Holbrooke Versus Kristol And Negotiating With Iran
Navigating The Scylla And Charybdis Of Diplomacy
By Pejman Yousefzadeh Posted in Featured Stories | Foreign Affairs — Comments (7) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Via the comments section over at Greg Djerejian's place, I find this link of a debate on the Charlie Rose Show between former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and William Kristol. Greg says that Holbrooke "manhandles" Kristol and I am not inclined to disagree; the former was clearly the more forceful advocate in the course of the debate and Kristol was reduced at the end to trying to narrow areas of disagreement between himself and Holbrooke while still trying to maintain a veneer of opposition to some of Holbrooke's larger arguments. After a while, Kristol's heart appeared to be barely in even that last enterprise.
One of the debate topics was whether we should negotiate with Iran. Holbrooke argued that we should, and Greg agrees. Kristol argued that we should not because, as Greg paraphrased, Kristol was not sure what we had to talk about with Iran. Retorts Greg:
. . . Mr. Kristol, there is a helluva lot to talk about, and we well know what our goals would be in such a dialogue, issue by issue, as you well realize, including, without limitation: A) the situation in Iraq, B) the situation in Afghanistan, C) Iran's support for terror organizations, D) the situation in Lebanon, E) whether Iran would come around to supporting the Saudi-endorsed two state resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, of course, F) the nuclear issue. We can spin our wheels with John Bolton playing mustachioed PSI'er-In-Chief--and other such ultimately ineffective fare--or we can get to 'root causes', to use a term in vogue. To do so, we need to have an intelligent, direct high level dialogue with the Iranians.
But having seen the debate in whole, I can say that much of Kristol's argument regarding the issue of negotiations with Iran was that we have not ourselves divined our negotiating strategy. As Kristol points out, we do not know what we will insist upon and what we will be willing to negotiate away. To which, I would add that we do not know what our best alternative to a negotiated agreement is and how it would compare to the negotiated agreement most likely to emerge as a result of talks between the United States and Iran.
As recently as yesterday, I pointed out--and will do so again today--my strategy--for how any negotiations between the United States and Iran should take place. As I did yesterday, I say again that if people have other ideas on the general principles we should employ in negotiating with Iran, they should come forth and present them. Let the best idea win. I rather like basing negotiations with Iran on the negotiations with the Soviet Union that followed in the wake of the enactment of the Helsinki Final Act since with that method, we had a mechanism by which to discuss security issues with the Soviets while at the same time ensuring that we harped on the issues of democratization and human rights in public and in private.
This latter track of discussions was highly valuable, of course. As I argued in my article:
Totalitarian governments -- for all of their public contempt for the democratic institutions of other states -- crave the acceptance of those very same states. This is understandable; democratic governments are in place because of the free and considered judgments of the populaces that elected them; while totalitarian governments come to power without bothering to gain the assent of their people. Thus, the acceptance of totalitarian governments as the diplomatic equals of democratically elected governments gives the former the appearance of legitimacy it would not otherwise have. With said legitimacy, such regimes are able to quash domestic dissent while presenting themselves as respectable members of the international community.
To add to this passage: In Jimmy Carter's memoirs, the former President discusses his preparations for the summit he had in Vienna with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. In advance of the summit, Carter received a letter from "Wise Man" W. Averell Harriman, in which the latter sought to brief the President on Soviet perceptions of the magnitude and importance of the summit. One of the points Harriman made was that Brezhnev would consider a summit meeting with the American President as one of the great and most important moments of his life.
Carter, doubtless, read that as flattery. More grounded observers of international relations read that passage and think instinctively of the fact that--as I mentioned--totalitarian leaders seek legitimacy by being associated favorably with leaders who have achieved a mandate by democratic means. And what better way to garner such legitimacy than by receiving the implicit stamp of approval of the President of the United States?
We ought to remember that this dynamic will be at work in any meeting between an American delegation with an Iranian one--and for that matter, in any meeting between an American President and an Iranian one who achieves power under the auspices of the current regime and who seeks to keep it through repressive and bloody means. Even as we discuss any and all security issues between us and Iran, it behooves us to deny any and all legitimacy to the Islamic regime. The principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act can help us do just that.
And yes, prior to talking with the Iranians, we need to figure out how to structure the negotiations so that American security needs are met and the principles of Helsinki are advanced. To be sure, as Greg Djerejian points out, we have much to talk about with the Iranians. That much, we have figured out. But that does not mean that we have figured out how best to talk with the Iranians, and to the extent that William Kristol makes that point with Richard Holbrooke, Kristol's comments are and should be well-taken.
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Holbrooke Versus Kristol And Negotiating With Iran 7 Comments (0 topical, 7 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
The only way to successfully "talk" or "negotiate" with Iran is to:
1. Have a very good idea as to how far they will go. Right now, it appears that nuclear war as soon as they're able is their intention, but it would be a mistake to negotiate with them from that viewpoint unless we're really convinced that it's correct.
2. Recognize that by even talking with them in terms of a negotiation we are exhibiting weakness; they will believe they are negotiating from strength.
3. Know that we must not reward their threatening behavior with anything immediate. An agreement must be of the kind that says they must do something good before they are treated differently by the West. Otherwise, we will encourage thuggery.
4. Know our own bottom line regarding what we are willing to accept from them in return for whatever we are in turn willing to give them. That should be presented as a "take it or leave it" offer, otherwise they will interpret accomodations to their demands as weakness and capitulation.
5. Know exactly how willing and able we are to walk away from the table if our demands are not fully met.
6. Know how capable we will be to meet the threat that will be the result of failed negotiations. If we can't afford to "fail," we can't afford to negotiate.
Negotiations with a rogue state that doesn't consider its own destruction unacceptable is considerably different from negotiations with the Soviet Union, who took the other, more rational, viewpoint.
Personally, I believe that negotiating with Iran would be like negotiating with extortionists. It will just encourage them to continue to extort.
Democrats on Iraq: "We don't want to win. We just want to quit."
Actually, negotiating with Iran seems far more likely to do harm than good, because as long as the talks go on, efforts to prepare ourselves for the coming conflagration will be hamstrung by the wishful thinkers on our side of the table.
Djrejian's list is almost comical. Our goals for Iraq, Afghanistan & Lebanon cannot be reconciled with Iran's; asking Iran to cease its support for terrorism would be asking them to deny who they are. These would be negotiations in which both sides would come to the table asking the other to surrender. Meanwhile, the clock keeps ticking & Iran gets closer and closer to the day when the balance of power changes.
Right now, the Iranians believe they are winning. The chorus in the West which dithers, issues empty threats & urges us to "talk" gives them ample reason to hold that belief.
We don't know for sure whether Hitler believed England & France would honor their pledges to Poland; there was a historian (A.J.P. Taylor, I believe) who argued that Hitler expected England & France to accept the partition of Poland, just as they had accepted remilitarization of the Rhineland and the subjugation of Austria & Czechoslovakia and was 'surprised' when war was declared.
Please, let's not repeat that mistake again - let's not be so irresolute that our enemies take that one step too many, erroneously believing we won't act.
... I'm compelled to wonder aloud what, precisely, we are to talk about? Talk implies common ground. What, precisely, do we have in common interest with the theocracy of Iran? Anyone? Anyone?
These (Holbrooke, Djerejian, etc.) are the same people who thought we could talk the Soviets into an "agreement". Reagan (with some serious help from Baroness Thatcher and others) defeated them, instead.
There's a time to talk. After the fascist regime in Iran is toppled we can spend all the time we wish talking about any number of things.
Until such time as that is an option however, there is literally nothing about which we can talk - unless that is we're negotiating surrender terms.
Over to you, Neville.
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"I don't know." -- Helen Thomas, when asked by White House spokesman Scott McClellan, "Are we at war, Helen?"
a mystical incantation which never fails to uplift the heart and reinforce one's self image. Caution, overuse of this word is one of a number of indicators pointing to possible fanaticism and a denial of an external world, relating to memory and experience. A temporary treatment for this is failure, but the condition soon returns and sometimes in more virulent forms.
"a man's admiration for absolute government is proportinate to the contempt he feels for those around him". Tocqueville
Negotiations are fine even if they are quite likely to be futile, so long as the very act of negotiating does not provide cover for the Iranian conduct we are trying to prevent by engaging in the negotiations in the first place. First and foremost, of course, the point of negotiations with Iran is to prevent the Iranian regime from developing operational nuclear weapons. As a secondary goal, the point would be to get the Iranians to stop exporting terrorism to Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, and thereby seeking to become the dominant regional power. The final goal would be to encourage the Iranian regime to become more democratic.
Negotiations with the Iranian regime are unlikely to achieve any of those objectives unless it is clear to the Iranians from the inception that the consequences of a failure to achieve some negotiated resolution acceptable to the US and its allies would be even more harmful to them than whatever advantages they expect to obtain by continuing their present policies and refusing to negotiate a minimally acceptable resolution.
As others have pointed out, negotiations have been a complete failure in achieving the first objective. The reason is that, to date, the Iranian regime has had nothing to fear and everything to gain by playing out these negotiations endlessly. Unless and until the Iranians come to believe that they will suffer terrible consequences from a failure of the negotiations, nothing much will be accomplished.
Thus, the first prerequisite that the US needs to establish with its allies is the consequences that the Iranians will suffer if the negotiations are a failure, along with the time-line that will govern the negotiations. Sec. Rice has plainly been trying to develop a consensus with the other permanent members of the Security Counsel, along with Germany and (probably) Japan, that economic and other sanctions will be applied to Iran if the negotiations with respect to Iran's nuclear program are unsuccessful. Assuming that Sec. Rice could obtain agreement to such sanctions -- and it seems unlikely that the Russians, Chinese or even the French would ultimately go along -- the Iranians know as well as we do that such sanctions have failed before and probably will again.
The need for the US and its allies to agree on a time-line -- so that the negotiations do not take on a life of their own, as if the purpose of negotiations was just to keep negotiating -- is at least as urgent. The Iranian threat, especially to Israel, will become exponentially greater if the Iranians obtain operational nuclear weapons. From the reports from Israel after the cease-fire was agreed to, it appears that the Israelis may well be unwilling to accept the emergence of a nuclear Iran, and are prepared to take preemptive action despite the devastating consequences that such action may have for Israel. The reason is that, for the Israelis, an Iranian nuclear capacity threatens the very existence of Israel.
Neither Holbrooke nor Djerijian comes to grips with the terrible alternatives here, let along the pressures on Israel to take action. Both of them seem to accept the inevitability that the Iranians will soon develop operable nuclear weapons; the proper response, according to them, is to put in place the kind of containment strategy that served the US well in dealing with the Cold War from the late 1940s until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Djerijian appears to take the view that the Iranian threat can be contained if the US will just put its efforts to building an international consensus for a containment policy backed by some real teeth. The strategy, at least as they describe it, involves watching the Iranians closely, holding them responsible for their actions, threatening consequences if they don't behave, etc.
Put aside for the moment the warnings by Bernard Lewis that containment will not work with the Iranian regime (his op ed in the WSJ several weeks ago made that point strongly). At bottom Holbrooke and Djerijian are just offering another version of the sanctions strategy when the reality is that the players who would have to agree to and enforce such sanctions -- especially Russia, China and the EU -- have signalled pretty clearly that they will be missing in action when push inevitably comes to shove.
The considerations sketched above lead me to believe that, unless the US can signal to the Iranians in a clear and believable way, that their only alternative to a minimally acceptable negotiated resolution will be swift and certain action to end the Iranian nuclear program, negotiations will be not merely futile but probably quite harmful -- in the sense that, like much of the pre-9/11 war against Islamofascism, they will create the false sense of forceful action to forestall the gathering deadly danger when in fact they will be the opposite. The possibility that Israel will be prompted to take unilateral military action against Iran, perhaps involving the use of tactical nukes, is also likely to be heightened if the only strategy by the US and its allies is a demand for negotiations without a display of the essential resolve to meet the Iranian challenge forcefully by other means if negotiations fail. For the reasons explained above, I doubt very much that talk of a sanctions regime, in any guise, will strike any of the key participants as a way of challenging the Iranians in a way that will convince them to change their current policies.
believes that we can and will lay waste to them they are not going to negotiate in good faith --- they have no reason to do so, there is no penalty. And, as of today, they have no reason to believe that we can or will do anything beside roll over.
John
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Why would God invent a thing like whiskey? To keep the Irish from ruling the world of course.
who I think is a policy lightweight which I think his background more than aptly demonstrates. But to say Djrejian is wrong is simply an understatement.
He lists these areas as subjects for negotiation with Iran
If by "negotiate" you mean capitulate you are right. If by negotiate you mean find common ground and mutual advantage then his proposition is just silly on its face.
Let's look at them.
A) What can Iran offer in Iraq that we want? I submit nothing. While, arguably, they may not want a failed state on their border, though the presence of Afghanistan never seemed to bother them greatly, they clearly do not want the Iraq we want and we don't want the Iraq they desire. Some might claim we could negotiate an end to Iranian interference but I just don't see why the Iranians would do that and it is really doubtful that there is anyone who we would talk to in Iran who could guarantee the behavior of the Pasdaran.
B) Afghanistan. See above.
C) Iran's support for terror organizations? You're kidding, right. What is there for Iran to negotiate. Their prestige and regional influence is directly related to their sponsorship of Hezbollah and similar organizations. Why would they negotiate away what must look like a winning combination in Tehran?
D) The situation in Lebanon? If news reports are accurate Iran has been fairly clear on Lebanon. Again, one fails to see what possible incentive Iran has for minimizing its own influence.
E) This is just lunacy. That is all.
F) Djrejian hasn't been in a coma, has he? Has he missed the negotiations that have proceded over the past couple of years? Or is he suggesting that we just cut the legs out from under our negotiating partners and go it alone? Did he avoid reading the news this weekend about Iran's nuclear program, it was covered in RedHot so it couldn't have been too much of a secret.
It is really hard to take seriously someone who could put forward this list in a forum other than Scrappleface.