A Two State Solution
from the "be careful what you wish for" files
By streiff Posted in War — Comments (3) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Today we have what the US State Department and the EU has long dreamed of in the Middle East. A "two state" solution to the Palestinian issue. Early today Hamas evicted Fatah from the Gaza Strip and assumed governance of the 1.4 million potential suicide bombers who live there.
Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah have moved to consolidate their grip on the West Bank.
The unctuous Martin Indyk offers an interesting perspective on the situation. He thinks Abbas may be laughing all the way to the bank.
Read on.
One might expect that this democratically elected leader would denounce Hamas's coup and call for international intervention to restore his control. But there he sat in Ramallah, prevaricating as the only liberated part of his putative state fell into the hands of his Palestinian archenemies. Finally yesterday, he dismissed the Hamas-led government, but only after its takeover of Gaza was complete.
Critics will say that this is typical of Abbas, a weak leader who would rather appease his challengers than confront them. But perhaps Abbas understands the emerging realities better than they do.
Over the past year when Hamas would stage attacks in Gaza, Fatah forces would retaliate in the West Bank, where they were stronger. When fighting began this time, Fatah did little in the West Bank to counter Hamas's onslaught. Abbas's passivity further confirms that the fix was in. Abbas and Fatah have in effect conceded Gaza to Hamas while they hold on to the West Bank. Hamastan and Fatahstine: a "two-state solution" -- just not the one that George W. Bush had in mind.
Indyk's analysis has a lot to recommend it. There was no visible effort by Fatah to reinforce their garrisons in Gaza and the Israelis didn't intervene to prevent an international terrorist group from forcing an ongoing criminal enterprise from power. For Abbas losing Gaza may be a loss of prestige but in terms of governance it makes his job much easier.
From an Israeli perspective, isolating Hamas in a few hundred square miles of undesirable real estate and dealing with a Fatah that doesn't have to worry about Hamas has to be appealing. According to Indyk, Hamas may now be confronted with more important issues than winging the odd Qassam rocket into Israel:
Of course, all Palestinian leaders will continue to declare the indivisibility of the Palestinian homeland. But in private, Abbas and other Fatah leaders may take solace from the dilemma Hamas will now have to confront.
The failed state of Gaza that Hamas controls is wedged between Egypt and Israel. Its water, electricity and basic goods are imported from the Jewish state, whose destruction Hamas has declared as its fundamental objective. One more Qassam rocket fired from Gaza into an Israeli village and Israel could threaten to seal the border if Hamas did not stop its attacks. Hamas would then have to reach a meaningful cease-fire with Israel or seek Egypt's help meeting the basic needs of the 1.5 million Gazans. Hosni Mubarak's regime turned a blind eye to the importation of weapons and money that helped ensure Hamas's takeover. But would Egypt allow on its border a failed terrorist state run by an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood with links to Iran and Hezbollah? Or will it insist on the maintenance of certain standards of order in return for its cooperation?
Whatever transpires, Gaza has become Hamas's problem. It's a safe bet that the real attitude of Abbas and Fatah is: Let Hamas try to rule Gaza, and good luck.
Indyk's premise though is based on the notion that Fatah will be able to prevent Hamas from metastasizing to the West Bank from Gaza. A notion that seems to reside as much in he realm of hope and faith as in the realm of probabilities. Ironically, the best way of preventing that is the wall that Israel is building.
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tiations with Egypt, Israel was practically begging Egypt to take back the Gaza Strip under its own administration, with suitable security guarantees for Israeli settlers. The Egyptians wanted no part of that failed mini-state with no economic or political underpinnings. So Israel was stuck with Gaza and happy in '93 to hand it over to Arafat---who didn't much like the place either!
Good analysis! I worked with Indyk on a project for a short time and he's not as unctuous as he sounds---he is from the land of Oz, after all!
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Taunted by a Liberal in Parliament that he was going to die "on the gallows or of a vicious social disease," Disraeli replied "That depends on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
While the idea of letting the Islamists take control of some not-too threatening countries and let them run them into the ground is alluring, in this case the idea will not work:
1) The separation between the West Bank and Gaza is artificial, in that the Palestinians do not believe in it. Just wait until the (inevitable) confrontation between Hamas and Israel, and popular pressure will prevent Abbas from proceeding anywhere in negotiations. (I don't really believe Israel could get an agreement with Abbas anyway, but that's another debate). Hamas will, of course, blame Israel for every failure of his in Gaza.
2) With apporval ratings below the margin of error, Olmert does not have the ability to do anything that will attract too much opposition (and Barak's "security credentials" are rather suspect in the eyes of many in the Israeli public). In all likelihood, the final Winograd report will bury him.
3) Hamas has not been destroyed in the WB, but rather militarily neutralized (for now). Expect a flurry of assasination attempts on Abbas, like the recently discovered bomb tunnels.
What will likely happen is a lot of empty noise about negotiations, and the well-known phenomona of "regression to the extreme", where each Arab leader is forced to accept the position of the ones more extreme than him, under fear of assasination and/or rebellion.
The peace process is doomed for this generation.
"The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason." - T.S. Eliot
I read an analysis in a Middle East newspaper yesterday very much along the same lines. The only variable I would add is that more money from Iran and Syria can provide complications. In addition, from a converse view this (separating from the corrupt Fatah PA) also provides Hamas additional flexibility to pursue their own ignominious agenda.
As proven in Lebanon, money can buy considerable appeasement among the population. Along with aid from other “sympathetic” Muslim nations it could forestall, and I choose that word deliberately, the eventual disaster.
However, as you aptly pointed out logistics (e.g. the reliance on Israel, somewhat “hemmed in” geography), long term funding and above all else ideology will provide impetus for disaster. With respect to the latter; I am curious how long it will take before some type of Hamas military action against Israel will provoke a response? Certainly, that is a prerequisite for blaming their problems on someone else.
I for one will be waiting to see how this power is consolidated, what appeals are made and which nations will deal “under the table” with Hamas. Certainly, the mention of Alan Johnston’s status this morning indicates they are at least attempting or thinking about how to achieve some support.
"Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori"
Contributor to The Minority Report