Redstate

I don't know much more about Daniel Drezner than what he says about himself in this piece. Much of it reads like a New York Times article, with rafts of unsourced factoids thrown together in front of a conclusion, in the hope that the reader will make the desired connection without realizing that a coherent argument hasn't actually been made.

Where Drezner actually is on solid ground is his analysis of the various WW2-era multilateral institutions that dot the world of big-time international-relations practitioners. He makes the mildly interesting (if rather obvious) point that the Europeans which are over-represented in those institutions (the UN, the IMF, the WTO, and others) don't half-like the idea of ceding some of their influence in favor of China and India.

Drezner thus understands the core challenge of our foreign policy: to domesticate China and India by bringing them into the existing international structures, without honking off the Europeans too much.

When you're a hammer, the whole world looks like a nail. When you're a card-carrying member of the global NGO elite, the whole world looks like a summit meeting.

Power doesn't work that way. It's much more fluid. Drezner is absolutely right when he says that China must come to see its new leadership position in the world as carrying responsibilities as well as perquisites. But the Chinese are already doing that.

The real challenge for us is to ensure that the patterns of global power continue to operate in our favor. There is much more to said about this (including whether and how energetically we should pursue the advance of political freedom in places like the Middle East). But in concentrating on the UN, the IMF, and the WTO, Drezner is missing where the action is.

To his credit, he hints at the true new reality when he briefly notes the several international organizations and conferences that China has already anchored and will continue to.

About the so-called BRIC countries: let's try not to forget that this coinage originally came from the banking community (from Goldman Sachs, IIRC). The fact that countries like Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, and India look like big wet dreams to an investment banker shouldn't blind us to reality.

What I mean by that is: don't underrate China, and don't overrate India. Drezner's analysis of India seems to come from reading the New York Times. I love India, and I believe that their nuclear capability is an essential counterweight to China's ambitions for regional hegemony. But I don't think India is the rising economic superpower they're widely considered to be.

And here's a funny thing: Drezner doesn't say much about Russia. He doesn't consider Japan in any significant way whatsoever.

His extraneous comments about 'unilateralism' (translation: 'Germany, France and Belgium didn't sign on') in Middle Eastern policy encumber what was otherwise a very interesting article about our China/Indian policy:

I didn't read Drezner's brief aside regarding US ME policy as conflating "unilateralism" with "Germany, France and Belgium didn't sign on" or even with "Western Europe didn't sufficiently sign on." But, then, it has been about a month since I read the article.

My views on the article generally mirror Blackhedd's comment (above), although I think Blackhedd is (1) wrong to fault Drezner's lack of supporting cites (that's just FA style); (2) unduly fixated on the NY Times as an alleged shaper of foreign policy (among dailies, the WSJ and FT are each at least - if not more - influential); and (3) find his characterizations of "card-carrying member of the global NGO elite" and their alleged perceptions to be overly simplistic. But those are really quibbles.

p.s. If the rumors of the death of neoconservatism may have been slightly exaggerated, does that mean neoconservatism may be only slightly alive? Because that certainly seems to be accurate ....

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.