Iraq vexations.
By Paul J Cella Posted in War — Comments (8) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
My trouble with the Iraq war boils down to a pair of vexations: (1) democracy is a profoundly inadequate and possibly perverse answer to what threatens us; (2) and the imposition of democratic theory upon our Iraq policy has introduced a crippling conceptual corruption of our idea of victory. Victory is now said by our leaders to consist of a long series of holding actions against the enemy: first by American troops, and eventually (it is hoped) by Iraqi themselves. Destruction or subjugation of the enemy is not even contemplated. Such a goal can only be conceived as “victory” by a brazen debasement of the word.
Read on.
On the question of democracy, it is not that Islamic peoples will prove “incapable” of democracy; it is rather that they will prove quite remarkably capable of it, and the result will be the addition of force and legitimacy to radicalism. Under the rubric of democracy we run the terrible risk of abetting the establishment of Jihadist regimes, and lending to them all the authority and prestige of our favored doctrine. If an Islamic democracy chooses Jihad as its driving principle, on our own theoretical grounds how can we gainsay it?
Men thought they knew despotism in the form of the ancien regime; but the introduction of radical democracy by the Revolution in France soon made the world realize that it did not yet know the full range of tyranny; and from that Revolution virtually every revolutionist of the twentieth century derived his utopia. This bloodiest of ages was not foreseen by the men who laid its foundations; and we cannot foresee what will be built upon the foundations we have lain.
In our country democracy and liberty have achieved a curious conflation. The terms have become almost interchangeable, though in strict definition they clearly mean different things. It must be recognized how unusual this is. Lord Acton, for example, wrote of the “elementary antagonism between liberty and democracy.” Tocqueville also perceived an inherent tension between the two: much of the second half of his great work consists of a haunted reflection on the perils of democracy. Rousseau, “first among the theorists of radical democracy” according to Irving Babbitt, is not often thought a great champion of liberty. Yet we — from the President on down — often talk as if the two were one. I do not deplore this instinct, this ingrained conceptual elision — for part of the true genius of America has been this improbable fusion. Here we touch on a signal feature of the American political tradition. And herein lies the difficulty:
President Bush and his men have been careful to repeat at every opportunity their unwillingness to impose “our traditions” upon the people of Iraq. In his Second Inaugural, Bush gave a firm reassurance against imperial democracy: “[W]hen the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling.” Or again, in his 2006 State of the Union address: “Democracies in the Middle East will not look like our own, because they will reflect the traditions of their own citizens.” (Emphasis added to all quotations.)
Thus at the crucial moment, President Bush takes steps to repudiate the specifically American content of the principle he has been celebrating. At the very moment when his doctrine of Democracy turns its attention to the Islamic world, it jettisons, at least in part, the qualities which, flowing from the singular American amalgam of democracy and liberty, make it uniquely fit to disarm the dogma of our enemies, and diminish the conditions which empower that dogma. “Our traditions” are what transform democracy, from being merely an engine of popular passion, or mere factional passion, into a rich tapestry of civilized life, by which liberty may be sheltered. There is in this a devastating theoretical error, which will — indeed it already has — issue in dire practical consequences.
These problems also had consequences in the recent election — the most important being, in my view, the demoralization of a large number of Conservatives, many of whom ended up casting their votes for Democrats in swing districts, especially in the Midwest. Here the conceptual debasement of victory was of greatest importance. The election did not evidence a failure of will on the part of the American people; it demonstrated, once again, their congenital impatience with foreign wars whose connection to national interest is obscured by sophisticated political sermonizing. The debasement of the concept of victory finally, on November 7th, exacted its price.
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saying that there is no political solution to the problem of Jihad is an admission which implies "no hope." Alot of things in the world are basically intractible. To lower our sights from a vast transformation of a culture and the religion which sustains it, to an idea of more mundane self-defense, does not strike me as concession to "the utter brutality of our instinct for survival."
We must resist utopianism. It will blind and enervate us.
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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.
To be more clear, I should have said "no hope for it (a political solution, that is)."
At any rate this puts us back at our prior point of stasis. My strong intuition is that the absence of a political solution leads inevitably to a brutal, violent and wide ranging war. You have advocated that this is avoidable and that we will win because, as best as I can tell, and I beg you not to take offense at the analogy, we can be the world's largest turtle. If we will win and clearly do so without mass destruction, I will be very glad. But I am in need of information and arguments that defeat my intuition as to what seems obvious. I am as open now to such as I have been before when we reached this point.
John E.
First, thanks for the below, because it counters a blood libel of the American electorate:
These problems also had consequences in the recent election — the most important being, in my view, the demoralization of a large number of Conservatives, many of whom ended up casting their votes for Democrats in swing districts, especially in the Midwest. Here the conceptual debasement of victory was of greatest importance. The election did not evidence a failure of will on the part of the American people; it demonstrated, once again, their congenital impatience with foreign wars whose connection to national interest is obscured by sophisticated political sermonizing. The debasement of the concept of victory finally, on November 7th, exacted its price.
I am not happy in the result but its basis can only be understood as you describe it. The American people cannot be spun on what consitutes victory and what is, as you correctly pointed out, a debasement of it.
I am a bit more critical here, though:
On the question of democracy, it is not that Islamic peoples will prove “incapable” of democracy; it is rather that they will prove quite remarkably capable of it, and the result will be the addition of force and legitimacy to radicalism. Under the rubric of democracy we run the terrible risk of abetting the establishment of Jihadist regimes, and lending to them all the authority and prestige of our favored doctrine.
On what basis can we conclude that the Islamic peoples are "remarkably capable" of democracy? In the above context, this is often cited in regard to HAMAS, the Muslim Brotherhood and so forth, but don't we confuse process with result here? In other words, Islamists hijack the democratic process to achieve a national victory. Does this show a remarkable capacity to be democratic, or as seems more likely, a remarkable ability to use the system to install a theocratic tyranny? Does anyone really believe that HAMAS or the Muslim Brotherhood or like parties will relinquish power once it is attained?
As an aside, Turkey's short-lived democratic experiment appears under siege. I mention this only to circumvent as an example the anomaly Attaturk's work represents.
Finally, a question about this observation:
Thus at the crucial moment, President Bush takes steps to repudiate the specifically American content of the principle he has been celebrating. At the very moment when his doctrine of Democracy turns its attention to the Islamic world, it jettisons, at least in part, the qualities which, flowing from the singular American amalgam of democracy and liberty, make it uniquely fit to disarm the dogma of our enemies, and diminish the conditions which empower that dogma.
What are we to conclude then? Bush decided to adopt real politik because of the conditions on the ground? He never really believed Iraq could become democratic? This was a signal to the American people that his was a lost cause?
I agree with you as to what happened, but would like to know why you think it did. I have not a clue.
My point about Islamic peoples being "remarkably capable" of democracy was made hyperbolically -- in order to prove my point, which is that empowering the people, in Islamic lands, may well result in the popular ascendance of Jihadism. This is democracy in the strict sense: the soveriegnty of the people.
If a passion for Jihad is indeed the deepest, or at least most organized and articulate passion under Islam (and I am only saying that it might be), then democracy will efficiently lend it power and legitimacy.
My critique of Bush is that he made a grave error. His goal was the export democracy, but he was quick to deny that we have any designs of imposing "our traditions" on the people of Iraq. Thus the democracy he would export would one shorn of the very traditions traditions that make it more than merely an instrument for popular passion.
I think all this happened in the great amalgam of policy-making. Bush and men his wanted to avoid the charge of imperialism; they wanted to bring Liberals into their coalition; they did not fully appreciate the American "variation" on democracy, how delicate and unusual it is; most of all they did not (as most of us did not, myself included) fully appreciate the intractible problems of the Islamic world.
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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.
As to your second answer, and I may have missed it: what was the motive? True belief? To avoid the charge of imperialism? I follow you and obviously agree with you on the inherent tensions between liberty and democracy, but why did the Administration finally concede only the latter was possible? I realize this calls for a great deal of speculation but want to read what you think. I haven't drawn any conclusion yet.
> Victory is now said by our leaders to consist of a long series of holding actions against the enemy: first by American troops, and eventually (it is hoped) by Iraqi themselves. Destruction or subjugation of the enemy is not even contemplated. Such a goal can only be conceived as “victory” by a brazen debasement of the word.
Are there any examples of this? I'm not aware of them. They certainly aren't in Iraq, where we have no enemies, no allies, no mission, and no right to "nation build" their country.
http://www.redstate.com/stories/archived/the_battle_of_iraq_is_about_big...
I argued in this posting that we should not fight every battle and every war the same way we did the last one, including defining victory. Iraq is not world war II nor Viet Nam nor the Cold War. It is not a failure or surrender if we don't fight Iraq exactly like we fought world war II. The global war on terror was always supposed to be fought mostly with US special forces, friendly local forces, economic aid, and propaganda, the same way we fought and won the Cold War and Afghanistan.
for us to declare victory (and get out)- neither does it guarantee victory. In the case of Iraq, democracy seems to equal majority rule.
We have replaced a failed Sunni state with a failed Shia state (does anyone doubt that the current government would not last long were we to pull out our troops now?) What we need to do is establish civil order, ensure that the regime can defend its borders, restore the faith of the people in their rulers, and guarantee the oil-based economy. We have not done any of these.
We gainsay such a democracy because it declares war on us; a war which must be engaged to the death. It may very well be that you are correct in your prediction that a political solution is impossible, but many of us feel the burden to prove there is no hope, even though it involves some sacrifice, before we unleash the utter brutality of our instinct for survival.
Whether our policy has divorced liberty and democracy, I take as a point for consideration. It would be devastating. Can there be any doubt that our national interest has been obscured by sophisticated political sermonizing? But which way does that knife cut?
John E.