Masters of the Obvious
why intelligence analysts shouldn't drive trains
By streiff Posted in hayden | Intelligence | War — Comments (5) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
[Note: I'm taking a short break from our daily Obamafest to check in on the rest of the world]
In most activities you have two basic choices to make, a former commander of mine was fond of saying. You can drive the train or you can call out the whistlestops. I naturally prefer driving the train but I can call whistlestops with the best of them. What I can't abide is the guy who claims to be driving the train calling the whistlestops or, conversely, the guy who is supposed to call the whistlestops trying to drive the train.
I'd submit that this basic inability to either decide on a role, or to carry out the role they are best suited for, is the crux of the problem with our intelligence apparatus.
Read on.
Nearly a year ago I wrote this story taking to task a Marine lieutenant colonel who gained momentary fame, and if there is a Just God a lasting reputation as an asshat, for writing a crafted-for-leaking intelligence estimate declaring Iraq's Anbar province lost to the Coaltion. A report that appeared shortly before al Qaeda was driven from that province.
Today in the Washington Post we have another example. Headlined as U.S. Cites Big Gains Against Al Qaeda we learn:
Less than a year after his agency warned of new threats from a resurgent al-Qaeda, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden now portrays the terrorist movement as essentially defeated in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Just a year ago, on May 20, 2007, the CIA was quoted as saying that the al Qaeda's success in the war in Iraq had created a fund raising bonanza for them:
The senior U.S. counterterrorism official said there are "lots of indications they can move people in and out easier," and that Iraq operatives often bring cash.
"A year ago we were saying they were having serious money problems," the official said. "That seems to have eased up."
The cash is mainly U.S. currency in relatively modest sums — tens of thousands of dollars. The scale of the payments suggests the money is not meant for funding elaborate terrorist plots, but for covering al-Qaida's day-to-day costs: paying off tribal leaders, hiring security and buying provisions.
Al-Qaida in Iraq has drawn increasingly large contributions from elsewhere in the Muslim world — largely because the fight against U.S. forces has mobilized Middle East donors, officials said.
"Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is the reason people are contributing again, with money and private contributions coming back in from the gulf," the senior U.S. counterterrorism official said.
He added that al-Qaida in Iraq also has become an effective criminal enterprise.
In September, Michael "Anonymous" Scheuer, former head of the CIA's faild bin Laden unit of the 1990s, remarked when commenting on a bin Laden video:
"First of all, the setting is very relaxed, very comfortable. He is not in his camouflaged jacket. There's no rifle. What he is trying to say is that he is under no pressure from the Americans. The Americans are failing in their effort to kill him, and in their effort to destroy al Qaeda.
[...]
He is gloating. They think they're winning, and I think they're probably correct at the moment."
But what has really changed in the past year? Nothing. The trends that Hayden relies upon for today's assessment were readily apparent to anyone paying attention for at least 18-24 months. In fact, just as the CIA was predicating al Qaeda's fundraising prowess on its success in Iraq al Qaeda had nearly been eradicated from western Iraq.
We see the same effect in pronouncements from last year that Iraqi prime minister al Maliki was nothing more than an Iranian stooge and a captive of al Sadr. Today, we see an al-Maliki firmly in control of his government and Sadr's Mahdi Army driven from Basra and no longer a visible force in Sadr City.
What has changed in the intervening time? Not much, really. The political strength that allowed al Maliki to launch the offensive against Sadr didn't happen overnight.
The problem in all cases is that our intelligence community seems to be contending for a role as Master of the Obvious but ignoring their obligation to tell us where trends are taking us. Or, going back to the train analogy, they are claiming they can drive the train but in reality they are only suited to calling out whistlestops. So long as this type of non-analytic analysis is used as the basis for developing national security policy we are all at risk.
Masters of the Obvious 5 Comments (0 topical, 5 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
It's frankly a little confusing to try and keep up with the daily stream of reports. For example, Negroponte told the SFRC earlier in the week;
Terrorists and violent extremists continue to exploit Pakistan's rugged tribal areas as safe havens and cross the border to attack Afghan and coalition forces. ... We must find ways to more effectively coordinate and synchronize operations by both nations.
I am not an expert but forgive me if that sounds like offensive action.
Negroponte is of course from a different part of the government, nonetheless I presume most of this intelligence comes from the same place. The abstractions and seeming inconsistencies provide opportunities for all types of political hijinks which ulitimately obscur the actual status and achievements on the ground.
Certainly battle is fluid and sources/interpretations vary. However, one would think some type of meaningful information coordination and validation would be in order. Simplistically, to an average citizen it appears this issue originates with intelligence gatherers and alleged experts at CIA, masters of the obvious extraodinaire.
"Nec Aspera Terrent"
bene ambula et redambula
Contributor to The Minority Report
"First of all, the setting is very relaxed, very comfortable[100 miles away from the action]. He is not in his camouflaged jacket[He can duck into a burkha at a moment's notice]. There's no rifle[threatening bluster is now inoperative]. What he is trying to say is that he is under no pressure from the Americans [while in the basement in Karachi]. The Americans are failing in their effort to kill him, and in their effort to destroy al Qaeda.[repeat six times daily]"
"He is gloating[high]. They think they're winning, and I think they're probably correct at the moment.[contact high]"
Just too many variables and assumptions in play.
From time to time they get lucky.
During Desert Storm, we got our intel chief (O-6) a subscription to the Weekly Word News -- just as accurate as his assessments and more fun reading.
I'll take a battlefield operator's judgement any day over a bunch of intel weenies sitting in an air conditioned bunker with their biggest worry being if the coffee is fresh.
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"Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." -- James Madison
I know you must be aware of the difference between intelligence analysts - and field operators (e.g.; Foreign Agent Case Officers, Offensive Counterintelligence CO Case Officers, Offensive Counter Espionage Operatives, Field Operatives, Special Forces Intelligence Operations, Reconnaissance Units, Deep Patrols and all other such intelligence information gathers).
To lump these 'action critters' into the same 'weenie' bundle as the analysis/analyst and other REMFs - and dub them all 'weenies', is not too much different from associating company clerks with RANGER patrol leaders.
Your normally discriminating mind must have been on a brief Sabbatical when those comments were made.
De Opresso Liber
Whereas military leaders use what's happening on the ground to plan strategy, adjust tactics, etc., the lefties and the press live off instant gratification and anecdotes (where it suits them) as opposed to overall pictures and trends.
If they applied the same standard to themselves, Hillary would have been asked why she wasn't dropping out as an utter and complete failure after finishing third in Iowa.