Don't Try This At Home
By streiff Posted in User Blogs — Comments (8) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Promoted from the Diaries.
The military, as perhaps no other profession, is plagued with experts who study it. They range from the gravitas end of the spectrum, including luminaries such as Gary Hart and Edward Luttwak, to the buffoons who write about defense affairs for major daily papers. They basically have two things in common. First, they only have a vague knowledge of the institution they analyze. Secondly, they feel free to comment on military affairs in a way that it would never occur to them to talk about running a hospital, a car dealership, an international shipping company, or even a bordello.
Today Brian Gifford, a research fellow at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, joins this esteemed list by writing The Costs of Staying the Course: Conditions in Iraq and in Past Wars Cast Casualty Tolls in a Different Light
Gifford's thesis seems to be, and I am open to correction on this, that the casualty rate among US forces in Iraq is really quite high. High enough to call into question whether the conflict is sustainable.
Read on . . .
A closer look at these deaths -- 1,232 as I write -- reveals a real rate of manpower attrition that raises questions about our ability to sustain our presence there in the long run.
Incredible. Not incredible--wow! Who knew? But incredible--bull crap.
While I don't have first hand knowledge of Mr. Gifford's politics, other than his employer gives one a good hint, his methodology reeks of critical sociology: "a methodological approach that uses research to bring about social change. It rejects the scientific principle of objectivity, claiming that all research has a political character." Simply put, this means the researcher ties numbers to a rack and tortures them with hot pincers until they give the correct answer.
Let's examine the methodology. We really can't be sure exactly what the author does as he doesn't tell us. It appears that he attributes all deaths and all injuries incurred by the Armed Forces during a conflict as being a result of that conflict. For instance, he sets the number of deaths in the Vietnam War as 58,000. This number includes all personnel in Southeast Asia from all causes. Combat deaths totaled 47,424. The other obvious mistake he makes is that he includes all soldiers wounded in Iraq in his total of wounded. This includes 46% of the wounded who return to duty within 72 hours. In previous wars the number of wounded only counted those requiring evacuation to a hospital. So at a minimum he does not present an apples to apples comparison.
The Department of Defense provides historical end strength and casualty data from the American Revolution through today here, here, and here.
Moreover, we fought those wars with much larger militaries than we currently field. The United States had 12 million active-duty personnel at the end of World War II and 3.5 million at the height of the Vietnam War, compared with just 1.4 million today. Adjusted for the size of the armed forces, the average daily number of killed and wounded was 4.8 times as many in World War II than in Iraq, but it was only 0.25 times greater in Vietnam -- or one-fourth more.
This, quite honestly, is just nonsense. Neither during Vietnam, nor World War II, nor now, were all forces in a combat theater. If we look at the daily casualty rate we find this
World War II --- 460
Korea --- 81
Vietnam --- 42
Iraq --- 9
Nothing counterintuitive here. World War II was more intense than the Korean War, and so on. I think we all knew that.
Adjusting for the size of the military is trickier. He also seems to compare the average daily casualties to the maximum strength of the force. If so, this doesn't pass the smell test. It applies all casualties during a war against the peak strength of the armed forces. If we use the number of man-years as a comparison we have a much better comparison. Admittedly some soldiers are counted twice, but many of the wounded were wounded multiple times. For instance, Tommy Franks was hospitalized three times for wounds received in Vietnam. He counts for one man on the personnel strength yet he accounts for three wounds.
The percentage of the forces available during a conflict that were killed or wounded in battle are:
World War II --- 1.85%
Korea --- 1.97%
Vietnam --- 0.36%
Iraq --- 0.21%
Again, nothing counterintuitive here. But using total troop strength masks true intensity. For instance, in 1942 combat for American forces was not very intense: unless you were on Guadalcanal or at Kasserine Pass. If we look at casualties in relation to troops assigned to the theater of operations we are limited to a comparison to Vietnam by the limitation of online records. Here we see:
Vietnam --- 6.00% of all forces ever assigned to Vietnam were killed or wounded in action.
Iraq --- 1.76%
So when we look at the author's statement:
Our better-prepared troops are taking casualties at a real rate not tremendously lower than their predecessors in World War II, a bloodier, costlier, longer war that was fought on three continents and across three oceans and one that relied heavily on face-to-face combat rather than precision-guided munitions.
We can only guffaw. When considering the casualties suffered by all troops who participated, and are participating, in the Iraq War they are 11% the rate suffered in World War II. When we do an apples to apples comparison of all casualties suffered by all troops serving in theater in Vietnam against the same population for Iraq we find Iraq casualties are 29% of the Vietnam rate. We know the Vietnam rate was only a fraction of that of World War II.
That the insurgency is nonetheless growing more effective in the face of heavier losses makes it difficult to imagine an exit strategy that any reasonable person would recognize as a "victory." Some will charge that this analysis amounts to defeatism. I disagree. Understanding the battlefield as the men and women of our armed forces experience it acknowledges the sacrifices they are making in our name.
A statement unsupported by facts, to say the least. That the author believes he has performed analysis or understands the battlefield is nothing short of risible.
In short, it is clear that the author just doesn't know enough about his subject to write this paper, or to even hold this opinion, that he has not only written it and had it published speaks to the low level of scholarship that those in the military have come to expect from those who write about war.
Sustainability of operations may become an issue in the future, but it will not become an issue because of casualties. Obviously, the Army and Marines need to add some tens of thousands to their strength just to reduce the operational tempo.
I do not minimize the casualties we have suffered. You can't look at the rows of phots of good, young officers, NCOs, and soldiers who have died and not feel a pang of sorrow and regret. However, it is just a total misreading of the institutions to think that casualties will ever drive the Army or Marine Corps from the battlefield.
It seems that Mr. Gifford is now working on an analysis of racial disparities in casualties in Iraq. Anyone want to hazard a guess at the result?
RE:
"However, it is just a total misreading of the institutions to think that casualties will ever drive the Army or Marine Corps from the battlefield"
Agreed, but the point is not whether the military will want to leave, but whether the American people will look at the war as a lost cause and want to get out. I think the jury is still out on that.
Any evidence of this other that you "thinking" it?
And even were that the case that is not his thesis. His thesis is the casualty rate is too high for the military to sustain.
- that it isn't about casualties. It is more about the reason they are being sacrificed. America remembers 9/11 and most have accepted the link between that event and Iraq - despite the best efforts of the MSM and other leftists. There is a price to pay.
- casualty rates are NOT measures of success or failure in war. They are more a measure of the type, intensity, and method of warfare.
- casualty rates are not likely to become an issue for Iraq unless and until dolts like Gifford and MSM drum-beaters make them an issue.
Gifford seems to feel that current casualty rates will remain the same, or increase. The underlying assumption is that the 'insurgency' in Iraq is insolable and likely to go on ad infinitum. He is dead wrong there.
He does not take into account that this administration was just reelected in large part with (some would say 'despite') the war in Iraq as a central issue. The so-called public will accept the losses, and more. This isn't Vietnam with a discredited president half-heartedly pursuing a war he hadn't the courage to fight.
Typical. Psuedo-social scientist trying to manufacture an issue from circumstances he neither understands nor is able to appreciate.
That Gifford's commentary is published in the Washington Post is telling in itself. The democrats have picked up on what they perceive as a moral values deficiency within their party. Following the democrat radio address on Saturday and the commentary by democrat operatives on the Sunday talk shows, Gifford's commentary seems to follow in the same democratic values theme. It's just morally wrong to ask our soldiers to give their lives, no matter how many or how few, for a war we can't justify. The public just won't stand for it. There were no weapons of mass destruction.
The numbers and statistics are irrelevant as far as the Washington Post is concerned. Liberals think in terms of feelings, not logic. They got their message out to their audience.
streiff -
This was an excellent analysis. Your points on the statistical jiveness of the author's statements are acknowledged.
That said, I agree with morielly's point. It may not be evident to you, but it's crystal clear to me that there is way less than 100% support for our involvement in Iraq. Not due to lack of spine, but due to lack of confidence in the case that was made to take us to war there.
The American people have always been willing to bear great losses in a cause they believe in. We're not a weak people. They won't, however, support a cause they believe is bogus. I share morielly's agnosticism about how Iraq will ultimately be viewed.
Cheers -
opinions so laden with weltschmertz that they make my butt ache.
Americans don't support any war with enthusiasm, World War II is the only exception that comes to mind.
World War I wasn't popular for long. Korea was never really popular. Neither was Vietnam. Nor the Philippine Insurrection.
But if we cannot agree that removing Saddam Hussein, was in and of itself, a laudable project then there is simply no common ground possible. If we cannot agree that at least setting the conditions for at least a Kemal Ataturk-style democracy in Iraq is a noble and worthy goal then we certainly are a craven people. Those two items alone make it impossible to call Iraq a bogus cause.
streiff -
I don't think Americans support wars with enthusiasm. I think they are willing to accept losses if they believe the war is worth fighting.
I think your examples support that.
I agree that removing Hussein was a good thing, and agree that establishing, at a minimum, a government that is run by rule of law and is responsive to its people in Iraq would be splendid. Sincerely.
"Bogus cause" was a poor choice of words, and I apologize for them. There were, and are, many good reasons for a military intervention in Iraq. There are also many reasons that I, personally, did not support invading Iraq in March of '03, and also many reasons why I believe support in this country for the invasion is mixed. We can discuss them if you like.
But, I agree that the result of removing Hussein from power was a positive benefit, and also hope that a stable, at least somewhat democratic government can be achieved there.
Cheers -
Critical scatology (whoops, I mean sociology) then means, as applied to any topic, anything anti-war types want it to mean. I think a better name for it is propaganda. They may dress it up as some kind of "methodology", but it's still nothing more than the Big Lie concocted with the aid of statistical gymnastics.
Yea, Vietnam is a perfect example. Most Americans believed at the time that TET was a major defeat for us. Wrong. The Dan Rather brigade snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by manipulating the story. Indeed, most people may still not understand that we won the land war in SE Asia and that our boys' sacrifice was squandered by Jane Fonda, John Kerry, Tom Hayden, Woodward and Bernstein, and many ohers for cheap political glory. (Man, compared to Slick Willie, Richard Nixon was a saint.)
In any event, we've reached the point in this country where no ignominy (or lie) is to small to heap on our country or our Armed Forces. Sure, we used propaganda in WWII, but its' purpose was to help win the war and end the war and thereby save lives in the long run. Many people nowadays don't realize what a close thing our victory in that war was. We might very well not have prevailed if a fifth column was at work in the media at home. Or even if we had not wisely used and promoted positive, pro-American messages.
Anti-American content would not have been tolerated by ANYBODY, which is what we basically have now. They may attempt to hide behind the First Amendment, the "people's right to know", or a dozen other sanctimonious dodges, but they're getting or boys killed and I for one don't appreciate it.
The article you cited is a perfect example of this dangerous nonsense. Thanks to the NEA and the AFT, there are many, many Americans out there who will not appreciate the subtle manipulations going on here. Forget about bloggers, here we have a think-tank denizen in his pajamas who is being PAID to do real harm to our boys, our war effort, and our country. Unlike Vietnam, it will not go unnoticed or unchallenged this time. Good work Streiff