Redstate

By streiff Posted in War — Comments (1) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

General Barry McCaffrey has returned from Afghanistan and another of his indispensable memos is beginning to circulate and as far as I know, RedState is the first to get a copy (I stand ready to be corrected on this but I’ll toot my horn for the moment).

McCaffrey made a trip to Iraq last year and his memo still stands the test of time. If this memo follows that path, things in the Long War may be looking incrementally better.

More on the memo below the fold.

The Situation

The War in Afghanistan has been shamefully under-resourced by DOD throughout the entire intervention in terms of inter-agency involvement, US combat forces, political will, and nation-building resources.

The situation is now turning rapidly for the better[…]

We are now in a race against time. We must deal with: the Taliban (700% increase in IED’s---140 suicide bombers last year); the criminals who control much of the ground level governance of the largest narco-state operation in the world; foreign fighters who now plot terrorism against both the Afghan Government and the US ---from sanctuaries in Pakistan’s uncontrolled border region as well as the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan; and finally from the growing disaffection of the suffering people of Afghanistan who lack police, roads, electricity, security, jobs, and belief in their government.

We can, without question, achieve our US national objective of a functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy--- which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is the cross-over year. The execution of our plan in the coming 24 months will decide the outcome in the country. 90% of the Afghan people (to include the Pashtuns) reject the extremist ideology of the Taliban. They strongly abhor the continuing violence. They are working frantically throughout the country to re-build. They admire and trust their new Army. They are incredibly eager to absorb new lessons, new opportunities. They trust, admire, and protect their Embedded US Trainers. They will support security and progress while remaining a deeply Islamic state. In addition, the Pakistanis are strongly supportive of our goal of a strong, stabilized state.

The Afghan Army and Afghan Police

As with many Third World nations, forming a police force is proving much more difficult that forming an army.

We have no real grasp of what actual ANP presence exists at the 355 District level operations. We have trained 60,000 Afghan police—but we have no idea where they are. We do know that 50% more Afghan police were KIA last year than ANA soldiers. Probably there are non-uniformed, untrained, and largely criminal elements in many of the District Capitals. There are no real jails-- or prosecutors --or judges -- or squad cars. The 34 Provincial level capitals actually do have a uniformed Police presence with a functioning connection to national Police command authority. The ANP presence in some key areas such as Kabul is inadequate… but functioning. There is a new National Police Command Center.

The task of creating 82,000 Afghan Policemen (currently a notional 62,000 force) is a ten year job that we must fully resource. We are now initiating a Police Reform Program which includes assessing the 15,000 officers of the ANP -- and firing half of them. Without effective police -- there cannot be governance. Without effective police -- there cannot be security and counter-insurgency. Without effective police -- there will be no economic reconstruction. The Germans had the lead on this effort. They have done an inadequate job. The German program consists of a few senior German police mentors (40+) of enormous professionalism but few resources.

This is an echo of Iraq and of Haiti. If we get dragged into a nebulous lose-lose war in Darfur we would do well to remember that we need to focus on training a national police force and quickly.

The Afghan National Army, however, is making strides.

The ANA is much better postured. They have pride, embedded US trainers, a functioning chain-of-command, a superb combat leader (Gen Bismullah Kahn as CHOD), and rudimentary equipment. They will fight. They are in good physical shape. (Like mountain goats). They are the first element of national unity in 100 years in Afghanistan. They have successfully mixed ethnic formations at all levels. They have been able to discount the factional pull on their unity of purpose. They actually look like great soldiers. However, they have no real national logistics or maintenance system.

The ANA has for all practical purpose no air power[…].

They have no high speed, wheeled, light armor […] They have junk small […] They lack body armor. They lack deployable, modern mortars and light artillery.

The bottom line here:

If we want to be out of Afghanistan in 15 years—we need to spend 10 Billion dollars on ANA and ANP equipment over the next five years ---and equip a capable, dominant battle force and law enforcement capability.

Friendly Forces

General McCaffery is big on the NATO presence:

NATO presence in Afghanistan and their current responsibility for all of the national AOR is a political and security triumph. (37 nations and 36,000 troops---15,000 US) […] The US should be enormously grateful that NATO legitimacy backs our national strategy.

but still qualified in his praise and dead-on in his assessment of the brittleness of NATO forces:

As a general statement, however, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential supporting elements (helicopters, engineers, logistics, intelligence), have severely restrictive rules-of-engagement, and may lack the national political will to fight when required. It is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support.

The greatest value of NATO is their Command and Control presence--- the ISAF Headquarters.

He also hints at some of the politicking that comes along with coalition warfare:

In my view, it is essential that the US retain the Commander position. The US will continue to provide the bulk of the useful ground combat power, air power, economic reconstruction, and trainers for the ANA and ANP. There is long NATO tradition of allowing the US to retain command where we provide essential resources.

[…]

The NATO Allies should rotate the Deputy and other positions—not the commander.

I am not so enamored with NATO. Coalitions are great examples of negative synergy, a situation where the sum of the whole is much less that the sum of the parts, and one is reminded of the joke floated while the EU was just a fleeting nightmare:

The EU was designed to be a place where the cooks are French, the police are British, the mechanics are German, the lovers are Italian, and everything is organized by the Swiss. In reality, the cooks are British, the police are German, the mechanics are French, the lovers are Swiss, and everything is organized by the Italians.

On the US military, McCaffrey gives the lie to those who claim the volunteer military has failed and that it doesn’t know how to fight a counterinsurgency.

The most important single factor in Afghanistan--without which nothing else is possible-- is the reality of the enormous courage, aggressiveness, discipline, and flexibility of US combat forces. No one inside the Washington Beltway actually understands the gravity of this finding. It is assumed to be what happens when you reach for the military tool. This is no accident. It is a function of NCO and Officer leadership--- and the decade long exposure to combat and stability operations of the Joint Forces team in the Balkans, Desert Storm, Iraq II, Afghanistan, and the many other theaters in which US air, sea, and land power operate.

These troops are the best combat force we have ever fielded. They are physically and mentally tough. Their OPSEC is unbelievable (one of the major historical weaknesses of the US Army). Many are now on their third or even fourth combat tour. They know their business cold. They know each other from repeated deployments in the same units.

They have solved the Joint interoperability problems with air power, artillery, and logistics at a tactical level. The commanders are incredibly experienced at company, battalion, and brigade. The generals grew up together in combat and trust each other. (The current Afghan deployed US Army force is the paratrooper--light infantry cult. They are self-actualizing).

The Joint Force fundamental combat skills are awesome. I don't think they understand how good they are. The primary reason that US casualties number in the hundreds killed and maimed -- instead of the thousands -- is the enormous tactical skill of these battle forces.

There is a lot more in the letter on Pakistan, special operations forces, drug eradication, turf wars between US agencies, reconstruction, and his summary:

The Afghan economy is booming at 12% growth rate a year. $14 billion has been spent on aid since 2001. Six TV channels and a hundred free/uncensored publications are available to the people. Literacy is increasing rapidly. The ring road is now 2/3 complete. The 40,000 soldiers of the ANA are growing rapidly in numbers and capability. There are 45,000 NATO and US troops in-country. There is a functioning democracy with an elected Parliament ---and a serious, dedicated Afghan President in office.

Afghanistan can be a strategic victory in the struggle against terrorism. We are now on the right path.