How to respond to a new nuclear neighbor (who wants what you have)?
A brief look at Saudi Arabia.
By Jeff Emanuel Posted in Featured Stories | National Security — Comments (12) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Author's note: The subject of "WMD" proliferation and international security is a weekly feature here. Although all included details are verifiable through the attached end notes, the topics herein are intended as a starting point for discussion and debate, not as the definitive be-all, end-all of "WMD" and nonproliferation discussion. Bearing that in mind, read on.
The threat posed to the Western world by a nuclear Iran has been, and will continue to be, well documented. The purpose of this entry is not to rehash that topic, but to discuss the effect of a proliferating Iran another area.
The tenuous state of affairs which passes for “stability” in the turbulent region that is the modern Middle East has become even more so with the renewed pursuit of nuclear technology – and, likely, nuclear weapons – by Iran. While the area is no stranger to conventional warfare, the presence – and threat – of a nuclear power on their doorstep would be unsettling at least, and potentially deadly at worst, to each of the Middle Eastern nations (not simply to Israel, as erroneous conventional wisdom might suggest).
Let us use Saudi Arabia as our example, and pose this question for discussion: what nuclear strategy should Riyadh adopt to best ensure their nation’s security in the face of a resurgent Iranian nuclear threat?
Read on . . .
The Kingdom’s geopolitical and geostrategic setting demonstrates the reason for its security concern. Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Middle East in land area, has a smaller population than that of Iran and of Iraq (though its population doubled between 1980 and 2004); it also controls 25% of the world’s known oil reserves.
Absent of outside protective alliances, this situation makes Saudi inherently vulnerable to the desire of its more populous neighbors – at the moment, Iran, rather than a non-unified Iraq – for more resources and, thus, for more income. Of all of the nations in the region, Iran may be most in need of the additional oil which the enormous Saudi fields (led by their largest oil field, Gharwar), and superior drilling and refining technology, can provide, as their oil revenues are falling 10-12% annually, due both to outdated equipment for harvesting crude oil (making it more expensive to recover the oil from the ground), and to the drying up of foreign investments in the Iranian economy in response to the state’s rogue attitude toward nuclear proliferation.
Iran has more reason than just oil to be a threat to Saudi Arabia. In a division not fully understood by the West (save, perhaps, the Catholics and Protestants of turbulent Northern Ireland, or, increasingly, to those paying close attention to the current sectarian violence in Iran), the Sunni (85% of Muslims worldwide) and Shi’a (89% of Iran’s population) sects of Islam are irreconcilably – and violently – opposed to each other. A hotbed of institutionalized Wahabbist Islam, and the original homeland of the Sunni Al Qaeda terrorist network, Saudi Arabia is at odds with the Imami Shi'ites of Iran in some key doctrinal areas, such as the Imami belief that the lost “Twelfth Imam” will return only upon the descent of the world into war and crisis – a belief which has caused some to suggest that a nuclear Iran could use that technology to spark a regional conflagration in hopes of summoning the so-called “Twelfth Imam” (a form of messianic figure to Imami Shiites).
Furthermore, ancient history must be taken into account – specifically, the quest for empire which has been a characteristic of the Persian population since nearly one thousand years before Christ. Though empires, and classical imperialism, appear to be a feature solely reserved for the past, history can, and generally will, serve not as an exact guide, but as a precedent for present and future actions – and, in the case of Iran, there has been repeated precedent set of a quest for Empire (most detailed for us in the writings of Herodotus, whose history of the Greeks’ Persian Wars is a preeminent work of Classical literature.
Given these reasons for worry about Iran, it seems natural that Saudi Arabia would seek to counter the current Persian nuclear proliferation policy – which not only threatens their security directly, but also could prompt a nuclear arms race in the region – by establishing a nuclear program of their own. However, except for possibly deterring an invasion by conventional forces, the possession of a nuclear arsenal – or even a latent nuclear capability, like Japan’s in the Far East – would do little to increase the actual security of the Saudi kingdom. The leaders of Saudi Arabia appear to recognize this, and have denied any interest in developing their own reciprocal nuclear program.
There are two major reasons why the use of nuclear weapons on Saudi Arabia by Iran is an unlikely prospect. The first, and far less compelling of the two, is the long-term damage to the area which would result from the use of radioactive weaponry. The second, a geopolitical reason (or “georeligious,” to unofficially coin a term), is that Saudi Arabia is home to both Mecca and Medina, two of the Holy Cities of Islam. While capturing these locations from the Sunni Arabs, and placing them under Shiite Persian control, could be an appealing idea to the leaders of Iran, the best means of achieving this would not be through the use of nuclear weapons, but by means of conventional invasion and occupation.
The slim reality of the Iranian nuclear threat to the security of Saudi Arabia, combined with the time necessary to successfully construct a nuclear weapons program (though, with reciprocal aid from Pakistan, that time might be far briefer than it would be for a nation beginning from scratch), means that the Kingdom can benefit as much – if not more – from relying on its existing alliances, and perhaps from forging new ones – as well as from using the economic weapons at its disposal – than it can from violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it is a signatory (as are Iran, Iraq, and every other state in the Middle East save Israel, but that is a different matter).
Economically, the Kingdom is even now flexing its muscles a bit, unilaterally increasing production (and thereby driving down oil prices to the tune of a 17% decrease in "the past few months") while steadfastly refusing to acquiesce to calls for a special meeting of OPEC. Riyadh is able to do this without damaging its own economy (while simultaneously crippling that of Iran) because, due to advantages in availability and technology, the Saudis can recover, refine, and distribute oil for under 20% of what it costs Iran to do so. (Iran, in fact, is a net importer of gasoline.) As NBC news has reported:
[Saudi Arabia,] other Sunni-dominated oil producing countries and the U.S. are working together, believing it will hurt majority-Shiite Iran economically and create a domestic crisis for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose popularity at home is on the wane. The traders also believe (with good reason) that the U.S. is trying to tighten the screws on Iran financially at the same time the Saudis are reducing the Islamic Republic’s oil revenues.
For the Saudis, who fear Iran’s religious, geopolitical and nuclear aspirations, the decision to lower the price of oil has a number of benefits, the biggest being to deprive Iran of hard currency. It also may create unrest in a country that is its rival on a number of levels and permits the Saudis to show the U.S. that military action may not be necessary.
Strategically, the best ally that Saudi Arabia has in its quest for nuclear deterrence against Iran is the United States. As the source of 13.1% of America’s annual oil imports, and a strategic ally in the region, the Kingdom’s survival, and relative stability, is of great value to the world’s superpower. With a relationship which has been said to be “like a marriage from which there is no divorce,” America’s promise of security, and of potential nuclear reprisal should there be a strike carried out, can provide Riyadh with a sufficient indirect defense apparatus that the decision to continue on the course of nonproliferation can be sensibly, and comfortably, made.
To echo the conclusion drawn by Bahgat, “US commitments to defend Saudi Arabia against external threats are solid and are not likely to weaken in the foreseeable future. The American-Saudi unofficial alliance is built on shared interests, not common values. Saudi oil is crucial to the prosperity of the American and world economies, and oil is projected to remain the main source of energy in the next few decades.”
Due to the aforementioned external and internal factors, Saudi Arabia would be best served responding to the potentially increased threat from a nuclear Iran not by implementing a nuclear program of its own, but by continuing to rely on the reciprocity offered by existing alliances with external powers which can better serve to protect the Kingdom from attack, and to deter enemies from considering such action.
NOTES
Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia.” Middle East Journal. Vol. 60: Issue 3. 2006: 421-443.
Bozorgmehr, Najmeh and Roula Khalaf. “Iran admits oil projects suffering.” Financial Times. December 2006.
Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Imports by Country of Origin.” 2006. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a...
Meyer, Stephen M. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1983: 1-43.
Von Heyking, John. “Iran’s President and the Politics of the Twelfth Imam.” Ashland, Ohio: Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs. November 2005.
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Founder and contributor to The Minority Report and Senior writer for The Hinzsight Report
I think the Saudi Kingdom should also think about possible political changes and (from their perspective) worst-case scenarios, which would include the overthrow of the Kingdom. If it is succeeded by a jihadist regime, the whole regional situation will be much worse if there is an existing nuclear arms program to inherit.
I wonder if this factored into why Bush waited for this year's State of the Union address to finally start a campaign towards higher fuel efficiency? If the Saudis are keeping production high in order to depress Iranian oil revenues, then they must maintain this position for a considerable amount of time, and this allows other OPEC members, particularly Russia, to also increase production for the sake of volume sales. Meanwhile, we'll be working towards reduced dependency on foreign oil. It won't reduce oil demand in China and India but it ought to be of net benefit to Americans.
Maybe they will just give that whole godforsaken desert a fine glaze and solve a lot of the world's problems...
"The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal comfort... has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself."
--John Stuart Mill
Due to the aforementioned external and internal factors, Saudi Arabia would be best served responding to the potentially increased threat from a nuclear Iran not by implementing a nuclear program of its own, but by continuing to rely on the reciprocity offered by existing alliances with external powers which can better serve to protect the Kingdom from attack, and to deter enemies from considering such action.
This is a very good analysis in many of its generalities.* The US's alliance with Saudi Arabia is indeed a marriage where neither truly wishes a divorce -- despite the fact that many in both countries may hope for one -- precisely because it is based on shared interests rather than shared interests. (Self interest is nearly always a more reliable guide to human behavior than professed values.) But I don't agree that there's no possibility of divorce: Indeed, the reason why it's unlikely that SA would implement a nuclear program of its own is that the revelation of such a program would directly threaten its marriage with the US. It would trade a proven defense strategy for a defense strategy that may never pan out. That, more than anything else, should be sufficient deterrance to deter the Saudis from the bomb. (That an SA nuclear program would risk the SA-US marriage is a fact that needs to be quitely stressed to the Saudis, as I am reasonably confident that it is.)
That said, it is in SA's long term interest to avoid turning Iraq into an Iranian satellite state. One way to do that is to prolong the Sunni insurgency, although, for a variety of reasons, this likely strikes the Saudis as one of a series of bad options. Another option for them, perhaps, would be to encourage the break-up of Iraq so as to Balkanize it into hostile (although nominally at peace) ethnic and religious enclaves, which avoids the sort of all-or-nothing Shia-Sunni confrontation that the Sunnis are almost certain to lose. This option, however, may be worse for the Saudis because, although it weakens the Shia, it places a guaranteed Iranian satellite state right on SA's and Kuwait's borders. A third option would be to support the current Iraqi government, despite the fact that al-Maliki appears intent on creating a Shia state in Iraq, in order to try to bind Maliki to the Saudis. (Better to have a seat at the table even if it is uncomfortable, the Saudis may reasonably conclude.)
Different instruments of the Saudi government may conclude that differing tactics are the optimal, resulting in a mish-mash of seemingly contradictory approaches (e.g., fund the insurgency but provide support to Maliki). The interesting thing, however, is that playing both sides can be a winner (or, at least, the best of a series of bad options).
von
*I differ in some of the historical views, particularly w/r/t whether the Iranians' motivations today are influenced at all by memories of the Great King.
For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.
I differ in some of the historical views, particularly w/r/t whether the Iranians' motivations today are influenced at all by memories of the Great King.
I'm not sure whether you think that they are or are not influenced by "memories of the Great King" here, but I don't think that they sepcifically are at all. There's a difference between looking back a few millennia and saying, "We once had an empire under the great Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, and we deserve to have one again!" and the much more subtle (and accurate, in my opinion) trends and beliefs which history reveals.
A proud people who, through the centuries, have dominated the lands around them will, in my opinion, have an intrinsic knowledge that there is something better than status as an isolated, rogue state which is dirt poor and an international pariah, and they will believe that they deserve that something better. I believe that this can make a country like Iran very dangerous, because, while the optimal result in the next few years would be for them to overthrow their oppressive government, an equally likely scenario - as I see it - is that, especially with the "us against the world" mindset that sanctions, etc. can spur, the country may unite around a strong leader (somewhat like the Germans, who have had a history of warfighting) who can promise a return to that better fate which they deserve as a people who have been to the pinnacle of success in the past.
Please don't mistake the feeling of superiority which many Persians have over their "dirty, Semitic Arab" neighbors - and the resentment they harbor over the success of the Arab states in the region, which often far outstrips their own.
For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.
And I would add it is a reason why we need to consider very carefully what, if any, military actions we take against Iran. As Gadaffi has said (to paraphrase), the pursuit of nukes was a waste as it was a weapon he could never use. Were Iran to use nukes, it would be the end of Iran (sorry for the fallout in central asia).
My own concern with Iran would be the terrorist angle but I also believe a carte blance statement by the US and NATO that any nuclear blast not directly attributable to a state actor will be considered an attack by Iran would be a serious incentive for Iran to be compliant with NPT again (which need not necessarily preclude enrichment for power plants). The combination of economic sanctions and a sword over their head may prove much more persuasive in the long term than any potential military solution available today.
Rant Street! www.rant.st
I have written often about the Saudis at my blogsite as I was Political Officer at the Embassy in Jidda three decades ago and have followed the Saudis' odyssey on the international stage over the years. The new Saudi Ambassador to DC, Adel Al-Jubair, is a personal friend who has shared many interesting insights with me on the Saudi view of the world, which I spoke of at a San Francisco World Affairs Forum back in the eighties.
The Saudis are now, to use the new cliche, at a tipping point in their relations with Iran. They have never trusted the Iranians, who even under the Shah seized islands in the Gulf and made moves considered hostile to the Saudi royal family. For instance, the Saudis agreed with Kissinger to a price decrease in oil in the early '70s only to have Iran nix the deal [The Shah denied Kissinger had ever brought up a price decrease.] But despite their feeling of betrayal by the US on occasion, now it appears that Bandar bin Sultan, a strong advocate for US-Saudi close cooperation, is in a prime position to steer things the US way.
Quite bluntly, this means lowering the price of oil by increasing production, which the Saudis have indicated they are going to do. The SAG is the only Opec member with a real incentive to keep oil prices down, as they have a small population and want to keep non-Opec oil reserves from being developed [through high prices which spur development of otherwise marginal fields] which might eventually cut Saudi influence on world affairs.
So the Saudis were visited by their old friend Dick Cheney a couple of months ago and the price has now begun a slow descent since then. A single swallow does not make a Spring, but the Saudis' mistrust of the Iranian menace is an ongoing perennial phenomenon---literally, the Shah had part of his army in Oman back in the seventies and the Persians invaded Arabia the year Muhammed was born.
So the Saudis have their own economic interest to keep prices down----namely low prices increase world demand through an expanding global economy and thus ensure the Saudis' long-term economic viability.
And they have their regional interest to beggar their neighbor Iran, which they fear is going to take over a Shi'ite Iraq. Low prices take Iran [and incidentally Iran's silly ally Chavez] away from the table of geopolitical heavyweights.
Finally, Bandar's apparent ascendancy inside royal family councils may augur lower prices and a closer relationship with the US.
Let's hope for cheap oil and a weaker Iran.
The only realistic solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation is improved cooperation among the world's democracies (and the spread of democracy). The best way to accomplish this is through a completely revamped UN, specifically:
www.UnitedDemocraticNations.org
I'm open if someone has a better solution.
gary
I would point out though that while your post talks about falling oil revenues in Iran as a systematic phenomenon the drop has been much more recent and much more drastic. Even with outdated equipment $70 a barrel oil helped swell Iran's foreign currency reserves into the tens of billions ($37 billion was the highest figure I saw). Iran could afford to be bellicose because those revenues helped to buy domestic acquiescence with money left over to fund the export of the revolution. They also drove prices up, and now that oil prices are falling Iranians have less money to buy higher-priced goods. Inflation, coupled with the idiocy of Ahmadinejad's populist programme, promises to make the economic decline even worse. And while I doubt the Saudis intentionally orchestrated the earlier price rise, it would not surprise me if they eventually manipulated oil prices in a conscious attempt to bleed Iran white.