Iraqi Sunnis Meet Realpolitik
By Pejman Yousefzadeh Posted in War — Comments (1) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
One of the concerns regarding the recent American decision to arm Sunni tribes against al Qaeda in Iraq is that once the Sunnis vanquish or seriously diminish al Qaeda's power, they will turn their weapons against the Iraqi Shi'ites--including those in the Iraqi government. Any alliance between the Iraqi Sunnis and the United States was portrayed as a marriage of convenience that would end with the dissolution of al Qaeda and would transform into a policy disaster with the Sunnis using American weaponry to further the onset of a civil war in Iraq.
Comes now this report out of Iraq to tell us that the Sunni-American alliance may be more long lasting than its critics gave it credit for:
The Sunni insurgent leader lifted up his T-shirt, revealing a pistol stuck in his belt, and explained to a U.S. sergeant visiting his safe house why he'd stopped attacking Americans.
"Finally, we decided to cooperate with American forces and kick al-Qaeda out and have our own country," said the tough-talking, confident 21-year-old, giving only his nom de guerre, Abu Lwat. Then he offered another motive: "In the future, we want to have someone in the government," he said, holding his cigarette with a hand missing one finger.
Abu Lwat is one of a growing number of Sunni fighters working with U.S. forces in what American officers call a last-ditch effort to gain power and legitimacy under Iraq's Shiite-dominated government. The tentative cooperation between the fighters and American forces is driven as much by political aspirations as by a rejection of the brutal methods of the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, U.S. officers and onetime insurgents said.
"This is much less about al-Qaeda overstepping than about them [Sunnis] realizing that they've lost," said Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, a planner for the U.S. military command in Baghdad. As a result, Sunni groups are now "desperately trying to cut deals with us," he said. "This is all about the Sunnis' 'rightful' place to rule" in a future Iraqi government, he said.
To be sure, the article does not fully discount the possibility that the Sunnis might eventually turn against the government once al Qaeda is contained or defeated. But the impetus behind Sunni efforts to ally with American forces now goes well beyond the need to defeat al Qaeda. As the article and the people interviewed for it observe, the Sunnis realize that if they do not make nice, they will be given little to no role whatsoever in Iraq.
Naturally, that scares the Sunnis. And well it should. And as long as that means that the United States will have a partner in Iraq dedicated towards the proposition of positive political reforms and a peaceful, stable society, I am all for the infusion of a healthy degree of fear into the political process.
(Via Democracy in America.)
the Sunnis realize that if they do not make nice, they will be given little to no role whatsoever in Iraq.
And if they find that the Shiites will not give Sunnis much of a role anyway -- and in turn, little access to resources and little security -- they will go back to fighting the (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army, other Shiites, and us. Political reconciliation at the national level is key. The Shiite leaders have shown little genuine interest in it. We must apply greater pressure, and the way to do it is to threaten reduction of our support if they don't get moving.