Lebanon: Victory Without (More) War?
The Optimists Continue To Make Their Case.
By Dan McLaughlin Posted in War — Comments (9) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Charles Krauthammer makes one of the few persuasive optimistic cases I've seen for the argument that Hezbollah really did lose the war with Israel, and won't fight again. Most of the optimistic assessments by serious people have been grim ones, based on the idea that the peace won't hold and the war will restart on terms more favorable to Israel than where we were when the shooting stops. Krauthammer thinks otherwise:
"We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not."
-- Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, Aug. 27
Read On...
Nasrallah . . . knows that Lebanon, however weak its army, has a deep desire to disarm him and that the arrival of Europeans in force, however weak their mandate, will make impossible the rebuilding of the vast Maginot Line he spent six years constructing.
Which is why the expected Round Two will, in fact, not happen. Hezbollah is in no position, either militarily or politically, for another round. Nasrallah's admission that the war was a mistake is an implicit pledge not to repeat it, lest he be completely finished as a Lebanese political figure.
The Lebanese know that Israel bombed easy-to-repair airport runways when it could have destroyed the new airport terminal and set Lebanon back 10 years. The Lebanese know that Israel attacked the Hezbollah TV towers when it could have pulverized Beirut's power grid, a billion-dollar reconstruction. The Lebanese know that next time Israel's leadership will hardly be as hesitant and restrained. Hezbollah dares not risk that next time.
Read the whole thing. Austin Bay also think's Hezbollah's moment of glory in not being entirely crushed by the IDF will prove fleeting, as does Amir Taheri. Notwithstanding my disdain for the hollowness of the cease-fire agreement itself, I hope they are right; if a weakened Hezbollah can be purged from power in Lebanon by the Lebanese themselves, only secondarily relying on foreign support and the in terrorem effect of Israeli vigilance, it will not only be a blessing to regional security but further proof of the effectiveness of the two-pronged Bush strategy of (1) frontal military confrontation of armed terror groups and (2) promotion of democratic institutions that can take ultimate responsibility for controlling the security of their own territory.
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Lebanon: Victory Without (More) War? 9 Comments (0 topical, 9 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
Everyone is misreading the Hezbollah reconstruction as a move to increase their support. It does not do that! They are trying to prevent the loss of support. If you have your house bombed, obviously you are mad at those who dropped the bomb, but you are just as angry at those who caused the bombs to drop. This is not going to increase Hezbollah's support, it is just an attempt to keep their current level of support from eroding. Coupled with the admission that the war was a mistake, Hezbollah is admitting to the world that its actions were not supported by the Lebanese people by and large.
I think when the dust settles from reconstruction and whatnot, there will be many sighs of relief that houses have been rebuilt but I do not think people will be rushing to have these new homes destroyed. They will thank Hezbollah for rebuilding what was destroyed, but they won't want to gamble what they just got back again. The Lebanese people want Hezbollah disarmed, the peace deal is an opportunity to get the Lebanese people do to just that. Or failing out right action, to get the Lebanese people to demand that the UN or the US or whoever, disarm Hezbollah.
However, I agree that if US public diplomacy operations were where they need to be, it would be much easier for the United States to take advantage of the situation.
International Affairs is just Political Science with an accent.
Coupled with the admission that the war was a mistake, Hezbollah is admitting to the world that its actions were not supported by the Lebanese people...
They're being much more subtle than that. They are saying that the war was a mistake only in the sense that one trips and falls - that the war was unintentional, rather than that a major war with Israel was a poor policy choice. Furthermore, they are suggesting that the Israeli response was disproportionate to the antagonism. Even though Hezbollah is admitting that its action of capturing the soldiers was a mistake, it is still framing the war as Hezbollah standing up to an atrocious attack by Israel.
If Hezbollah can successfully establish their "truth" that Israel is to blame for the destruction but that Hezbollah is the only group putting things back together, that's a major gain for them. They may, in fact, be looking at the Hamas model: Suicide bombings bring a destructive war with Israel, but social efforts (schools, etc.) win Hamas control of the Palastinian government. In the next elections, Hezbollah might just win a parlimentary majority as the only party that lifted a finger to defend Lebanon and also the only party that lifted a finger to rebuild Lebanon. Frankly, I like their chances.
Actually, "like" is exactly the wrong word. I hate their chances. By the way, where do you study?
To a certain extent you are correct. They're saying that capturing the soldiers was a mistake. They are also admitting that the war was unintentional. But the question is, why are they admitting this? After all, destroying Israel is every Arab's goal isn't it? What difference does it make when it is done? You are right that they are trying to frame this as Israeli aggression and Hezbollah standing up to said aggression but the question is why?
The answer is that the people of Lebanon are tired of violence. After a while, people just don't want to fight any more. The country had been rebuilt after the civil war. There was peace. Massive protests during the Cedar Revolution kicked out Syria. Why were there such protests? One because of Hariri's death, but also because Syria is seen as willing to fight Israel to the last Lebonese. And the people of Lebanon are tired of this.
Hezbollah is not nearly as popular as many Westerners think. You are right that they are following the Hamas model. But I think there is a limit to that model. For instance Hezbollah is a Shiite organization and the majority of people in Lebanon are not. In the PA everyone can support Hamas, in Lebanon only radical shiites can. They may gain seats if they can prove they are better at reconstruction than the government, but thats just another reason to support the Lebonese government full force.
I am a student at George Washington University in DC.
International Affairs is just Political Science with an accent.
Setting aside the question of whether you or Krauthammer has the right analysis, both his piece and yours do suggest that US policy could turn the situation to advantage... toward isolating Hezbollah.
How could we do this? Do we make conditional offers to equip and train the Lebanese military in order to strengthen the 'democratic' government? Do we offer economic aid to the government? What would be the conditions and would they be politically acceptable there? Must we require or use incentives to broker a peace deal with Israel? Do we insist on governmental reforms or the disbanding of militias?
I am hearing reports that the discussion in Lebanon is presently moving toward blaming the US rather than Israel...calling Israel a proxy of the US rather than simply seeing the US as a blind partisan supporter of Israel.
At any rate, in context of the GWOT/IF it seems we need to invest in a policy on the Lebanon front which divides the Hezzies from the moderners.
John E.
"it seems we need to invest in a policy on the Lebanon front which divides the Hezzies from the moderners"
I could not agree more. I think it is very important that we send monetary aid to the Lebanese government for reconstruction and humanitarian aid. We need to make sure the Lebanese government has the power to enforce it's will. We need to back the Lebanese government politcally as well, keep the pressure on Syria to stop meddling. This is where we agree strongly with Lebanese public opinion and it is important to stress that point of agreement.
As for equiping and training the Lebanese army. I feel that that is important but needs to be coupled with some purges of the army as well. Syria helped create the army, and as such, many of the higher level officers have ties to Hezbollah due to that organizations ties to Syria. So while we need to strengthen the army, we need to make sure we aren't strengthening Syria.
We should demand the Hezbollah be disarmed but link that to UN resolutions and the will of the Lebanese people. We cannot allow Hezbollah to spin our demands as a way of enabling Israeli military aggression. I don't think that Hezbollah will willingly disarm. However, if we prevent the situation from becoming Hezbollah against the US and turn it into Hezbollah against world opinion and the desires of the Lebanese, it will be easier to gather momentum behind this. Coupled with pressure on Syria, and I think we could reduce Hezbollah's support to a manageable level, and eventually disarm them.
With Hezbollah disarmed, peace talks between Israel and Lebanon can go foward. Israel may need to give up the Sheeba farms area or at least a part of it, to assuage Lebanese pride, but that is many many years into the future and only if things go right.
International Affairs is just Political Science with an accent.
I felt Krauthammer was whistling past the graveyard on this one.
We'll see how this plays out but for the moment I think we are fooling ourselves if we don't think Hezbollah came out of this strengthened politically.
I wouldn't believe the man if he told me it was raining. Why should anyone believe this statement ?
of not fighting the war on interior lines I doubt that we would be posting as we are today. Ignoring the IDF's advice he plunged dead ahead in best "Light Brigade" fashion, a lesson not lost on either Israel or Hezbollah and an experience not to be repeated.
Time will tell but I tend to take Nazrallah's statement seriously given what Israel has, for the most part, taken [and given away] over the past year. The level of response, the amount of destruction,and the loss of territory are sobering however loud one claims victory, a victory gained by the UN, not by force of arms.
As the civilians, the real ones, walk thru the rubble they may blame and hate Israel. Then again they may hope for a more pacific way of showing it. They may even start to spread the blame around.
Long term I'll go with Krauthammer.
"a man's admiration for absolute government is proportinate to the contempt he feels for those around him". Tocqueville

He ignores the true audience of Nasrallah's statement, and he fails to understand the multiple levels of Hezbollah's success in this war.
First, Nasrallah's statement is a lie. Hezbollah incited a war with Israel, intentionally, not just by capturing Israeli soldiers but also by near-simultaneously raining missies on Israeli territory.
Second, Hezbollah's success is more than simply a "moment of glory in not being entirely crushed by the IDF." In the process of failing to entirely crush Hezbollah, Israel succeeded in destroying large quantities of Lebanese property and infrastructure. Hezbollah was on the ground, practically the next day after the ceasefire, clearing streets and distributing cash (much of which came from Iran). This will not be forgotten, and politically, this puts Hezbollah in a significantly stronger possition within Lebanon than it was before.
Finally, and most critically, the political gains from rebuilding what the Israelis destroyed will evaporate if Hezbollah is seen within Lebanon as the primary cause of the war that destroyed so much and killed so many. Therefore, it is in Hezbollah's interest to lie to the Lebanese people and claim that it did not intend to start a war by performing, essentially, acts of war. Krauthammer's mistake is in assuming that Nasrallah's statement speaks to Hezbollah's long-term plans when, in fact, it is merely an attempt to cement Hezbollah's short-term gains.
As an aside, the statement is a powerfull clue as to how a robust U.S. public diplomacy operation might undermine Hezbollah's gains here. It's a real shame that we're not set up to take immediate advantage of this.