The McClatchy narrative on Iraq
downtalk, downtalk, downtalk
By Charles Bird Posted in War — Comments (5) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
McClatchy reporters Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott wrote yesterday about an Iraq study by a Dr. Joseph Collins of the National War College. The article is technically accurate but misleading because the article doesn't address until paragraph 13 (out of 19 written) the focus of the study, and then gets wrong that "much of the blame for what went wrong in Iraq after the initial U.S. victory at the feet of then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld." The folks at Small Wars Journal read it and the "reporting" raised enough red flags that they contacted the author of the study. Here is Dr. Collins' response:
More below the fold...
The Miami Herald story ("Pentagon Study: War is a 'Debacle' ") distorts the nature of and intent of my personal research project. It was not an NDU study, nor was it a Pentagon study. Indeed, the implication of the Herald story was that this study was mostly about current events. Such is not the case. It was mainly about the period 2002-04. The story also hypes a number of paragraphs, many of which are quoted out of context. The study does not "lay much of the blame" on Secretary Rumsfeld for problems in the conduct of the war, nor does it say that he "bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It does not single out "Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley" for criticism.
Here is a fair summary of my personal research, which formally is NDU INSS Occasional Paper 5, "Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath."
This study examines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decision-making process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Even allowing for progress under the Surge, the study insists that mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out in the mid- to long-term for improvements in the U.S. decision-making and policy execution systems.
The study recommends the development of a national planning charter, improving the qualifications of national security planners, streamlining policy execution in the field, improving military education, strengthening the Department of State and USAID, and reviewing the tangled legal authorities for complex contingencies. The study ends with a plea to improve alliance relations and to exercise caution in deciding to go to war.
This is just the latest example of McClatchy clinging to its narrative of downtalking Iraq despite the facts and despite the actual situation on the ground. A few weeks ago, in the wake of the Basra offensive, Leila Fadel of McClatchy clearly colored her reporting to proclaim Muqtada al Sadr the victor and Nouri al Maliki the loser. The reality is that the situation in Basra has improved since Iraqi forces entered the city.
Leila Fadel of McClatchy is an uncritical cheerleader of that Soros-funded study.
Leila Fadel (and co-journalist Mohammed al Dulaimy) was quick to report a mass slaying of 11 in Baghdad, "underscoring the fragility of recent declines in violence." The problem is that the story is a hoax.
McClatchy was quick to report that twenty headless bodies were found near Baghdad last June. Quote: "A car bomb parked at a crowded Baghdad bus terminal killed at least 25 Thursday morning, while 20 beheaded bodies were found on the banks of the Tigris River southeast of the capital…The beheaded remains were found in the Sunni Muslim village of Um al Abeed, near the city of Salman Pak, 14 miles southeast of Baghdad." QandO compiled other similar reports of the slaughter, but the problem is that the massacre never happened (McClatchy removed the link and, best as I can tell, replaced it with this).
Jay Price and Qasim Zein of McClatchy produced this ridiculous story, lamenting the loss of business for Najaf cemetery workers because of the declines in violence.
I know it's tough being in the newspaper business, but there could very well be a connection between their sloppy, inaccurate reporting and the fact that their stock price has dropped around 70% in the last twelve months.
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The McClatchy narrative on Iraq 5 Comments (0 topical, 5 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
I can hardly wait for the day we all will talk of newspapers as we do of dinosaurs....based on their numbers recently it should be in my lifetime :-)
Freedom of Religion not Freedom from Religion
... of the almost innumerable reasons why I will not read the leftist rag AKA The Miami Herald. Among others are the crummy columnists like Leonard Pitts, Andres Oppenheimer and the inimitable Carl Hiaasen.
It was a crummy newspaper when Knight-Ridder owned it and it hasn't gotten any better since McClatchy.
John
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Why would God invent something like whiskey? To keep the Irish from ruling the world of course
Instead of arguing about the McClatchy summary of the INSS study, why not just read the INSS study for yourself?
It points out things like this:
By the second half of 2003, there was plenty of evidence that an insurgency had gotten underway, yet Rumsfeld refused to acknowledge it, probably for public relations reasons. As a result, there was no rapid buildup of reinforcements to nip it in the bud (page 23).
But the study leaves open the question of just who was ultimately responsible for not increasing the size of the force to deal with the insurgency until Bush's surge of mid 2007. It just concludes that was a major error.
The report faulted Rumsfeld for going too light personnel-wise and not being adaptive enough, it faulted Bremer for lots of reasons, it faulted Sanchez and other generals for not adequately responding to the insurgency (and other things), it faulted Cheney for cherry-picking, it faulted the military command for insufficient post-war planning and failing to coordinate with State and USAID, and it ultimately faulted President Bush for various reasons and because the buck stops at him. The blame was pretty well spread. Singling out Rumsfeld was misleading reporting, and trust me, the folks who know me also know that I'm no fan of Rumsfeld. Collins was easier on Franks than I thought he would be.
1. McCain, 2. Thompson, 3. Giuliani, 4. Romney

I read the headline in my local paper this morning, saw that it was a McClatchy story and moved on. This was all I needed to know that the story was not worth my time. I had a hunch there was an untold part of the story. Thanks again.