Iraq Revisited
Looking Back, Looking Forward
By Pejman Yousefzadeh Posted in Featured Stories | War — Comments (5) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
I supported the war in Iraq because (a) I believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction or would have/was determined to have them soon; (b) because his continuing violations of the 1991 cease-fire resolutions via attempts to shoot down coalition aircraft patrolling the southern and northern no-fly zones constituted casus belli; (c) because the sanctions regime was breaking down and only served to hurt the Iraqi people while Hussein and his cronies continued to be wealthy and powerful and (d) because I believed that democratization would, over the long term, encourage a state of transparency that would augment international security.
Read on . . .
Obviously, I was wrong about the WMD's, though if I had to make the guess again, I might very well find myself deciding the same way, given the overwhelming weight of international opinion that presumed that Saddam had WMD's and given the opaque nature of his regime. I still have no idea why it is that Saddam simply didn't give inspectors free rein to check for WMD's. I know that he didn't want to lose face by being exposed as defanged and disarmed, but at least he could have saved his regime. That he failed to do so demonstrates just how out of touch he was and just how much he underestimated the American resolve to get rid of him.
But the immediate issue before us is the reconstruction of Iraq. And it is a hugely important issue. To my mind, the best thing that can be done now is for the United States to focus on achieving a state of security for Iraq and its citizens and then work for democratization. You cannot have the latter without the former. This may mean more troops--I continue to believe in the fusion of the Rumsfeld and Powell Doctrines, thus giving us a light and mobile force that can win the initial combat stages of war and then the influx of a heavy force that can win the peace. This may mean discussions with other parties in the region as well, namely Iran and Syria. But we must figure out before any discussion what we have to gain from such talks, what we might have to give up, whether we are comfortable with what we might have to give up, what our bottom line in negotiations is, whether we are willing to walk away from negotiations if our bottom line is breached, what our best alternative to a negotiated agreement is and whether we would prefer that to what we can reasonably judge will be the nature and characteristics of a negotiated agreement. Additionally, because authoritarian and totalitarian states crave respect and legitimacy--especially from the United States in its capacity as the greatest democratic republic that the world has ever known--they will be especially anxious for us not to bring up the denial of political and social freedoms that tragically are the hallmark of such oppressive societies. We should not allow this to happen. As with our discussions with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, we should discuss both security issues and issues revolving around the preservation and enhancement of political freedoms in countries like Iran and Syria. The principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act should be front and center in any discussion with Iran and Syria and no amount of diplomatic skedaddling should prevent us from bringing those principles up loudly and clearly, even as we discuss security issues like the reconstruction of Iraq. If, after all, we judge that Iran and Syria have a vested interest in talking to us about security issues, the discussion of political freedoms should not drive them away. Ultimately, such discussions did not drive the Soviets away--precisely because they too perceived the existence of vested interests in talking to us despite our persistence in raising the points embodied by the Helsinki Final Act. In the course of preserving and enhancing our security interests, there is no reason why we cannot peacefully and persistently delegitimize the regimes found in Iran and Syria. The model that worked in the Cold War should be given a chance to work in the war we currently find ourselves.
I say again what I think should be obvious: Withdrawing American troops at this stage will do nothing to bring peace and quiet in Iraq. On the contrary, it will only create a power vacuum that will be filled by insurgents bound and determined to make Iraq their base of operations, just as Afghanistan was the base of operations for al Qaeda until the end of 2001. Sectarian strife and civil war will loom larger over the horizon absent American troops. I do not like writing this; nothing would give me greater pleasure than to argue that the Iraqis can now take over their own country and that American troops can come home. But that is just not in the cards right now. It is one thing to press the Iraqis to take over their own country. It is quite another to ditch them before they are ready to do so and to undermine our own security interests, our capability to deter threats and our general credibility in the process.
A final word: Iraq is an artificial state whose boundaries were drawn by Western powers. Should the Iraqi people wish to maintain those boundaries, their wishes should be respected. But if the Iraqi people are willing to consider it, neither partition nor a dramatic degree of federalization should be left off the table. Indeed, the circumstances on the ground appear more and more to make partition and/or federalization options that must be seriously considered . . . and possibly soon implemented.
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The job of the Iraqi military should be to kill terrorists, and either imprison, or kill, the private death-squad militias in Iraq. At this point, our only job should be to supply, to collect intelligence for, and to provide air support for Iraqi troops while they do their job--killing terrorists and imprisoning death-squad militia members. As for the Iraqi military, let the Iraqi military be the Iraqi military--feared for their ruthlessness. It’s the only thing that works there. I think most Iraqis would cheer a real scorched-earth war on the terrorists and murderers. In medieval societies, I guess you have to get medieval sometimes. Iraqis can. We can't.
as expressed here today in this very interesting front page. As I see it, we have a range of options:
1. Stay the course. To review, this consists of continuing our police operations in Iraq in support of the current government, while continuing to train the Iraqi forces. When the Iraqi army is able to take over our functions we will pull out, leaving behind the stable reasonably pro western government.
Pro: This was the strategy decided by Bush after the Iraqi government was installed in a series of elections. Presumably we have 2 more years to carry it out. Also, it conforms to UN resolutions on Iraq.
Anti: The election established that this is no longer acceptable to the american people. Already at today's Senate hearings, Gen John Abizaid tried to present this option, to be rejected by Dems and Republicans alike. To quote McCain: "The status quo is no longer acceptable."
2. The McCain option: Increase the number of troops in Iraq and resume offensive operations against the militias, Baathists, jihadis, etc. Fight until there is an unambiguous military victory.
Pro: McCain is betting his Presidential run on this being the correct course. He is still very influential. He is not the only person pushing this. I would imagine there is considerable support for this among the military, as well as among the American people as well as right-wing opinion generally.
Anti: Seriously, would the Maliki government be on board with this? If not will we simply proceed? Is there enough support in the country (ours) for this? In practical terms, where will we get the troops for this option? Most importantly, have we frittered away our time on unrealistic goals so that there is now no stomach for a renewed fight, as there would have been up to a year ago?
3. The Afghan model: As described here, this would mean following the successful route we pursued in Afghanistan: Quick military strikes, use of unconventional forces and indigenous resistance, install an exile-based provisional government followed by elections, secure the capital and let the countryside be secured by local forces.
Pro: Aghanistan was a success.
Anti: The Pentagon war plan for Iraq called for an exile-based provisional government and a quick drawdown of forces, followed by elections and a temporary American force in Baghdad while the countryside was pacified by local forces. What went wrong? Everything, but the main problem is that Iraq is not Afghanistan. Short answer: No Hamid Karzai, no unifying tradition or figure, no national Iraqi force big enough to control the capital, let alone the countryside.
We did attempt this model earlier this year when we drew down troops to beef up our forces in Baghdad to secure the capital. It was not successful. Will another attempt be supported at this point?
4. Cut & run: We begin a phased drawdown of forces without ensuring the viability of Iraqi replacements or for that matter the continued existence of the current government. We establish a timetable and stick to it without regard to events on the ground, as we redeploy to...Okinawa.
Pro: Supported by a sizeable portion of Americans but probably not a majority. Promoted by Congressional Democrats like Murtha and Levin who now have power. Would (theoretially) free up troops and national will to focus on other fronts in the WOT. Would give the illusion of progress, or at least change. Would remove the Iraq war as an issue, something politicians in both parties would welcome.
Anti: Would embolden terrorists everywhere, would encourage despots and discourage Democracies and pro-Western countries. Would likely lead to the collapse of the Iraqi regime and the creation of a failed state in Iraq. A failed state with 25% of the world's oil. We lose a staging area for future operations.
5. Restoration of an authoritarian government: in other words, we overthrow the government we installed and replace it with either (1) a military dictatorship like the one in, say, Pakistan. Or like Saddam without the genocide.. (2) restore the monarchy, or find a king somewhere..
Pro: So much less messy than Democracy!
Anti: Ask the Brits how the monarchy thing worked out. They put a Hashemite prince on the throne of Iraq after WWI, that regime was overthrown in an exceptionally bloody revolution in 1958, followed by the de rigeur civil war, followed by the de rigeur repressive strongman. As for a military coup, talk about Vietnam redux! We ran a coup in Vietnam in 1963 to get rid of our guy Diem and replace him with someone who would do a better job on the war. And that worked out....
6. What I call the Goldberg plan: Suggested by Jonah Goldberg in a column suggesting a plebiscite in Iraq: should the US stay or go, and act accordingly. Another variation would be thatMaliki, or the government (at our encouragement) asks us to go and we pretend to be disappointed and then pack up our stuff and pull out in the hasty manner of #2.
Pro: A fig leaf variation on cut & run that gives us some cover & lets the Iraqis gain some face, or honor, or whatever.
Anti: Unworthy of a great power.
7. The Biden option: Give up on the united Iraq, always a construct anyway, created out of three provinces of the Ottoman empire after WWI, by the British, with Sunni rulers over the restive majority Shia for maximum divide & conquer control and extraction of oil. When restrictions are lifted, the Iraqis will continue to fight each other, whatever we do. So convene a conference and divide Iraq up like FDR & Stalin divvying up Europe after WWII. This is the realist option, admitting that we need the agreement of regional powers Iran and Syria to stop the civil war, and in order to get their help, we need to give them something. Iran gets the south, Syria gets the Sunni center, we get Kurdistan.
Pro: A cease-fire and some security for the people of Iraq, a base and oilfields for us in Kurdistan. An end to our occupation of Iraq. The ability to focus on other fronts in the WOT like Waziristan.
Anti: A win for Syria and Iran. Very likely continuation of the civil war in at least the Sunni & Shia parts of Iraq. The loss of the pro-US Maliki government....hmmmm not sure how much of a loss that is.
Anyway, that's my summary. One of these will be the path we take over the next few months. We will have to pick one, because the Democrats will not hesitate to start troop withdrawals/hearings/cutoff of funds when they take over in January.
That is an interesting summary of options. #1 (stay the course) and #2 (increase troops) are complex. Some new remarks from Wednesday's congressional hearing featuring General Abizaid seem important.
The first is from the Republican chairman of the committee:
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Sen. John Warner, R-Va., the committee chairman, noted that the conflict has lasted as long as World War II, with the Iraqi government still unable to stand on its own and assert authority over security forces.
"How do you explain that in simple terms to the American people?" he asked in his opening statement.
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General Abizaid said the following:
In response, Abizaid said he was not arguing for the status quo. He said the key change that is needed now is to place more U.S. troops inside the Iraqi Army and police units to train and advise these forces in planning and executing missions...
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Despite such issues, the addition of more American forces would simply impede Iraqis from taking responsibility for their own future, Abizaid said.
Asked again whether more troops are needed, the general responded, "We do need more troops and the more troops we need are Iraqis." ...
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Abizaid said he believes U.S. troop levels, now at about 141,000, should stay steady but may have to rise temporarily to train and advise Iraqi military units.
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"There will be some hard things on the horizon," Abizaid told the senators. "We'll have to do something in al-Anbar province. We'll have to commit forces to deal with the Mehdi Army.
"Each of those things will be battles in and of themselves that we can win if we set the right political and military conditions. And I sincerely believe we can do that."
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What stands out from all of that testimony is that there really is no difference between option #1 ("status quo") and option #2 ("The McCain Option" = more troops). The military is already fighting to win, and is already adjusting the troop strength as needed. The military is already preparing to fight the battles mentioned above as part of option #2, taking on Sadr, etc.
Abizaid points out the reason why it won't help to add more US troops or for the US military to fight even harder: "the addition of more American forces would simply impede Iraqis from taking responsibility for their own future"; "We do need more troops and the more troops we need are Iraqis."
This is because the mission is not to defeat a certain enemy; the mission is for the Iraqi people to be able to defend their own country. We can't go any faster than the Iraqis learn, and fighting for them won't help, just like a parent can't help a child learn to ride a bike by riding the bike himself.
Senator Warner made the comment about the Iraq war already lasting longer than world war II, yet the Iraqis still couldn't defend themselves. He then asked, "How do you explain that in simple terms to the American people?"
That points out that maybe the voters haven't given up on training the Iraqis, but are wondering why it is taking so long. It has been common in a lot of postings, not the one I'm replying to, to blame the American public, saying they are soft. I take the opposite opinion, that the people correctly see that something is screwed up, and they want to know what is going wrong. Senator Warner's question hints out that the problem is with the Iraqis, not us, and General Abizaid says that clearly, that if we keep more troops there, then the Iraqis will just keep depending on us and learn more slowly. (i.e the simply impede remark I quoted earlier)
The summary of what I wrote above seems to agree with the general: The commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East said Wednesday he is optimistic that "we can stabilize Iraq." We can achieve the goals by continuing with the current goal of training the Iraqis to take over, but with continually adjusting troop levels and tactics, which is options #1 and #2 combined. One of the changes which needs to be made is to communicate better to the public. This would include explaining clearly the goals and end conditions for the war, something which many, many individuals have said the administration has not done well. This would also include explaining why the war took longer than expected.
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Even those who learn from history are surrounded by those doomed to repeat it.
Your post reflects the leadership I think the USA needs. Our flagging hope needs bolstering.
John E.