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Some thoughts on the Rumsfeld Iraq memo in the New York Times

By AcademicElephant Posted in War — Comments (12) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

The New York Times published yet another recent classified memo on Bush administration Iraq policy today in what could become an unfortunate pattern of leaks. Last week, we read National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley's memo on the status of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's unity government (go here for Michael Gordon's analysis, and here for the text of the memo). This time, the author was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the topic was possible strategy changes in Iraq. While it is certainly interesting to gain insight into how policy is being crafted, and unlike the Times I do not find the memos unmitigated documents of dysfunctional defeat (more on this below), these leaks could do serious damage to this administration's ability to weigh options on Iraq. The President needs to hear all his alternatives, the good, the bad and the ugly, and to give him those options in an honest and forthright manner, his advisors cannot write with an eye to what will play well on the front page of the New York Times. But if these leaks continue, that is what they will be forced to do. This begs the question: who is doing the leaking? If additional documents of this nature appear, the agenda of their source may become clear. At this point, I think the best guess is that it's someone with a vested interest in destablizing the current Iraq policy and reinforcing the impression that Iraq is a failed, or at the very least a failing, state. But now the memos are "out there" for everyone to read, I wonder if they will have the intended effect. When carefully read, they are not the "gotcha" evidence of failure in Iraq that critics claim. In both the Hadley and the Rumsfeld memos there are indications that yes, things are difficult and peril lurks. But progress is being made and success remains possible--even, gasp--likely.

Read on...

The Times is predictably disdainful of the Rumsfeld memo in analysis that frames it as an admission of defeat by Mr. Rumsfeld, who is dubbed by authors Michael Gordon (who also analyzed the Hadley memo) and David Cloud "a symbol of a dogged stay-the-course policy." The Times goes on to equate Mr. Rumsfeld with Saddam Hussein and to suggest that the Secretary is, to borrow a phrase from Bob Woodward, "this close" to John Murtha (D-PA) on a policy of re-deploying American troops to safer locations in Iraq and Kuwait. Furthermore, the Times asserts that Mr. Rumsfeld, like the paper's august editors, is ready to declare defeat in Iraq because he doesn't "seem confident that the administration would readily develop an effective alternative." Overall, Mr. Gordon and Mr. Cloud are almost gleeful over the contents of this scooped memo, particularly over the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld's proposals will "no longer have the same weight" now that he has resigned.

It seems a pity to rain on Mr. Gordon and Mr. Cloud's parade because they clearly are having such a good time with this line of reasoning, but I fear we have a fundamental problem here. They have failed to grasp the purpose of this document. Apparently at Mr. Bush's request, Mr. Rumsfeld assembled a "laundry list" that contained a full range of strategic options for Iraq. Notice the plural here. Options. Not option. Mr. Rumsfeld began his memo by concurring with the President that it is time for a major policy change, and divided the alternatives into more and less desirable sections, but the memo is not a policy statement. It is a tool for the President to use in deciding on his strategy. After all, it is not titled "A New Strategy for Iraq." It's called "Iraq -- Illustrative New Courses of Action." They are suggestions, contemplation of which may lead to clearer vision on the problems we face, and so to additional solutions. As Mr. Rumsfeld noted, there is no silver bullet on this list. Different options, if selected, would need to be combined with others to be effective.

So what exactly are these "courses" that the Times is now so eager to dismiss? Where might they have come from? And how likely is it that they will be implemented?

There was some talk on the Sunday shows today that the memo was a last-ditch attempt by Mr. Rumsfeld to hang onto his job. If so, it was an uncharacteristic misstep. This is not a memo full of what the President wanted to hear. It does not paint a rosy picture. It does not purport to make its author look good--there's no "I told you so" or hindsight justification of strategy. In fact, staying on the "current path," which is what Mr. Rumsfeld might be expected to recommend were he trying to cling to office, is number one on the "less attractive options" list. I got the sense that rather than being about Mr. Rumsfeld, the memo was designed to be deliberately provocative, even shocking in passages, in the interests of stimulating new thinking on Iraq. Since the Times has seen fit to release it, I recommend reading the whole thing. It won't take long as it is blunt rather than discursive. Here are the bits I found noteworthy:

Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units' language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.

This proposal makes excellent sense, but I don't recall seeing it before. By participating in the activities of US troops, the Iraqis can experience first hand what it is to run a modern military, which would be enormously helpful to them, particularly in logistics. Iraqi embeds would also be helpful to US troops, as they could function as translators and emissaries to local communities. My understanding is that the informal KATUSA arrangement is unique, but as I would much rather see Iraq turn out like South Korea than like Vietnam, I don't see why the model can't be adapted in Iraq. Certainly the practice of embedding US troops in Iraqi units should be continued--indeed, increased--but the notion of reverse-embeds might turn out to be even more valuable in the long term.

Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.

Rumor has it that Secretary Rumsfeld has been advocating more aggressive military action against Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq for some time. Beefed up troop presence on these borders would help stem the flow of weapons and terrorists into Iraq, and so materially increase security and decrease the inclination of the Iraqi government to listen to Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Yes, there are risks to this strategy. Such deployment might increase the possibility of expanded US military action in the region, but it is becoming increasingly clear that without securing those borders, Iraq has little hope of stability.

Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.

This suggestion falls into the hearts-and-minds category, and so might seem outside the traditional purview of the DoD. It is, but, as Mr. Rumsfeld notes, "no other organization could do it," so the military will have to. Such a program would provide young Iraqis with a viable alternative to becoming terrorists, and would also, if structured in a certain way, give them a vested interest in their country's success. It has been suggested recently that what Afghanistan needs is not a US implemented, high-tech new infastructure, but one that is built by more traditional methods by Afghans themselves with the support and direction of the US. A similar program could be implemented in Iraq, where public works projects would thus not only repair the decades of neglect under Saddam, but provide work for disaffected youths that would integrate them into the fabric of the new Iraq.

Also of interest were the "less attractive" items that went below the fold. I mentioned number one, "Stay on the current path," above. The others include many of the options supposedly under consideration by the Iraq Study Group, such as a massive troop increase (the "surge" that is also rumored to be favored by the President), a firm date for withdrawal, partitioning Iraq, and a Dayton-like peace summit (rumored to be favored by the Secretary of State). As with the more-attractive options, Mr. Rumsfeld does not get into the whys and hows of these alternatives, he simply presents them as topics of discussion. Everything is on the table. But it is clear where his inclinations lie--towards a creative and forward-thinking development of Iraq's military and its government, indeed of its whole society--which will result in an Iraq that is increasingly less-reliant on both the US and its less helpful neighbors.

So if he was not motivated by self interest, what formed Mr. Rumsfeld's thinking as he crafted this memo? It seems unlikely that he dreamed it up on the morning of November 6th; it is rather more plausible to surmise that it grew out of the extensive internal review the Pentagon has been conducting since early September under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace. While General Pace has been the official "face" of this review, it seems to me likely that his civilian boss was an active participant as well. If this is indeed the case, then the Rumsfeld memo reflects the current thinking of commanders on the ground in Iraq--not just Generals Casey and Abizaid, but also the lower ranking generals and colonels who are just back from their tours that General Pace has included in this ongoing discussion. It will be interesting to see if the forthcoming Pace report includes recommendations such as the reverse-embeds and the deployment of additional troops to the Syrian and Iranian borders, and to see what traction these proposals gain as Mr. Bush develops his new strategy.

The New York Times has played its part in the successful short-term media campaign to make Mr. Rumsfeld a "symbol" of a myopic dedication to a doomed stay-the-course policy in Iraq, and the paper leapt on this apparent crack in the facade of what it has portrayed as Mr. Rumsfeld's stubborn refusal to contemplate, let alone publicly acknowledge, reality on the ground as evidence that the war they oppose--not to mention the man who prosecuted it--is a failure. But documents such as this memo, when assessed independently from the paper's analysis, may present some long-term problems for this narrative. What if Mr. Rumsfeld turns out, in the light of such evidence, not to have been just a symbol? What if he emerges as an insightful and thoughtful leader who was willing to consider all options and has been fully aware of the true state of affairs in Iraq? What if some of his more favored recommendations are implemented after all, and result in a material improvement for the mission?

We shall see. The endemic leaking that has beset this administration is regrettable, as is the Times' attempt to distort the contents of these documents, but this has happened and the memo cannot be returned to classified status now. Given this circumstance, the Rumsfeld memo is an important contribution to the public record on Iraq. Citizens interested in making progress in Iraq rather than scoring political points in Washington should consider its recommendations carefully. Mr. Rumsfeld has demonstrated that he believes stimulating productive debate on Iraq is more important to him even than protecting his own job. It would behoove all of us to treat the topic with similar seriousness. Does it make sense to dismiss constructive suggestions because Mr. Rumsfeld is making them? Or is it time for all of us at long last to remember that we're Americans in this together, and that together we can move forward in Iraq?