, nor does he make the politcal decisions as to whether or not air strikes should be made in Iraq in 2002.
We may be quietly making lots of fond memories of American troops among ordinary Iraqi citizens, but I think on balance we'd have been better off killing more bad guys -- with far more aggressive Rules of Engagement -- before we started with the "hearts and minds" stuff.
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"It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race." - Chief Justice John Roberts
so it should be noted that his critiques are probably just CYA type things. However, Bremmer wrote in his book about several mistakes by Rumsfeld.
1) Promises were made. Essentially Bremmer claims that Rumsfeld told Chalabi and other pro-american exiles that they would be handed power almost immediately. This made construction of a government incredibly difficult as everyone just tried to wait out the Americans.
2) Iraq Force Levels. Bremmer claims that Rumsfeld and indeed the entire DOD exagerated Iraqi troop strength as well as police strength. This caused problems because people without sufficient training were given incredibly important security missions and couldn't handle it. This caused Iraqis to doubt the effectiveness of their security forces and turn more towards militias.
3)Sadr and other troublemakers. Bremmer claims he warned about Sadr early on when he had few supporters but the military didn't want to make a move. Supposedly this was because major military operations were over and the military didn't want to start more fights.
4) No aggression. This gets back to the idea that the war was won with the toppling of Baghdad. Saddam and his loyalists fled to the Sunni triangle area and were not hunted down in a sufficiently aggressive manner because of the hunt for WMD.
Essentially Rumsfeld calculated that we wouldn't be in Iraq long. Now one can argue that these mistakes are being corrected but it would seem that they have been made.
International Affairs is just Political Science with an accent.
So here I lay down the opportunity for The Dissatisfieds to educate me. Please, do, spell out the mistakes, miscues, blunders, etc. of the Bush Administration in the conduct of OIF. Explain how they could, or should, have been avoided based on information that was known at the time, and what should have been done differently.
1. Committing a force that conventional wisdom suggested was too small. (The conventional wisdom is convention because it is frequently true.)
2. Mishandling the entry into Baghdad and the fall of the regime. There was a need to have overwhelming force in the capital during the first week and the expectencying (and training) to impose civil order. Instead, we got "stuff happens."
3. Continually shooting at the (various) king(s) but decling to kill them: Fallujah, Sadr, etc.
4. When security was obviously lacking, failing to send additional troops.
The greatest disaster, however, was failing to appreciate that Saddam, even at his worst, was immensely valuable in playing off Tehran. (There is a China-USSR analogy to be made here.) We have midwifed the birth of a new regional superpower.
This war was a mistake. The only question is whether we will cut and run, and turn a disaster into an unmitigated disaster.
For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.
1. You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you wish you had. In other words, the Pleasant Fiction that more troops would have solved all our ills ignores to "Inconvenient Truth"
- that we didn't have the boots to put on the ground
- that we had plenty of boots on the ground in SE Asia and still lost
2. Sez you.
3. Perhaps someone can address this one better - that said, if Baghdad is the problem, why was departing (unceremoniously, granted) from Fallujah such a bad idea? I'm not aware that Fallujah was such a problem these days.
4. You've not identified from where these troops were going to come, and failed to accept that the "UN led international force" never materialized because they pussed-out.
The rest is your opinion, which much like backsides, we all have - and some stink. Just saying.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.
1. You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you wish you had. In other words, the Pleasant Fiction that more troops would have solved all our ills ignores to "Inconvenient Truth"
- that we didn't have the boots to put on the ground
- that we had plenty of boots on the ground in SE Asia and still lost
I don't know why this talking point exists, because it has never been persuasive. First, if you grant that "more troops" are necessary, then the answer to the "you go to war with the [insufficient] army you have" is that you don't go to war or you make the army sufficient by, for instance, imposing a draft.
Second, assuming I buy the notion that we lost Vietnam despite prosecuting it as vigorously as requested by the generals (a notion that I don't buy, but I'll play along for your purposes), it says nothing about whether more troop in Iraq would have nonethless been improvement. Folks lose wars for all sorts of reasons. That you might have lost for reason Y even if you corrected mistake X is not a good response.
2. Sez you.
Am I supposed to take that seriously? Because it's exactly that kind of casual approach to warmaking that has gotten us into this mess.
When you go to war, you go in with overwhelming force. You're not toppling a regime. You're conquering.
3. Perhaps someone can address this one better - that said, if Baghdad is the problem, why was departing (unceremoniously, granted) from Fallujah such a bad idea? I'm not aware that Fallujah was such a problem these days.
It sent an unmistakable signal that we would not, or could not, take and hold ground. (Ditto Sadr.) War is football, not baseball. You win a war by seizing and controlling territory, not by making it around the bases once.
4. You've not identified from where these troops were going to come, and failed to accept that the "UN led international force" never materialized because they pussed-out.
See point 1.
The fourth being time. It takes time to fire-up a draft - there's legislation that needs passing, there's boards that need to be set-up, there's money that needs procuring.
It takes time to draft 3, 4, 5 divisions. And train them. And get them ready to fight.
And your Director of Central Intelligence has just told you that it's a "SLAM DUNK" that Saddam has WMD and is gonna use them.
Tick tock. Tick tock. Tick tock.
That's if I grant your assertion, heretofore unsupported, that more troops were needed. I do not.
Re: Sez you - you can treat it as seriously as I treat your assertions that led to this statement. There is nothing - N-O-T-H-I-N-G - to indicate that having another 300k troops on the ground would have done any good in the frist week of the occupation. Zero.
Besides, I suppose you subscribe to the Powell Doctrine then. I suppose we can always wait to have enough troops - until a chem/bio weapon goes off in Chicago (see point vis-a-vie teh DCI, above). Tick tock. Tick tock. Tick tock.
It appears we're adapting to the "take and hold" part to the extent that the training level of the Iraqi forces will allow. How long would we have had to hold Fallujah? At what cost? And where would those resources have come from? Mosul? Basra? What would have happened there?
No slam dunks there.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
Point 1 and only Point 1 because all the rest of your points are based off the idea that we did not have enough troops.
We had the Army we had. We had no time to build a larger army, as has already been mentioned. Furthermore, even if we Had had such time:
"Institute a Draft" You just killed your Army. You just permanently destroyed with half-wits, drug users, criminals and people who are just plain bad for morale, the greatest Army to ever walk this earth.
Unless your just talking about throwing all these worthless souls into special Infantry only Cannon-fodder divisions.
But if you are, you're not seriously talking about a force that you would have taken to the Iraq War, I hope. I shudder at the casualty lists for units like those.
Now what? Where do you get your larger army from now? The UN and the vast majority of your "allies" just tucked tail and ran and you are effectively on your own with a job that Must Be Done NOW and a force too small to do it. What are you gonna do next?
Exactly what Rummsfeld did, that's what. Make what you have work. And from here, it certainly seems to be working just fine.
"Always be honest with yourself even if you are honest with no one else...
...It helps you keep track of your lies..."
--Myself
and the subject of the draft came up. "If we had draftees, we'd need more ammunition.", said he. "Why?", I asked. "We'd shoot the worthless bas***ds before combat started and they got us killed.", said he. No rancor in his voice, just being realistic.
Anyone who thinks we lost in Vietnam despite prosecuting the war vigorously is either an idiot or a complete drooling fool. Vietnam was lost because the President and his SecDef (whose names I refuse to type) felt the need to run day to day operations in the combat zones. Vietnam was a political loss not a military loss, due solely to cowardice on the part of the political overlords.
I agree with your comments about overwhelming force, but that doesn't necessarily require more troops. It requires the will to kill a whole lot more people to suppress the "insurgency". One forward aircraft controller can kill many more people than an infantry company. Our lack of the application of force in Sadr City and Fallujah and in fighting the terrorists has little to do with a lack of troops, it's a lack of political will.
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If "pro" is the opposite of "con", what is the opposite of "progress"?
Perhaps this was actually part of the strategy. Saddam and Iraq was sort of the trip wire between Iran and the rest of the gulf states. By removing that safety block, America is able to use the threat of withdrawl and Iranian domination of Iraq to force Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to crack down on their terrorists.
I don't know if I believe that, but its interesting to think about.
International Affairs is just Political Science with an accent.
For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.
Perhaps this was actually part of the strategy. Saddam and Iraq was sort of the trip wire between Iran and the rest of the gulf states. By removing that safety block, America is able to use the threat of withdrawl and Iranian domination of Iraq to force Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to crack down on their terrorists.
If this really was the strategy, it architects should be tried for treason. Our goal was to subcontract out our defense to a hope that Saudi Arabia and Egypt would do the right thing?!!??
People need to be hung if you're right.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
Iraq isn't between Iran and the Gulf States, the Persian Gulf is and Iran has threatened UAE etc with attack across the Gulf in the past.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia began cracking down on their terrorists more in response to the happenings in Afghanistan than the happenings in Iraq. If anything, the War in Iraq offered an outlet for would-be jihadis.
I think invading a country and using the possibility of withdrawing, and turning it over to a nascent hostile regional power, on the off chance you can blackmail countries into whacking a few dozen terrorists is a high risk/low payoff strategy. Not to say you are wrong in that regard but it seems to me there are easier and cheaper ways of accomplishing the same goal.
First off, a short list of the Administration's decisions that I don't have a problem with, lest someone mistake me for a Democrat (I'm not a Republican either, but that's beside the point):
1. The policy of regime change. This is, without a doubt, the single most important policy decision that Bush made, and it is absolutely correct. If Clinton, or Bush Senior, or Carter had responded to terrorists and rogue states in this manner, the world would be far better off today. It is unfortunate that poor execution of the policy will likely discredit it for quite some time, because there are no viable alternatives.
2. Troop levels at the time of the invasion. This is not 1991, not 1991's U.S. military, not 1991's Coalition, and not 1991's Iraq. The Powell Doctrine has its merits, but it also has its faults, not the least of which is that it takes a long time to assemble a force of 500,000, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to keep that force in the field for several years, especially when the size of the military has been drastically reduced since 1991. Throw in the legitimate concern that Saddam would use WMD against our troops this time, and it is easy to see why a smaller, faster to assemble and attack force was used.
3. Lack of body armor. This is the fault of Congress, not the Administration, and Bush made the right choice when he decided not to wait until the troops were equipped.
4. Failure to secure munitions on the march to Baghdad. Simply put, it was not realistic to expect the military to do this while a credible threat of WMD being deployed existed, or while there was still a possibility that the Iraqi army could counter-attack.
5. Failure to prevent looting. Not only was this not possible without a Powell Doctrine 500,000 man army, it wouldn't be desirable even if it had been. It was simply too soon to establish order. The focus on combat was correct.
That being said, there are a few reasons why I count myself as one of the "Dissatisfieds".
1. Democracy is great. I love democracy. Heck, I live in one. That being said, the need for security and order has to be satisfied before the need for enfranchisement. Not only was Iraq's government corrupt, the society was (and still is) corrupt. Civic virtue is a foreign concept, and this fact alone is responsible for a lot of the problems in establishing a stable democracy. Iraq's institutions, from the Army to the DMV, needed to be completely wiped out and reformed under U.S. supervision, just as Japan's institutions were in 1945. We needed to write the Constitution and staff the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and continue to do so until Iraqis could be found and trained to do the job right. But we didn't, and it's too late for that now.
2. Failure to secure the borders. Securing the borders should have been done first, before entering Baghdad, rather than last, after allowing thousands of foreign terrorists in and who-knows-what out. Simply put, securing the borders would have taken Al-qaeda, Syria, and (arguably) Iran out as players in Iraq.
3. A poorly planned, and extemely poorly administered, reconstruction effort. Forget the failure to reform Iraqi society, forget the failure to secure the borders, if the Administration had gotten this right, the situation in Iraq would be far better than it is today. As it stands now, massive unemployment (25-30%) and the lack of security and basic services fueled both the insurgency and the creation of private armies by thugs like Muqtada al-Sadr. If the Administration wants Iraq to turn out like Germany and Japan did after World War II, the bill isn't going to be cheap. But it will be worth it.
In closing, there have been, and will continue to be, problems and screwups in Iraq. Problems and screwups are inherently a part of war. What is important is for problems to be addressed and screwups to be corrected (or mitigated). And most important of all is to keep the determination to win. But that doesn't mean we have to be satisfied with things as they are.
I suppose I've had trouble getting down to the bottom of my own thread.
I'll second streiff. Nicely done.
My quibbles are quibbles - chicken-and-egg variety - not worth clogging-up here.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
we should have sealed the borders with air power BEFORE we went in. We had the AF flying over the "no fly zones" for years, they should have shut down all border traffic into and out of Iraq for at least three months before the invasion.
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If "pro" is the opposite of "con", what is the opposite of "progress"?
And I don't really know how you "seal the border with air power." The numbers of terrorists coming in are small enough, they just cause trouble vastly disproportionate to their numbers... because they are largly comprised of martyrdom types.
As far as supplies go, you don't need to bring that much across the border to supply a terrorist op. It's not like they have to supply a conventional army. Everything they need is probably obtainable from within Iraq.
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"I am a great believer in luck. The harder I work, the more I have of it." -- Thomas Jefferson
The number one problem in Iraq is currently an ongoing problem: we are still there. I don't mean we should cut and run. What I mean is we need to move forward. This holding group crap is for the birds. Let the enemy worry about holding ground. We needed to get in there, depose Saddam and march on to the real terror threat: Iran. What is the number one objective of the terrorists, as stated by Pres. Bush? The terrorists want to thwart the installation of democracy. Well, if there is one target, i.e. Iraq, then they can concentrate their efforts and look to be a bigger force than they truely are. But if we make two democracies, i.e. Iraq and Iran, then their efforts are more spread out. Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran are interlinked via borders, and any attempt to slow down the democratization of these three countries would be very thin in terms of numbers. It would be rather hard to move within the three.
Second-and some one touched on this earlier-we need to implement total war. No percision bombings. Carpet bomb these territories and display a true projection of power. Look it, we were never going to win the PR war in the Big Media so why even try with limited warfare? We need to not be so worried about how we look in the press because short of complete surrender and conversion to Islam, the Big Media is going to act in the precise manner that they have been so long as there is a Republican in the Oval Office.
Standing athwart history yelling stop!!!! http://nationalwhig.blogspot.com
... for getting rid of Rumsfeld, beyond the specifics of which tactics/strategy worked which did not. It has to do with the President's management style, which this quote summarizes as well as any "Bush's 10 common-sense leadership lessons: Hire smart, build trust, talk straight, and leave aides alone..."
This is a classic private sector management style. If you get the right team in place, it is highly effective. I can speak from personal experience having managed large and small teams most of my professional career. My greatest success in business was using this style when I had a great team working for me. They made me look like a genuius while they do the work. It leaves plenty of time for golf and pontificating on how to win.
The problem centers on the word "accountability" a word that GWB uses frequently, but does not seeem to apply to his direct reports. With that management style, "say what you'll do, do what you say" is the mantra, it is incumbent to have clear agreed objectives, and if the objectives are not met, immediate replacement. If you, as the leader, are not going to get deep in the details yourself, then your only tool for managing performance is changing personnel when agreed objectives are not met. If you do not, then you have abbrogated your leadership responsibility.
The details of "coulda, shoulda, woulda" in Iraq have been pretty well covered in these two "dissatisifed" threads. My point is simple. Regardless of the specifics of how we got here, it is absolutely clear, that we are not now where we expected to be in Iraq, and the same guys that did the planning and executed the plan that got us here are still in charge.
This is too big a miss. Accountability demands that Bush replace Rumsfeld. Sometimes change for the sake of change is the right answer.
I anticipate that's pretty much what you'll hear.
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Internet member since 1987
Member of the Surreality-Based Community