Redstate

Yet.

By AcademicElephant Posted in War — Comments (1) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

On a blogger conference call yesterday morning, the first question to Major General William Caldwell (spokesman for MNF-I) was about the impact the congressional standoff over the President's emergency supplemental bill will have on our troops (you can download the PDF of the transcript here). General Caldwell concurred with Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker's assessment that the US Army would begin to feel the funding pinch at the end of April. As he pointed out, General Schoomaker is hardly given to hyperbole, so even though he (General Caldwell) was not in Washington, he agreed with the Chief's assessment. But another force, he reports, is already suffering from the delayed funds.

That would be the Iraqi Security Forces.

As General Caldwell noted, the ISF are the most vulnerable at this point:

But I can tell you from over here, it's going to have an immediate impact in the sense that the MNSTC-I element that we have is charged with building, equipping, helping to develop the Iraqi security forces, and that is going to have an impact on them. Now to what degree? You know, we can get into a lot more specifics, but they are already starting to feel the effects of not having this funding.

Again now, from the U.S. combat forces on the ground, it has not had an impact on us. We still have what we need to conduct our operations. But MNSTC-I, which is charged with, you know, the Title X responsibilities associated in very simplistic form with the Iraqi security forces -- it does have an impact today and will only get more pronounced with time.

The failure of the ISF has been a major theme for opponents of the war. There are those who believe there was no planning for them until General Paul Eaton saved the situation in 2004. Or General David Petraeus intervened in 2005. Even given their participation, there are still those who despair of the ISF altogether. They don't exist, and if they do exist their hopelessly corrupt and incompetent. So why should we care if their funding is cut? Serves them right for not getting their act in gear.

Or does it? As General Caldwell pointed out, the ISF have played a major role in Operation Fard al-Qanun. No, they are not the equivalent of US troops, but they've fulfilled their commitment to bring nine additional brigades into Baghdad and are now implementing a plan to keep their numbers constant through ongoing troop rotations. This didn't happen because of some radical change in approach over the past couple of months. It happened because of patient and not always arrow-straight progress over years. I've wondered before if the increased visibility and viability of the Iraqis in joint patrols with with MNF-I has been a key element in the early success of the "surge," especially since our part isn't implemented yet. Do the Iraqis sense that this initiative is different because they're an integral part of it? Could be, which begs the question why not do this before? Well, as General Caldwell discussed, some things take time:

I've been here almost a year now. And I can tell you that from a year ago when I first got here to now, and I'm out, you know, every week someplace, having the ability to get out and go around the country -- that, you know, they continue to get better all the time.

From better equipment, more capable leadership and the quality of their young soldiers as they develop the professionalism inside their force, it's going to still take time, but is beginning to take hold. Obviously, they're not going to be anywhere near the capabilities and the professionalism of our force any time soon, but they're moving forward, which is the important thing, and they are getting better all the time. Obviously, we count on them very much. As part of this Fard al-Qanun, they brought into the city about 4,500 extra troops, nine battalions, with some headquarters, but they brought in nine additional infantry battalions. And again, when I go back a year ago, the idea of even trying to move one Iraqi battalion was unheard of. About six months ago, if we attempted to move Iraqi army battalions, it was a significant challenge and we were not always successful; and when we did move them, it was very painful and it was unsustainable.

Today they've moved nine battalions into the city, as they said they would. They got them there. They've come in at varying levels of overall strength, some very good, some needing additional troops brought in to bring it up to strength. But they've moved all nine, and they're already starting to work the plans on how they would do the rotation out of those nine and bring nine more in. I mean, that is just an incredible step forward, to have developed that capability over the last year from non-existent last year this time to today they've moved nine in and they're going so far as now talking about rotating those nine in and out, which is just an incredible step forward for them to have that planning, discussions, mapping it out and then going and executing it.

Obviously, we would like to see the Iraqi security forces continue to grow and develop. There's plans on the shelf, as you know, to kick it up. You know, the prime minister has some initiatives out there that he's going to grow the size of the Iraqi security forces, and that's all been funded and planned for, and everybody's moving out on that.

But at the current moment, because of this lack of funding, MNSTC-I is unable to continue at the pace they were in the developmental process of the Iraqi security forces. And, you know, obviously we're looking at that real closely and it is starting to have some -- an impact today and will only, you know, have more of an impact over time. [emphasis mine]

So what we have here is an increasingly professional and useful force that is making a substantive impact on Baghdad security--and this is what congressional Democrats propose to cut off at the knees. I know they're very fond of timetables and that the ISF have not adhered to Nancy Pelosi's schedule. But maybe timetables aren't everything they're cracked up to be, and what we have here is stark evidence of having policy dictated by an arbitrary calender rather than what is actually happening on the ground. A large number of Americans and Iraqis have worked gruelingly hard to bring the ISF to their current level over the past few years. What a pathetic end this mean and politically-motivated funding cut would make to their story. We are right to be concerned about its future ramifications for our own troops, but while we're assessing the foolish recklessness of the Democrats' Iraq policy, we might spare a thought for how it's already effecting troops who have the potential to become some of our greatest allies in the War on Terror: the ISF.