Military Success, Political Stalemate: If it comes down to it, do we choose Peace and Security, or Democracy, in Iraq?
By Jeff Emanuel Posted in exporting democracy | Iraq | neoconservatism | War — Comments (8) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Samarra, Iraq — While the significant military progress made in Iraq this year is being acknowledged (either triumphantly or begrudgingly, depending on political orientation) by those who have been paying attention, that country’s fledgling democratic government has thus far failed to make similar progress.
Myriad problems have plagued the Iraqi government, whose Shi’a majority has been hamstrung not only by its own attempts at unilateral policymaking, but also by a minority party which has refused to accept its new post-Saddam status. With its many factions unable to compromise, Iraq’s federal government has been under increasing fire for appearing to be no more ready to secure and govern its own country than it was two years ago.
Read on . . .
As the security situation in Iraq is further improved, more pressure will be placed on the members of the federal government to rise above their differences and to work together for the good of a country that is desperately in need of domestic leadership. However, given the depth of division between those involved, it is not a foregone conclusion that a productive working relationship will ever be established. On the contrary: it is entirely possible that those involved, who by their nature understand the language of power over any other, and think of themselves as representative of their own tribes, sects, and clans rather than as part of a single unified country in whose success they have a vested interest, will never see eye to eye politically, and thus will never be able to generate the pragmatic working relationship necessary to govern effectively.
Should this latter possibility become reality, the first and most obvious step on the part of the coalition will once again have to be to revise its goals, as well as its definition of ‘victory’ itself. Where ‘victory’ in Iraq once meant leaving behind a country ‘at peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and an ally in the war on terror,’ a new standard would have to be set, and new priorities established, including choosing between the prospect of working exhaustively to make the current system of democratic government work, or focusing on establishing security ensuring a firm alliance with the West.
Due to the devastating consequences that would result from leaving a failed state in this part of the world, the emphasis that some would have the coalition put on trying to prop up a non-functional government must instead be placed on creating a secure territory which poses no threat to Israel or to the West.
One major concern is the fact that, should the government of Iraq fail, the resulting vacuum in the region would lead to far greater regional hegemony on the part of the Persian state to its immediate east, whose leaders have made very clear that Iraq would only be the first stop on their bloody march to the Mediterranean, and perhaps beyond. Iran is already fighting a proxy war on several fronts, both against Israel and, in Iraq, against the United States, and has repeatedly called for – and promised to bring about – the destruction of the former. Between the need to contain Iran and the fact that a failed Iraq would serve as an unregulated safe haven for the thousands of terrorists who have flocked (and are still flocking) there to fight against the coalition, the twofold mission in that country – should the government fail to function on its own – must be to maintain a significant coalition military presence, and to ensure the existence of an effective pro-Western government which can hold Iraq together while keeping out those who wish to subsume it into their spheres of influence.
While the coalition’s current course is working militarily, Iraq is still a terribly broken country, with a great deal of instability, unrest, and upheaval. Were the U.S. to leave at any point in the near future, the vacuum that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke of in the very recent past (which his imperialistic Iran longs to fill) would become a reality. While social, governmental, and security services are being developed and improved, at this point the coalition is still the glue holding the nation together.
Successful and stable nation building is a very difficult and time-consuming undertaking. There is still a chance (perhaps a very good one) that Iraq can, in time, become an autonomous, pro-Western democratic state; that is certainly the best and most preferable of all possible outcomes. Further, governmental progress in Iraq is not currently stagnant; while the federal government remains deadlocked, local and provincial democratic governments are being established and developed to provide governance to the nation in the absence of effective leadership from Baghdad.
When evaluating priorities for that nation, though - especially given the circumstances which led to the popular election of Hamas in the Palestinian territories, for example - security, alliance with the west, respect for human rights, and refusal to harbor terrorists are far more important than democratic government. If the government in Iraq is unable to perform, then the need to have a stable state in the region dictates that it be replaced with a system that allows it to fulfill these most important of requirements.
Jeff Emanuel, a columnist and special operations military veteran, is currently embedded with the U.S. military on the front lines in Iraq. His reports, which are 100% funded by reader donations, can be seen at www.JeffEmanuel.com.
This column originally appeared in the Jerusalem Post.
Military Success, Political Stalemate: If it comes down to it, do we choose Peace and Security, or Democracy, in Iraq? 8 Comments (0 topical, 8 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
I just don't have it in me to write enough to do a proper reply any justice, but here's my view of the situation.
We were wrong to think that we could both nation build and pacify the country at once. We should consider quitting nation building until every hostile element in the country is ground into submission.
It's hard though, because to do this properly we need to be an occupying authority, but that horse has already left the barn.
So I think that forces us to choose Democracy. I think ultimately we need to work with them, and if we're ready to give up, we give up and pull back to some bases. HOWEVER, we also make sure to retain the ability to project dominating force into the country, perhaps with aircraft carriers, so that should the free regime fall, we can go back in that minute and fight properly.
Not that I think we'd try again. No, we'd just bomb the snot out of the terror camps, and neutralize them. It won't solve the problem; it'll be a lot like the way we sat on Iraq for a decade letting THAT problem fester, but it'll be the best we can get the American people behind.
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Reality: Thompson/Romney Dream: Santorum/Watts.
If we look at our own history we realize that freedom is the key and a vital pre-requisite to democracy. By 1770 Amercicans realized that they had certain rights to be free, and that a man had a right to be free of his neighbors when choosing how to worship the Lord. A man could worship the Lord how he saw fit - as a Baptist, a Jew, a Shiite, a Catholic, a Methodist, etc. Even if a majority of a man's neighbors are Methodists that man doesn't have to be a Methodist, for example. Even George III didn't have the right to tell his neighbors/subjects how to worship the Lord. If somebody worshipped the Lord wrong, he'd find out about eventually when he met his Maker, but he shouldn't be judged for it by other men.
By the time we revolted against George III, freedom was well-established. We revolted against him because of oppressive taxes, not because he did not give colonists freedom of individual conscience on religion.
Iraq wouldn't be perfect if George III was king there now, but it would be a pretty good place - and it might ultimately make the transition to freedom+democracy peacefully, like Canada did.
We should have probably occupied Iraq longer, like we did in Japan, until all the people there got a respect for each others individual rights
I really don't understand how we became responsible for stability in Iraq. Look at Israel. It's been established for decades now, and it's not even close to stable.
Granted, Israel is hated by its neighbors. But Iraq's neighbors aren't exactly carrying bouquets of roses either. To deal with this seriously requires open war, which we're not about to get into, unfortunately.
We should insist that Iraq continue to work with us in addressing Al Qaeda, and continue to allow us a military presence. The only stabilities we should impose are no open foreign invasion and no AQI Caliphate. Let Iraqis work out their internal problems themselves.
I note that if there's going to be democratic success, we've got to let the local and central governments do some of the heavy lifting. This is how they acquire the moral authority to make changes. If we're honored while the central government is despised, it's all going to fall apart when we withdraw the bulk of our forces. And this time will come soon, like it or not.
Greece will fall before Israel. And Greece wont fall so we got that goin' for us, which is nice.
Molon Labe!
yes they hate it, but envy it more. They attacked it and got crushed. Now they are surrounded by countries what wish it's destruction but have not invaded it since the early 70s. That should tell you something, they simply are impotent.
Molon Labe!
a Mandela, a Karzai (or in Iran as perhaps the Shah's son would be) -- not a figurehead but someone recognized as a national leader is extremely difficult and in the case of Iraq, impossible. Maliki is a decent enough politician but is hopelessly parochial, a s many an Amerian politician would be (and have been ) when placed in control of the nation.
So, in the absence of this figure (and the absence was obvious to at least some of us before the invasion) what do we do?
In one of his interviews Gen Petraeus talked about capability building as opposed to nation building. We have had success in building the military capability of Iraq. The police is another area where we have had some success, though less success. The justice system, education, these may be areas where we can build capability.
We're very limited in what we can do vis a vis the political system. We can hope it will be less corrupt and inefficient, less reliant on family and clan connections and more on competence -- that's about it, though. The Iraqis wanted a party system and that's what they have, so they don't have local representatives to the National assembly, just party reps. Hence they feel cut off (hey I live in DC and I don't have national representation either) except for the Shia who are in the majority.
To me, the Iraqis are more or less back where they were when the Brits set them up after WWI as a buffer state between Iran and Gulf Arabs. They installed a relatively benign monarch and a Brit-style Parliament and an army run by Brit officers and set about stealing the oil and co-opting the Iraqi upper class.
Iraq is still an oil-rich buffer state and if anything even more important than it was in the 19th century. That's why we're fighting there, and why we need to win.
I like to think we'll be more successful in setting up a democratic Iraq that is stable and a reliable partner. We have learned a lot since Vietnam, and the Iraqis have learned a lot since they kicked out the Brits and replaced them with the Communist-based Baath Party (then quite secular). I think there are enough Iraqis who understand they've been given a secos chance to avoid a totalitarian nightmare/Islamofascist failed state outcome.
[S]ecurity, alliance with the west, respect for human rights, and refusal to harbor terrorists are far more important than democratic government
I'd agree with this. We have pursued our national interest; democracy in Iraq has always been a means to that end, and the best means, but not the only one. As I said before the war:
I don't think much has changed in that analysis, other than that Putin's Russia has continued its gradual slide downhill from what started as a working but fragile democracy.
Of course, I would add that the decision may end up getting made for us, one way or another. And let's not forget that even a failed experiment in democracy (e.g., Weimar Germany) plants the seeds that can grow down the road, as it gives people a tangible memory of the opportunities they once had, and might rightly demand again (the people of Pakistan have not forgotten democracy, and at least a faction of them still demands its return).
Moreover, it has been worthwhile to demonstrate that the United States has expended extraordinary efforts to give liberty to the Iraqi people; a republic, if they could keep it. If that is seen to fail principally because of a failure of Iraqi leadership as opposed to a failure of U.S. perseverance in the fight with Al Qaeda, the people of the region, whether they admit so or not, will recognize that we were willing to try to fracture the malignant, dead-end status quo. For that reason, it may be that the best course is for the U.S., at least publicly, to be seen to be the last to abandon the project of a democratic Iraq, if it persists in foundering.
"No compromise with the main purpose, no peace till victory, no pact with unrepentant wrong." - Winston Churchill