Redstate

By Rick Moran Posted in Spotlight Blogs | War — Comments (7) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

It's been a few hours since the President's speech - just long enough for some of the media and smart bloggers I respect on both the left and the right to weigh in with their reactions.

To say that this is just more of the same, a hyped up "stay the course" plan with nothing new in it is one of those ideas that is accurate but incomplete. And the differences between what we've done before and what is proposed now are quite telling indeed.

Bush appears to me to be prepared for failure in Iraq. What he has done in promulgating this plan is to place the onus for success or catastrophe on the shaky shoulders of the Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He has, in effect, granted Maliki's wish that Iraqi troops in Baghdad will be under his control:

Read on . . .

The plan sketched out by Mr. Bush went at least part way to meeting these Shiite concerns by ceding greater operational authority over the war in Baghdad to the government. The plan envisages an Iraqi commander with overall control of the new security crackdown in Baghdad, and Iraqi officers working under him who would be in charge of military operations in nine newly demarcated districts in the capital.

The commanders would report to a new office of commander in chief directly under the authority of Mr. Maliki. The arrangement appeared to have the advantage, for Mr. Maliki, of giving him a means to circumvent the Ministry of Defense, which operates under close American supervision. “The U.S. agrees that the government must take command,” Mr. Abadi said.

And at the same time Maliki is being given command of his own troops, he has thrown down the gauntlet to his biggest political supporter Muqtada al-Sadr:

Iraq's prime minister has told Shiite militiamen to surrender their weapons or face an all-out assault, part of a commitment U.S. President George W. Bush outlined to bring violence under control with a more aggressive Iraqi Army and 21,500 additional American troops.

Senior Iraqi officials said Wednesday that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, under pressure from the U.S., has agreed to crack down on the fighters even though they are loyal to his most powerful political ally, the radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Previously, al-Maliki had resisted the move...

Before Bush spoke, a senior Shiite legislator and close al-Maliki adviser said the prime minister had warned that no militias would be spared in the crackdown.

"The government has told the Sadrists: 'If we want to build a state we have no other choice but to attack armed groups,'" said the legislator, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak for the prime minister.

And the President made it clear that he would brook no more smoke and mirrors from Maliki who has made a habit these last months of promising tough action against the militias and then either not doing anything or worse, complaining publicly and bitterly when American forces have confronted the Sadrists:

Bush warned that the U.S. expected al-Maliki to keep those promises.

"America's commitment is not open-ended," Bush said. "If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people."

The Iraqi government welcomed the new strategy and promised it was committed to succeeding in quelling the violence.

"The failure in Iraq will not only affect this country only, but the rest of the region and the world, including the United States," said Sadiq al-Rikabi, an adviser to al-Maliki.

"The current situation is not acceptable — not only for the American people but also for the Iraqis and their government. As Iraqis and as an elected government we welcome the American commitment for success," he added. "The Iraqi government also is committed to succeed."

The question that has been uppermost in my mind is why should we expect Maliki to act any differently now? Time and time again he has promised action on a host of political reforms, anti-corruption schemes, reconciliation with the Sunnis, and even confrontation with al-Sadr. Not once has he or his government followed through with anything approaching the vigor necessary to improve the security situation in Iraq.

Just last month, a pitiful effort to begin the healing process took place in the Green Zone. Like a party given by the most unpopular kid at school, the invitations went out, the table was set, the band was hired - but in the end, nobody showed up:

None of the extremist Shiite or Sunni factions responsible for most of the violence attended the closed-door meeting, and the government leaders who delivered speeches offered no major new concessions likely to lure insurgents back into the political mainstream.

Only a handful of the 20 or so former Baathists and ousted generals expected to attend showed up, and none of the exiled Baathists thought to hold sway over some insurgent groups attended, even though the government offered to pay their way and provide security.

Ultimately, the violence will stop and peace will reign when one of two things happens: Either the 4 million Sunnis left in Iraq will be murdered or flee for their lives leaving Iraq free of them or, the Shia majority will grant protections for minorities, participate in power a sharing arrangement, and make a supreme effort at reconciliation for all Iraqis.

We can send 10 times 20,000 troops to Iraq and not change the basic political calculus that is driving the insurgency; Shia hegemony. The Sunnis fear Shia retribution (for good reason) and are fighting to re-establish their dominance. Since they are outnumbered 4 to 1, this is extremely unlikely. But given that they feel the alternative is death anyway, many thousands are willing to take up arms and fight their tormentors.

And, in fact, the Sunnis have every reason to fear the Shias:

The Shiite leaders’ frustrations have grown in recent months as American commanders have retained their tight grip in Baghdad. While the Americans have argued for a strategy that places equal emphasis on going after Shiite and Sunni extremists, the Shiite leaders have insisted that the killing is rooted in the Sunni attempt to regain power through violence and that Shiite militias and revenge killings are an inevitable response.

American officials have warned that with lessening American oversight, Shiite leaders might shift to a sectarian strategy that punished Sunni insurgents but spared Shiite militias. The execution 11 days ago of Saddam Hussein, carried out in haste by the Maliki government over American urgings that it be delayed until the legal paperwork was completed, only reinforced such fears.

How can we expect Maliki to buck the entire Shia establishment on the militia question - especially since he has proven in the past to be a spineless jellyfish when it comes to going after al-Sadr? In fact, is he serious when he says that he wants the Sadrists to lay down their arms or is this just more pablum to placate the Americans?

The arrangements appeared to suggest that Mr. Maliki would have the power to halt any push into Sadr City, the Mahdi Army stronghold that American commanders have been saying for months will have to be swept of extremist militia elements if there is to be any lasting turn toward stability in Baghdad. But along with more authority for Mr. Maliki, the American plan appeared to have countervailing safeguards to prevent sectarian agendas from gaining the upper hand. Bush administration officials said that Americans would be present in the commander in chief’s office and that an American Army battalion — 400 to 600 soldiers — would be stationed in each of the nine Baghdad military districts.

What all this boils down to - the benchmarks, the increase in troops, the granting of more autonomy to the Iraqi government to control their military, and the battle against the sectarian killers - is that Bush and America have now placed the power to make or break our effort in Iraq into the hands of a man who has not performed in the past and who has not proved himself strong enough, smart enough, or politically savvy enough to tackle the problems in Iraqi society head on and with the energy to do what is necessary for his government to succeed. He has limped along these last months, rousing himself only to criticize our troops when we violate al-Sadr's turf or when an incident involving civilians caught in the crossfire makes headlines.

He has promised much and delivered squat. Should we then continue to work behind the scenes to bring another coalition to power - one that is broader based and includes far more secular elements than the current government not to mention freezing al-Sadr out of the ministries?

I think it is inevitable that we will do so. Once it becomes clear over the next 60 days or so that Maliki is not getting the job done and pressure begins to mount once again for withdrawal, look for this last arrow in Bush's quiver to be loosed and a new Prime Minister come to power.

What difference it will make is arguable. But anyone will probably be an improvement over the weakling who currently occupies the Prime Minister's office.