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Does Anybody Actually Read These Things?

By Mark I Posted in War — Comments (14) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

Sen John Warner (R-VA) has issued a clarion call for the beginning of a drawdown of United States troops in Iraq. The reason: “I really, firmly believe the Iraqi government, under the leadership of Prime Minister [Nuri] al-Maliki, let our troops down.” Warner is frustrated that the Iraqi government has as yet failed to deliver political reconciliation and believes that the only way to force its hand in this regard is to begin removing US troops.

But that’s not what the intelligence community thinks, as evidenced by the recently released National Intelligence Estimate update on Iraq. Warner's prescription for political reconciliation is at odds with several of the Key Judgments of that report.

Read on…

The NIE isn’t bullish on the Maliki government’s performance. However, it is even less enthusiastic about the prospects that a withdrawal, drawdown, redeployment, pick your removal descriptive, will have on the situation.

Here, in their entirety, are the Key Judgments of the NIE that bear on the political situation in Iraq and the level and activities of US troops there. (all emphasis in original)

There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas. However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions.

We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that Iraq’s security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance. Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.

Political and security trajectories in Iraq continue to be driven primarily by Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as AQI and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia that try to fuel sectarian violence. Two new drivers have emerged since the January Estimate: expanded Sunni opposition to AQI and Iraqi expectation of a Coalition drawdown. Perceptions that the Coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intra-sectarian competition. At the same time, fearing a Coalition withdrawal, some tribal elements and Sunni groups probably will continue to seek accommodation with the Coalition to strengthen themselves for a post- Coalition security environment.

• Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded in the last six to nine months but has not yet translated into broad Sunni Arab support for the Iraqi Government or widespread willingness to work with the Shia. The Iraqi Government’s Shia leaders fear these groups will ultimately side with armed opponents of the government, but the Iraqi Government has supported some initiatives to incorporate those rejecting AQI into Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry elements.

• Intra-Shia conflict involving factions competing for power and resources probably will intensify as Iraqis assume control of provincial security. In Basrah, violence has escalated with the drawdown of Coalition forces there. Local militias show few signs of reducing their competition for control of valuable oil resources and territory.

• The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.

• Kurdish leaders remain focused on protecting the autonomy of the Kurdish region and reluctant to compromise on key issues.

The IC assesses that the emergence of “bottom-up” security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. A multi-stage process involving the Iraqi Government providing support and legitimacy for such initiatives could foster over the longer term political reconciliation between the participating Sunni Arabs and the national government. We also assess that under some conditions “bottom-up initiatives” could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.

• We judge such initiatives are most likely to succeed in predominantly Sunni Arab areas, where the presence of AQI elements has been significant, tribal networks and identities are strong, the local government is weak, sectarian conflict is low, and the ISF tolerate Sunni initiatives, as illustrated by Al Anbar Province.

• Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded, and neighborhood security groups, occasionally consisting of mixed Shia-Sunni units, have proliferated in the past several months. These trends, combined with increased Coalition operations, have eroded AQI’s operational presence and capabilities in some areas.

• Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.

• Coalition military operations focused on improving population security, both in and outside of Baghdad, will remain critical to the success of local and regional efforts until sectarian fears are diminished enough to enable the Shia-led Iraqi Government to fully support the efforts of local Sunni groups.

That’s a lot to digest, and much more than will be seen in the mainstream press, so here are the high points. The NIE credits the surge and the erosion of support for al-Qaeda in Iraq among Sunnis for the improvements in security in Iraq that have been noticed even by liberal Congressmen. But the report allows that there is still much work to be done, chiefly in the area of the Iraqi government’s performance. It concludes that the security situation will continue to improve over the next 6-12 months, “to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces,” but says that the Iraqi government will have trouble exploiting these gains and turning them into real political reconciliation unless the majority Shia and the minority Sunnis learn to trust one another and work together.

This is where Warner’s recommendation for the president to begin withdrawing troops runs afoul of the NIE. Warner believes that removing US troops will force the Iraqi government’s various factions to reconcile. But the NIE says that Warner’s plan may lead to just the opposite.

Two new drivers have emerged since the January Estimate: expanded Sunni opposition to AQI and Iraqi expectation of a Coalition drawdown. Perceptions that the Coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intra-sectarian competition. At the same time, fearing a Coalition withdrawal, some tribal elements and Sunni groups probably will continue to seek accommodation with the Coalition to strengthen themselves for a post- Coalition security environment. (my emphasis)

In other words, marginalized Shia groups, like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, will gain in stature, while Sunni groups will cease cooperating with the Iraqi government in anticipation of the Shia turning on them once the Americans leave. Evidence for this conclusion is found in the bullet points that follow.

• Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded in the last six to nine months but has not yet translated into broad Sunni Arab support for the Iraqi Government or widespread willingness to work with the Shia. The Iraqi Government’s Shia leaders fear these groups will ultimately side with armed opponents of the government, but the Iraqi Government has supported some initiatives to incorporate those rejecting AQI into Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry elements.

• Intra-Shia conflict involving factions competing for power and resources probably will intensify as Iraqis assume control of provincial security. In Basrah, violence has escalated with the drawdown of Coalition forces there. Local militias show few signs of reducing their competition for control of valuable oil resources and territory.

Where the coalition withdraws, the security vacuum causes Iraq’s disparate groups to look to their own safety first, subordinating the very goals that Sen. Warner wants the Iraqi government to achieve.

It should be no surprise to anyone that the Iraqi government has not delivered on political reconciliation. In its short history and in all its iterations since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Iraqi government has practiced political brinksmanship. It acts when it absolutely has to act, according to its own timetable, and not before.

Sen. Warner has great affection for the troops. But in this instance, he has let his affection cloud his policy judgment. The surge has given the United States a renewed chance to win a real victory in Iraq, as opposed to securing a moral or semantic one. Sen. Warner should remember that the troops want to win this fight. For the first time in two years or so, they are taking the fight to the enemy, winning hearts and minds, and setting Iraq on a course for even more dramatic gains in the coming months. Sen. Warner’s plan would get some troops a welcome Christmas homecoming, but in so doing, it just may upset the fragile balance they have striven to achieve since the beginning of the surge. If Sen. Warner truly loves the troops, he will withdraw his recommendation, and let them continue to win.