Shuffling the deck chairs or stacking the deck?
Staff changes at the UN, State, and the Pentagon
By AcademicElephant Posted in The White House — Comments (20) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
The pieces are moving on the military and diplomatic chessboards in anticipation of the President's long-anticipated "new-way-forward-in-Iraq" speech now set for Wednesday night. Over the past few days some long-rumored moves have become official, and we have Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad going from Baghdad to the United Nations and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte moving to the State Department. Meanwhile, Generals George Casey and John Abizaid will not extend their respective tours as Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq and as Commander of Central Command. Ambassador Ryan Crocker will replace Ambassador Khalilzad, Admiral John ("Mike") McConnell (ret.) will replace Mr. Negroponte, General David Petraeus will replace General Casey and Admiral William ("Fox") Fallon will replace General Abizaid. General Casey will replace General Peter Schoomaker as the Army Chief of Staff, and General Abizaid is retiring.
Read on...
I see this shuffling as posaitive overall, but a little bit of a mixed bag as is typical of President Bush's appointments. To some extent, the motion should be understood as a natural development during a long war--people just wear out under the strain and need to be replaced or at least rested and rotated. That's why we have tours, not lifetime appointments. This is certainly the case with Ambassador Khalilzad, who served as Ambassador to Afghanistan before moving to Baghdad in June, 2005. Dr. Khalilzad has a clear and precise understanding of the strategic threats faced by the US, and an unique knowledge of conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is also a tough and experienced diplomat who will brook little nonsense from the assembled menagerie at Turtle Bay. I am confident he will rigorously pursue American interests at the United Nations, and so will be a worthy successor to Mr. Bolton. On this one, I say a very nice pick, and would like to offer my personal thanks to Dr. Khalilzad for taking on this unpleasant task.
I'm a little less delighted by the movement of Mr. Negroponte to Foggy Bottom and Ambassador Crocker to Baghdad. Both gentlemen are career foreign service, and I worry that Mr. Negroponte, in particular, will not promote what had been a very ambitious plan for reform at the State Department that had been set out by Secretary Rice early in 2006. Ambassador Crocker is certainly expert about the middle east, having served in Lebanon, Kuwait and Syria before Pakistan. My concern is that he will value what will prove to be a transitory stability over establishing a lasting democracy. So on these two I would say safe picks--and Mr. Bush's record on the safe picks is not as strong as that on the gutsy picks. I expect that they will probably just kick the can down the road, but they might have unfortunate repercussions (can you say Armitage?).
Admiral McConnell is a choice that follows the model of General Mike Hayden at the CIA. There's not a great deal of public information on him--which tells us something right there. What information there is appears to make the ACLU nervous. Good. The Admiral is a serious intelligence expert having been the Director of the National Security Agency under President Clinton, and he has worked closely with the Department of Defense. As a consultant for Booz Allen Hamilton over the past few years, he has concentrated on threats to our financial and communications systems. He may not be as slick as Mr. Negroponte, and that could turn out to be a good thing. From the little I know, I would call this a good pick.
David Petraeus is a very interesting man who has served two tours in Iraq as the commander of the Airborne 101st, which cleaned out Mosul the first time around, and as commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command, in which function he trained the Iraqi security forces (here's another profile from the end of his second tour). He is generally considered to have been highly successful in both enterprises, as he was able to combine a seriousness of military purpose with the ability to actually deal with people. Pace Ralph Peters, but simply killing the evil-doers isn't going to solve our problems in Iraq. The whole point since 9/11 is that we can't kill all of them--but we can kill as many as possible while trying to change the mindset of those who consider joining them. The trouble is that changing a mindset has not been a traditional DoD task, but as former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld rather bluntly put it in his early November memo, no other government agency has shown any aptitude in Iraq. If the DoD has to take on this work, General Petraeus is uniquely qualified to spearhead the effort--and of course he demonstrated at Mosul that he can kill the bad guys quite handily as well, so I think he's an excellent choice.
One thing that could be a potential issue for General Petraeus that probably will not be for the other nominees is confirmation. There could be problems at his hearings when various senators (can you say Biden?) insist that the Iraqi security forces are a mirage and that the General's statements to the contrary when he was overseeing their training were misguided. This is going to be something of a sticky wicket, because such senators have based their opposition to the way the war has been carried out on the premise that there are no ISF worth the name. Further complicating the situation is the nomination of General Casey to become Army Chief of Staff, so the "It's anyone but Casey" argument won't work if you're confirming General Casey's promotion the next week. We shall see.
And, finally, we have Admiral "Fox" Fallon at CENTCOM. The primary question here seems to be "Why Fallon?" The Admiral has been head of Pacific Command for just under a year, and as streiff pointed out, you usually retire after this sort of appointment. But he's moving over to CENTOCOM instead. Why? I think the answer might be found in Admiral Fallon's March, 2006 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Admiral proclaimed the war on terror PACOMC's first priority, something that might sound surprising to those who would counter that Iraq and Afghanistan aren't under his command. Clearly, Admiral Fallon understands that this conflict transcends those individual theaters, and of course he has worked with coalition partners such as Japan and Australia in the course of his current command. He also handled the North Korean missile crisis this summer, and so is well-versed in moving troops by sea into position to confront such a threat. But aren't we talking about the middle east here, you ask? What about all that sand? Well, what about all that water? Ever hear of the Strait of Hormuz? Or the Strait of Bab el Mandeb? Having a Navy man in charge of this area might come in handy in the near future. So in some ways, Admiral Fallon may be the best of the bunch--a pair of fresh eyes with a strong global strategic vision--and clearly he has the confidence not only of the current Secretary of Defense but also of his predecessor, who promoted him to his current command, not to mention the Commander in Chief.
So, all in all I would call these developments favorable. General Abizaid will be missed, no doubt, and I think all Americans owe General Schoomaker a debt of gratitude for coming out of retirement to tackle Army transformation. I fear one thing we will not see from the Bush administration is a serious attempt at reforming the State Department. That said, there is much in this transition that is for the good, and I'm all for promoting Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey. Going into the President's speech on Wednesday, I think we're stacking the deck against the terrorists that confront us, not shuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic.
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Shuffling the deck chairs or stacking the deck? 20 Comments (0 topical, 20 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
streiff, you know perfectly well that all I do is pick your brain and then repeat what you tell me so I look good...
"I'm kind of old-fashioned. I like to engage my brain before my mouth." Donald Rumsfeld
I can't believe that Negroponte would take that job unless there is an unannounced promise that he will become Secretary of State upon the (already scheduled) departure of Condoleezza Rice.
Drink Good Coffee. You can sleep when you're dead.
Negroponte was brought back to State because, to be honest, things weren't quite working out at DNI. Condi held the job open for him since October, and he took it.
Condi ain't going anywhere.
"History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it"-Winston Churchill
faithfully. Let's review:
On Dec 19, 2006, Mark Kilmer posted on Redstate the interesting topic
"Captain Travis Patriquin's plan for Al-Anbar", which led to a discussion of counterinsurgency vs conventional tactics in Iraq.
Here's my contribution to the thread that day:
"To get back to our original topic (the failure to use Patriquin's counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq) I see that Gen Abizaid, a Redstate favorite along with Sec Rumsfeld, is retiring. As I've dared to argue here, these two officials have pursued the "small footprint" policy which has led to our current "not losing/not winning" stalemate. The departure of these two officials, hopefully followed by Gen. Casey, opens the door to the possibility of victory in Iraq, if only Sec Gates appoints an official like Maj Gen David Petraeus, a junior officer but one who is a counterterrorism specialist. And while I'm at it, I'd like to see the return to iraq of Col HR McMaster, the strategist who used the tactics at Tall Afar successfully."
Thanks, Mr. President, nice work on Petraeus...now get to work on McMaster...
It falls to me again to point out that the strategy in Iraq (small footprint, no more troops, Iraqis stand up as we stand down, bla bla) was the policy of four men, Secdef Rumsfeld, Centcom Abizaid, Gen Casey and his #2 Gen Chiarelli. This policy led to military stalemate and political disaster.
All four men have been replaced. Do we really have to have endless ave atque vale and Rummy we hardly knew ye for these guys? They failed. Let's move on.
"Petraeus is an interesting man.." Wow. Just -- wow.
While I'm delighted that you discovered General Petraeus last month, just a tiny point of protocol--he is a Lieutenant General, as I'm sure he would like you to observe. And I believe he'll be getting that fourth star when he moves to this command, for what it's worth.
As for the questions, I wonder why you think General Petraeus is such an outlier. You might ask yourself who it was that has fostered him over the last six years. Did he do it himself? Or was he encouraged and given increased responsibility by the very individuals you consider failures? Food for thought.
In addition, since as you say you dare to argue about such such things, I would appreciate it if you would explain to me how promoting General Casey to COS of the Army is getting rid of him and his failed policies? I suppose getting kicked up the steps does take your boots off the ground, as it were, but I'm still a little mystified as to your logic. Are you arguing he will excert less influence as a member of the Joint Chiefs?
"I'm kind of old-fashioned. I like to engage my brain before my mouth." Donald Rumsfeld
Here's my contribution to the thread that day:
It falls to me again...
And it falls to me to point out the ca ca in this "assessment" of yours (drum roll, please!):
It falls to me again to point out that the strategy in Iraq (small footprint, no more troops, Iraqis stand up as we stand down, bla bla) was the policy of four men, Secdef Rumsfeld, Centcom Abizaid, Gen Casey and his #2 Gen Chiarelli. This policy led to military stalemate and political disaster.
All four men have been replaced. Do we really have to have endless ave atque vale and Rummy we hardly knew ye for these guys? They failed. Let's move on.
septembergurl, I sense you're a legend in your own mind.
The "small footprint, no more troops" part of the policy was influenced by a factor that one shouldn't ignore: the size of our standing military. We have a 10-division Army and three MEF Marine Corps. As we need to have SOME troops back in the US to (a) be preparing to deploy into theater or (b) be recovering from just having returned from theater, that means we have only so many troops to send overseas at any one time. That constrains the size of the footprint you can create in the first place.
And, as for saying that these men "failed"--you really should return to cloud cuckoo land. Casey, Abizaid and Chiarelli have been trained to create operations plans that take into account the constraints the force will face. I can think of two big constraints off the top of my head:
(1) Limited numbers of US forces to send.
(2) Iraq is a sovereign country! It is our partner, not our possession. We have to get them to agree to some (if not most) of our ops. If they don't--well, that's a pretty big constraint on us, isn't it?
Without those constraints, I suspect you would have seen a larger footprint and more robust ROE. But, seeing as these three generals could not simply wish away or ignore these constraints (as a blogger can), they had to contend with them, and design the best plans they could.
I'm sorry if I've complicated your easy analysis of what hasn't gone well in Iraq, and who is to blame. But, someone needed to do it. Might as well be me!
"Who will stand/On either hand/And guard this bridge with me?" (Macaulay)
this comment was meant to reply to septembergurl's initial comment. I didn't thread it properly. It is her(?) ego to which I refer.
"Who will stand/On either hand/And guard this bridge with me?" (Macaulay)
Wow, where to begin...
Rumsfeld was always opposed to a larger force in Iraq. This isn't even debatable. The force that went in was small and the occupying force was small. That was Rummy's position up until Nov 7, 2006. Can we set some base facts that we agree on or do I have to argue everything from scratch? Because it's tedious.
This was a doctrinal position because Rummy was trying to make the military smaller, leaner, meaner, more effective. So, he was opposed IN PRINCIPLE to more troops in Iraq. Not because he didn't have enough troops.
Abizaid was a different story. He was considered ideal for this post because he was an Arab-American, he knew the lingo, he understood the Arabs, he was a regular Lawrence of Iraq. He has been quoted many times as saying that he opposed the increase in US forces because too many troops would upset the Iraqis. Their feelings would be hurt, you know. Too many troops would make it obvious that we were occupying their country, providing what security there was, and doing what Iraqis should be doing. It's an honor thing, you know? So he was against making our presence too...obvious.
Peter Chiarelli was Casey's #2, in charge of ground forces. As such he was in overall charge of the training of Iraqi forces. It was his program that was supposed to create the Iraqi force that would replace ours. He was perhaps even more opposed to more American forces than any of the others. Again, not because we didn't have the troops but because he wanted to decrease our forces, not increase. You dig? More Iraqis, fewer Americans.
As for Casey, who knows? I don't. He opposed more forces all along.
A little history here. The policy being pursued by these four honorable gents was perfectly reasonable if not overwhelmingly successful until February 2006. The Shia Mosque was bombed, setting off the Sunni-Shia violence which continues to this day. As a result, the violence (measured by Iraqis killed, bombs, etc) increased when we had been told by Casey et al that it was decreasing. The political developments (parties, parliament, unity government, etc) seemed to lead not to peace but to the creation of militias affiliated to parties. It was especially bad in Baghdad, where the different groups live next to each other. Soon there were death squads, ethnic cleansing, etc.
At this point a number of people in the White House and State Department expresed alarm and called for a review of our Iraq strategy. You know -- like maybe we should see how the whole Iraqi army standing up while we stand down is going to work when the different groups are killing each other? Like maybe we need to focus on SECURITY? Nope, no uh-uh negative! was the response from Abizaid et al.
This is where the President made his one and only mistake in Iraq (oh there were lots of things he probably regrets and would have done differently, but this was a mistake)-- he agreed with Rumsfeld and the generals to make no review and no changes in troop levels. He did this because he believed in giving his military total support and not second-guessing them. Especially not during an election year. Very noble, but wrong, and the President paid a huge price in the election.
"Failed" is probably too strong a word. And I personally adore Rummy.But facts are facts, and they have to be confronted, as the President has.
I suppose on the one hand it is nice that you personally adore Mr. Rumsfeld, while on the other I (again, personally) find your denigration of General Abizaid unfortunate--but what truly confuses me is your threadjack of a post that has nothing to do with Mr. Rumsfeld, General Abizaid or General Casey--let alone General Chiarelli. You were indeed prescient for identifying General Petraeus a couple of weeks ago, but I have to ask, don't you have any thoughts on Dr. Khalilzad? Admiral Fallon? Even Mr. Negroponte or Ambassador Crocker? Because they were the subject of the original post...
"I'm kind of old-fashioned. I like to engage my brain before my mouth." Donald Rumsfeld
"we have Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad going from Baghdad to the United Nations and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte moving to the State Department. Meanwhile, Generals George Casey and John Abizaid will not extend their respective tours as Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq and as Commander of Central Command. Ambassador Ryan Crocker will replace Ambassador Khalilzad, Admiral John ("Mike") McConnell (ret.) will replace Mr. Negroponte, General David Petraeus will replace General Casey and Admiral William ("Fox") Fallon will replace General Abizaid. General Casey will replace General Peter Schoomaker as the Army Chief of Staff, and General Abizaid is retiring."
I dealt with the parts that interested me, namely the military part. But you cetainly included the military changes, so "threadjack" seems a bit excessive.
I really appreciate your devastating politeness. It goes a long way in the blogosphere.
it was a fairly weak effort.
He was considered ideal for this post because he was an Arab-American, he knew the lingo, he understood the Arabs, he was a regular Lawrence of Iraq.
I think you overstate this. Abizaid's heritage is Lebanese. He did not grow up speaking Arabic, rather he learned Arabic a the Defense Language Institute -- like most other officer who "know the lingo", he "understood Arabs" mainly because he's served in the Middle East before as part of the force that protected the Kurds during the aftermath of the Gulf War.
Peter Chiarelli was Casey's #2, in charge of ground forces. As such he was in overall charge of the training of Iraqi forces.
Martin Dempsey is in charge of military training in Iraq. Peter Chiarelli is commander of MNC-I, but he's also commander of XVIII Airborne Corps. That corps headquarters rotates regularly.
As for Casey, who knows? I don't. He opposed more forces all along.
I learned, while getting my BA in Linguistics, specializing in Arabic Language and Literature, that Arabic is an exemplar of a linguistic situation known as classical/colloquial. Other examples are Mandarin Chinese/dialects, and Medieval Latin Christendom/European dialects (English, etc).
I'm sure you already know this, Streiff, but let me explain it for others. In this situation, the classical language(known and taught today as Modern Standard Arabic)) is used by the elites, for the media, government, education, religion, and all written communication. The Koran is in Classical Arabic, so are today's newspapers, so is pre-Islamic poetry. The language has not changed for 2,000 years and the Arabs are justly proud of it. Every Arab will speak Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, Moroccan, dialect -- a simplified verion of Classical Arabic, influenced by languages like English and French, and most importantly, unwritten. Educated Arabs also have a mastery of classical Arabic, which is used in business, governemnt, etc. More importantly, every literate Arab can communicate with every other literate Arab, no matter what country they come from via MSA. The consequences of this, to the concept of the 'umma and the Caliphate, are enormous.
But I digress. The point is, yes, I know Abizaid is Lebanese, and the Arabic he might have heard the older members of his family or community speaking would be Lebanese dialect -- not classical Arabic. However, being a native speaker of one of the dialects is a big help in learning MSA, as is being a native speaker of Hebrew, another Semitic language. It's like being a native speaker of English learning Latin. There are cognates, vocabulary items, etc that help.
Chiarelli -- I understood he was replaced by Odierno, who was in favor of increasing troops. I may have his position wrong, but I thought he was Casey's #2.
Casey -- Just today, Sunday, I heard Timmy Russert blustering away that "Abizaid was against a troop increase, Bush fired him; Casey was against a troop increase, Bush fired him.."
Allowing for Timmy's crude oversimplification, this is an idea that an awful lot of people somehow have. Are we all wrong?
"In his first wide-ranging interview, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq conceded Sunday that a military "surge" escalation would not be enough to rescue Iraq, advocating economic and political changes as well, as top Democratic lawmakers in Washington stiffened their opposition to any escalation of U.S. troop strength.
Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno said he believed that a combination of jobs, provincial elections, anti-militia legislation and stronger Iraqi security forces could stop the nation's plunge toward all-out civil war. Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, his predecessor, spelled out the same approach before his departure one month ago."
This is what I meant re Chiarelli & his successor, so I take back my correction. They call him the #2 & Chiarelli #2, OK??
Well now, even the Military leadership is beginning to speak their mind a bit more openly. SecDef Gates may not be a happy camper tonight.
I wonder when General Odierno's orders as then new CG of the Antarctic research station are coming down from the President?
_______________________________
Another South Park Republican spouting off !
Please take note that we have threaded comments here at RS 2.0. The content of your comments aside, please have the respect and attention to detail to let everybody know who you are speaking to, including the person to whom you are replying.
A quick look at the comment boxes will reveal a "Reply to This" link. Please use it.
-The Mgmt.
And while we're on the subject of rules, etc, maybe you can clarify for me:
When I post again -- and I will -- as I understand from the foregoing, it's absolutely OK and good form to refer to someone else's post as excrement and to cast doubt on the poster's sanity, as #7 did to me, correct?
Let me know, won't you? Because, though I don't normally resort to crude obscenity and ad hominem attacks to make my points, who knows? It might come in handy.
Can we set some base facts that we agree on or do I have to argue everything from scratch? Because it's tedious.
Yes, you'll have to spell everything out for us. We are ignorant dolts. And, pleeze be patyent with us...wee don't have ur burrrning intelekt.
So, he was opposed IN PRINCIPLE to more troops in Iraq. Not because he didn't have enough troops.
And, he told you this when? You ignore the possibilty that his reluctance to not send more troops was perhaps influenced by what he learned in second grade? Namely, the ability to count--which would have told him that he only had so many troops to send in the first place?
Peter Chiarelli was Casey's #2 ... He was perhaps even more opposed to more American forces than any of the others. Again, not because we didn't have the troops but because he wanted to decrease our forces, not increase.
I suppose Chiarelli told you this at the same time you spoke with Casey?
You dig?
Yeah, me dig. You rude. You legend in your own mind.
septembergurl, I hereby nominate you for Grand Mistress of Snark. Your Majesty, may I ask you a question: Are you saying that Rumsfeld had sufficient reserves of ground troops to bolster our force strength in Iraq if he'd wished, and still meet our other international security needs, without unduly straining our Army and Marine Corps?
Mind addressing that question, Captain? Pleeez!
"Who will stand/On either hand/And guard this bridge with me?" (Macaulay)
His desire to reduce the infantry was his top priority--to make the military lighter, more high-tech, and more lethal. (In priciple, it was a good idea that played to America's strengths.) The number of troops that went into Iraq was actually at the upper level of what Rumsfeld wanted. To make the Rumsfeld "you go with the army that you have, not the army that you might wish to have" argument obscures the fact that the army Rumsfeld wished to have was even smaller than the one he had.
If smagar is right that the number of troops available was always too small to effect a successful invasion...then maybe we should have given it a pass.
There are a few takeaways here.
First, contrary to John Podhoretz Casey isn't being fired. He's succeeding Pete Schoomaker as CSA and as such will bring home to the institutional Army, an institutional Army that still doesn't believe it is at war, a sense of urgency in training and doctrine.
The rapidly developing meme that there is something strange about an admiral commanding a theater which is conducting two ground campaigns (Larry Korb, call your office) is just bizarre. For 20 years, since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it has been a requirement that anyone ascending to general/flag officer rank, especially someone being nominated a combatant commander, be qualified to command all branches of the armed forces. As Commander, PACOM, he had responsibility for any ground campaign we would have fought in North Korea. There is a lot of stuff going on in the CENTCOM AO that is not Iraq or Afghanistan related. The Horn of Africa, naval interdiction in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and if push comes to shove with Iran the sharp end of the stick will be Naval air power.
I, too, am concerned about Negroponte overseeing the reform effort at state but he will also have enough clout to make State actually participate in the GWOT in some manner other than their daily press briefing.
AE, I wonder why I even bother to write on military matters. Great work.