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The “Raiders” of 1st ID’s Quarter Cav in East Rashid, Baghdad

By Jeff Emanuel Posted in Featured Stories | RedState to Iraq | Special Events — Comments (5) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

On my trip to Iraq, I embedded with the 1st Squadron of the 1st Infantry Division’s 4th US Cavalry Brigade (based out of Fort Riley, Kansas). The 1-4 Cav (“Quarter Cav”), a brand new unit, was created in January of 2006, and arrived in Iraq for this, its first combat tour, in February of 2007. It contains a disproportionately high number of soldiers (officer and enlisted) who are on their first combat tour of any kind and, though they seem like seasoned professionals at this point, Privates with fewer than eighteen months in the Army abound in the unit’s platoons which are operating on the front lines in Baghdad. “We are really like the Band of Brothers in some ways,” the Brigade Public Affairs Officer (PAO), Major Kirk Luedeke, told me. “This is the first time since World War II that units have been cobbled together to meet a need. It hasn’t been needed since then.”

The squadron’s inexperienced nature has caused it to endure some rough patches while learning “on the fly” – especially from its mistakes. More rough times doubtless lie ahead, both as a result of this rawness and of the fact that, rather than being assigned to a single area of operations for the duration of its tour (a situation which would make sense, given that sustained presence is a key point in the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine personally authored by MNF-I commander General Petraeus), the unit will soon be assigned to its fourth separate AO in three-plus months, having its cavalry, reconnaissance, and light infantry capabilities replaced in the current area by lumbering Striker vehicles from the 2nd Infantry Division in Fort Lewis, and moving north into Dora proper to provide some much-needed help in that area. However, this is not to belittle the 1-4 Cav’s many successes, or the fact that its soldiers are quickly proving to be both capable warriors and fast learners.

The Quarter Cav’s current area of operations in Iraq is home to a diverse population. Working in East Rashid, a district in southwestern Baghdad and a part of the Dora quarter of the city, the 1-4 oversees an area which includes Sunni, Shi’a, and Christians, with a good portion of its eastern neighborhoods being mixtures of at least two of the three. The western portion of the district, though, is clearly defined along sectarian lines, with the area known as al Hadir, lying north of a street called “Yemama Road,” being predominantly Sunni, and the area south of the road, called Abu Dischir, being almost exclusively Shi’a, and heavily populated by members of the “Mahdi Army” (the Jaish al Mahdi, or JAM) – followers of Muqtada al Sadr.

Read on . . .

Al Sadr and his followers have, of course, been in US headlines since 2004. The violently anti-coalition Shi’a cleric has sought for years to undermine US efforts in Iraq, both by fomenting violence against coalition troops and by refusing to cooperate in the efforts to govern Iraq effectively. His more recent public statements urging his followers not to cooperate with the coalition have hindered what was a bourgeoning coexistence between US troops and some areas heavily populated with JAM like Dischir. Despite this, and despite the fact that the Sadrists remain one of the most violently anti-coalition Shi’a sects, the Abu Dischir district appears to be an example of a fairly positive coexistence between US forces and the people in a JAM-heavy area.

Areas such as Dischir and other JAM-influenced districts are a difficult case for the coalition to deal with. A large part of the US’s recent mission has been to “win the hearts and minds,” so to speak, of the Iraqi people. This is not necessarily accomplished by trying to remake the Iraqis into flag-waving America lovers so much as it is by trying to get the Iraqis to accept not only that coexistence with US forces is superior to fighting against them, but also that the coalition can provide for them a quality of life that the sectarians and insurgents they are currently putting up with in their areas cannot. While this can work – and is working – in many areas (such as Anbar province), those controlled by JAM are another matter altogether. Their quality of life – from the cleanliness of their streets (no small issue in Baghdad, large parts of which appear to be one giant rubbish heap), to the safety of their neighborhoods – is assured by the JAM living there, and further enforced by the fact that many of the NPs, already majority Shi’a, are affiliated with JAM (though some cover their faces – illegally – when on joint patrols in the district, so as not to upset other Sadrists who might not look kindly upon their cooperating so completely with coalition forces).

Given this, the US cannot easily convince the people of such districts to break with JAM in hopes of receiving even better quality of life at the hands of the coalition; instead, as an intelligence officer told me, “we have to convince them that life in cooperation with us as well as in cooperation with the JAM can be even better than what the JAM provides alone.” While Abu Dischir might not have bought that far into what the coalition is offering as yet, the people of that district do appear to have come to one conclusion which has benefited both them and US forces working in the area: that not actively working against the coalition will have a better effect on their well-being than doing so.

Unlike many sectors in Iraq and in Baghdad, the people of Abu Dischir appear not only to have realized, at this point, that choosing not to fight coalition forces results in coalition forces not fighting them, but – more importantly – they appear to be acting on that realization. As a result, coalition and joint patrols there are much more relaxed than elsewhere. While I was there, I felt almost uncomfortably off my guard, as I was mobbed by children asking for chocolate, for their picture to be taken, or for my camera. The neighborhoods seem happy, and the people appear to be living their lives in the best way that they can. Rather than sprinting from house to house, keeping as covered and concealed as possible, and ducking into courtyards whenever they are available, always ready to return fire at a potential attacker (as is the case in al Hadir), the soldiers move calmly and almost casually through the streets. Though they are always prepared for the situation to change, the soldiers’ ease of manner and movement belies a surprising sense of security while in the Sadrist district. “Nothing’s going to happen to you here,” said Sergeant First Class Edgy, the platoon sergeant for the second platoon of Quarter Cav’s Alpha Troop. “It’s a pretty calm place.” Calm is, of course, a relative term, especially for SFC Edgy, who was the only member of his crew to walk away from a massive IED blast three weeks ago which killed his humvee’s driver and seriously injured his medic and gunner.

The current situation in Abu Dischir, which is the result of the citizens’ conscious decision to coexist with the Americans while simultaneously remaining solidly affiliated with JAM, is this: a relatively clean area, which has relatively little violence, in which the people can live and American troops can move in relative safety, though rumors that Sadrist hardliners who have more desire for violence than the regular inhabitants of the neighborhood have been showing up from elsewhere in Iraq, which could cause an increase in violence in the near future.

North of Yemama Road is a different story altogether. Small arms fire echoes through the streets and alleys of the predominantly Sunni area of al Hadir almost constantly, and the 1-4 Cav lost their first soldier to a sniper in this area only a few weeks ago. The neighborhoods are largely deserted, with several houses falling into disrepair, and there is a tangible sense of despair among the people living amidst the ruins. The area is extremely filthy, with piles of trash standing feet above the ground in the roads and on the sidewalks, creating ideal hiding spots for IEDs; while Iraqi companies have previously bid for the trash collection job there, a few shots fired by insurgents at the workers was enough to make them stop coming around.

The area has seen a high number of extrajudicial killings (EJK), with bodies being found regularly in abandoned houses (when they weren’t simply dropped on street corners). The primary culprit for these EJKs is thought to be Shi’a who are affiliated with the NPs, as a principal weapon used in these murders, I was told, is a Glock 9mm pistol – the issued handgun of the national police. The more grisly murders, though – and there have been some horribly gruesome corpses found in the area – are generally chalked up to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), who have become known far and wide for their unthinkably inhuman brutality. While the JAM in the south appear to have a goal in mind of what they wish to achieve – namely an independent, secure, prominent Iraq, free of western interference, which follows al Sadr’s brand of radical Islam – the goal of the AQI is very simple: to cause as much havoc, to create as much turmoil, and to kill as many people as possible. “There may be some reconcilables” in JAM and other sects, the Quarter Cav’s commanding officer, Lt. Colonel Crider, told me, “but the bottom line [on AQI] is that these are very bad guys who want to create as much chaos as they can.”

What the West simply doesn’t seem to grasp, he said, is that these terrorists cannot be appeased or negotiated with. “They’ll kill all of the Shi’a they can,” he said, “and then they’ll kill all of the less-radical Sunni. And then, when there is nobody else left to kill, they’ll start killing each other.” In other words, the actions of al Qaeda in Iraq and their counterparts in various cells and sects are not – as is argued by some – simply a result of the US’s actions; no amount of appeasement, of apology, or of attempted reconciliation will cause them to renounce their brutal ways. Terrorizing, torturing, and killing are simply what these people do; they are rotten to the core, and the only recourse the civilized world has is to destroy them.

When US patrols arrive in al Hadir, the people themselves seem happy to see American troops. When I was participating in an operation in the area, we were welcomed into homes and greeted happily, and as the day wore on and our presence continued, more people emerged from their homes to watch us from the street, apparently feeling safe enough to come outside – an obvious rarity in al Hadir. “Of course they’re happy to see us,” an officer with the 2nd Infantry Division told me. “When there are American soldiers on the street and in their house, they know nobody is going to come in and kill them.”

“It’s not the people themselves who want to fight us,” said a soldier in Quarter Cav’s Charlie (“Comanche”) Troop. “The AQIZ (al Qaeda in Iraq) and other insurgents are moving south into the area and causing the havoc.” LTC Crider considers this to be a major factor in the surge in JAM membership and activity in his Squadron’s area of operations, saying that, in his opinion, “JAM mainly formed and grew [in Abu Dischir] as a defense against AQI,” rather than as a force to oppose the coalition. The influx of more insurgents into Al Hadir from the north, and the continued shooting south across the northern boundary of Al Hadir from Dora proper, combine to create a dangerous location both for Iraqi citizens and for American troops, who constantly take some kind of fire when working in the sector.

Much of the violence in the region also originates from the mosques in the area. Shi’a and Sunni sectarians have fought bitterly between their separate neighborhoods, and one street, which featured a Sunni mosque on one end of the block and a Shi’a mosque on the other, was termed the “death zone” by soldiers who observed the heavy fire being exchanged daily between the two churches. Several mosques in the area have been destroyed, all by insurgent fighters; despite the unfounded perception to the contrary, the coalition is still restricted from entering these churches – let alone firing on them – even when the enemy is known to be shooting from within. In the case of one Sunni mosque, a tip was given to the NPs that a boy was being held hostage there by the church guards; when the police detained the guards for questioning – thus leaving the mosque unguarded – Shi’a sectarians promptly burned it to the ground. By the time the authorities realized that the boy’s abduction was a hoax, the charred remains of the mosque had been razed to the ground, leaving nothing but flat earth where the church had once stood.

Much like the greater Middle East as a whole, East Rashid is a study in contrasts at this point in time. Its northern sector lives in filth, fear, and squalor, and its southern part in relative peace, security, and cleanliness. However, with a further influx of JAM hardliners in the south, and a push down from the north by AQI terrorists, the situation is tenuous, and subject to possible violent change in the near future. Constant patrols and operations – both intelligence and action – against any number of the fifty-plus insurgent and sectarian cells which exist in Quarter Cav’s area of operations go some distance toward putting off this eventuality, but a very large flashpoint between the two neighborhoods does exist, and could be ignited at virtually any time. If and when that happens, the only question then may be whether to put our soldiers in the middle of the fight to protect the civilians who are growing to trust us with their security, or to let these two sects, both of which are capable of extreme violence and brutality, wage war on each other in hopes that both will be fatally wounded.

Though progress has been made in the brief time that the 1-4 Cav has been working in East Rashid – and many of the soldiers say that it has been very significant, and very obvious – the situation there is fluid, as it is everywhere in Iraq. The progress which they have made with their persistent presence in the area, despite being severely undermanned, could well continue with the arrival of the 2nd Infantry Division’s Stryker brigade which will begin to relieve them in place (RIP) in the near future. The sheer manpower (with the number of personnel they can dismount, while still maintaining fully crewed vehicles for movement, patrolling, and protection) that 2 ID will be capable of putting on the streets will be far greater than that which the 1-4 Cav has available. However, the replacement of humvees and frequent foot patrols with impersonal armored monstrosities seems more of a step back than a step forward in the battle to win over the trust and allegiance of those in these neighborhoods, as such a goal is far better accomplished through actually spending time with the people, getting to know them, and building relationships with them than it is through rolling down the streets in giant, threatening vehicles. The security factor may be higher in Strykers than in humvees or on foot, but the risk exists that the replacement of human faces in these neighborhoods with continuously moving, faceless armored shells will destroy the carefully crafted image of American soldiers as potential friends and protectors, and replace it once again with the image of the coalition as threatening occupiers who have no interest in the individuals in the area, just in looking for the first excuse to attack.