Redstate

But Fukuyama's been doing the I-didn't-mean-it two step for a few months now.

And while we cannot hope to recreate the American experience (by which I mean our culture, government, institutions, and society, not the lousy PBS show) out of whole cloth, I tend to be mildly dismissive of the argument that Iraq is somehow by its very nature incapable of building a passable imitation.

Courtesy and honesty compel me to point out that your personal blockquote is quite a turn of phrase.

Has he? I didn't realize that.

The idea that has been in mind lately: What if the question is not whether Iraq is capable of democracy, but whether she wants it? What simple pious man (of any religion) would want the democracy that we in the decadent West peddle?

I'm not nearly as pessimistic about the fate of democracy in Iraq. I've always assumed that democratizing Iraq would be a process that would take decades, not months. It's been less than two years. Call back in another generation and we'll see how things go.

I've always believed that democracy is based on innate human values. People tend to want to be free, and they want to be safe. Democracy has the right tradeoff between freedom and safety. It's not that democracy is some artificial structure, it's the best way of creating a government, the natural end stage of societal development. If this sounds familiar, it's because it's Fukuyama's own thesis in The End of History.

Iraqi democracy won't spring up overnight, and stability must be the primary goal before a true democracy can flourish. However, already Iraq is significantly more free than it was under Saddam, and the Iraqi people are seeing that the terrorists will kill Arabs just as readily (if not more so) than Westerners.

Fukuyama forgets that we're not creating Iraqi democracy. The Iraqis are. Allawi wasn't our pick, he was the IGC's pick. Neither was al-Yower. The Iraqis are creating their own democracy, we just got the ball rolling. It will take some time for them to get it right (it took us nearly a century and a bloody civil war), but we can't abandon what needs to be done to end this war just because it will take a long time.

Fukuyama's argument is that invading Iraq was the right choice, and promoting democracy is the right choice, but that somehow we need to be more realistic about it. What Fukuyama ignores is that no amount of diplomacy would change the mind of the French or any other country dead-set on anti-Americanism. There's little chance that Bush could have gotten a Security Council resolution authorizing force when France, Russia, and China all have veto powers and every interest in seeing Hussein in power.

The UN and the international system is fundamentally broken, and until that changes we can't assume that the UN has the best interests of the world at heart.

The Christian Just War doctrine makes a crucial distinction between a just cause and a just war. Let no man deny that overthrowing Saddam's cockroach regime (John Derbyshire vivid phrase) was a just cause. The question always was, for the clearheaded, whether it was a cause that was rightly vindicated by recourse to war.

This is the question -- and one that is frequently obscured by those on both the right and the left.  Indeed, whether you find comfort in the Just War doctrine or the cold embrace of realpolitik (but not, notably, in the arms of the neoconservative or LGF-conservative), you arrive at the same place:  Some worthy things must be left undone.  It's the lesson of scarce resources.  It supposedly was a lesson that, among all, conservatives have learned the best.  (Admittedly, it's hard to say this without sniggering in light of the current budget.)  

You (and Derbyshire) do the cause for war a disservice, however, by contemplating Saddam's regime as a cockroach -- i.e., something small and insignificant.  The convincing case for war (and the one that ultimately convinced me) was the claim that Saddam's regime in fact was a clear and growing danger to US security.  It was no cockroach -- or, if it was, it was a cockroach who might carry (quite literally) some loathesome disease to the far corners of the world.

The WMD case for war has been reduced, certainly, with the benefit of hindsight.  But those of us who remember the lead up to the war -- who remember that everyone, including the current Democratic nominee, believed that Saddam had WMDs -- do not dismiss it.  This was why we invaded.  It was the only good, just, and sufficient reason.  That we may have overjudged Saddam as a threat (and the jury is still out) reflects the vagaries of intelligence; analytical deficiencies amoung our leaders and agents; and the fact that, despite our post-modern insistence that everything be safe and accounted for, the risk that you might be wrong still exists.

What simple pious man (of any religion) would want the democracy that we in the decadent West peddle?

That it's possible to have our governance without our decadence. Indeed, the basis for men of faith to get involved in government is a belief that the system is not in its own nature corrupt; that it can foster good, or at the very least, not be antipathic to good. I happen to be one of those people. I suspect you are too.

I wouldn't make too much of the cockroach line, Von, but thanks for the compliment.

If you read the essay of mine that I link to, you will see that I end up rejecting the WMD logic. I stand by that view.

Why is this assumed? Granted, nearly anything is preferable to Hussein's regime, but why do we assume that everyone wants democracy? Might they not prefer a form of government that enshrines the hierarchical structures that tribal socities know well? Might they not prefer theocracy?

But why is democracy the assumed ideal? My point is that Conservatives have been criticizing democracy for a long time -- and have seen their criticisms vindicated many, many times. Why should be abandon that heritage of critique here?

There's little chance that Bush could have gotten a Security Council resolution authorizing force when France, Russia, and China all have veto powers and every interest in seeing Hussein in power.

From the write-up:

They talk as if their (that is, the Bush administration's) judgment had been vindicated at every turn, and that any questioning of their judgment could only be the result of base or dishonest motives.

Sound familiar?  Sure does -- those who thought Bush was going about this wrong just love Saddam, the love terrorists, and they hate America.

Or . . . could it be that everyone knew what would happen when Saddam was gone, and that they were right and a lot of people don't want to admit it?  Couldn't be that anyone learned from the mistakes in the former Yugoslavia, could it?  Couldn't be that anyone was working on faith, that most base, irresponsible, childish sentiment, to make the post-war work, could it?  Optimism does not a feasible plan make, and that is what the French, Germans, Russians, British (look at the polls!), Spanish (ditto!), and half of the Americans were against.  Try this: imagine, if you will, that those who opposed Bush's actions had good intentions -- work with me here -- and think through their arguments.  Don't ascribe our words and actions to base motives for once; try our point of view.  I've tried the war's supporters' point of view on for size, and it really makes the whole thing a lot more bearable -- I ascribed it to base motives, too, for far too long, but when looked at as if they were actually trying to do something good, it all made a lot more sense.  Paranoia is not a healthy emotion.

Thing is, Bush I (and the UN) blew it when they failed to support the Shi'ite uprising following the first Gulf War.  Democracy can flourish in Iraq -- well, general rebellion against authority, at least, which is the foundation of democracy -- but when we fail to support it when it happens of its own accord, it kind of makes it difficult for people to allow us to come force it down their throats later.  Securing the oil fields before anything else didn't look so good, either.  We have a serious credibility problem here, at least our President does, and without credibility the notion of people trusting us pretty much falls through the floor.

Allawi wasn't our pick, he was the IGC's pick.

And the IGC was selected by whom?

I pay the U.S. goverment to organize the world to suit my interests (or as best a facsimile of that state as electoral politics can manage.)  If our security and/or wealth is enhanced by enforcing Western-style institutions until they take, then so be it.  I have little doubt that most Germans and Japanese circa 1944 had very little desire to have new political structures forced on them from the outside at gunpoint (or bombpoint, as the case may be), regardless of their feelings on the regime in power.  American interests first...

Bernard Guerrero

Why is this assumed? Granted, nearly anything is preferable to Hussein's regime, but why do we assume that everyone wants democracy? Might they not prefer a form of government that enshrines the hierarchical structures that tribal socities know well? Might they not prefer theocracy?

Perhaps I failed to note the effect of the word "simple" on your argument -- if you mean "simple" as is "stupid, I would agree.  However, in pluralistic societies such as Iraq, a democracy (with some base protection for minority rights) is the only government that has the potential to be stable in the long run.  For instance, a Shia theocracy in Iraq -- just as a Baptist (or Roman Catholic, or Presbyterian) theocracy in the US -- would implode.  This is a result that the "smart" pious, by definition,* would seek to avoid.

*I.e., it's an irrational and immoral result.

...this is incorrect:

"well, general rebellion against authority, at least, which is the foundation of democracy"

The foundation of democracy, my man, is the creation of short-term stable outcomes when power-relationships are in flux.  Don't kid yourself.  Ask the fellows at Runnymede if they forced John to sign the Charter to "rebel against authority".  Ha!  They wanted to take authority, or at least a goodly portion of it.

Political writers have established it as a maxim that, in contriving any system of government and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. - David Hume

Our system is not so easily reduced as all that. Granted, fifty years of Democrats and squishy Republicans running the joint did bring us closer to, sadly, a purer democracy. For the record, were that what we're pushing, I'd be much more leery.

But our system is slightly better designed than that, to restrain men's wildest hopes and passions; for that very reason, I have guarded hope in it.

God willing, the Iraqis come to a similar understanding in time.

Last week I post a tribute to Burke, in which I quoted his definition of Jacobinism: the idea "that all government, not being a democracy, is an usurpation." Shall we apply Jacobinism to Iraq, and call every Iraqi who prefers some other form of government an usurper.

At the very least, that is a dubious position for Conservatives to take.

Or . . . could it be that everyone knew what would happen when Saddam was gone, and that they were right and a lot of people don't want to admit it?  Couldn't be that anyone learned from the mistakes in the former Yugoslavia, could it?  Couldn't be that anyone was working on faith, that most base, irresponsible, childish sentiment, to make the post-war work, could it?  Optimism does not a feasible plan make, and that is what the French, Germans, Russians, British (look at the polls!), Spanish (ditto!), and half of the Americans were against.  Try this: imagine, if you will, that those who opposed Bush's actions had good intentions -- work with me here -- and think through their arguments.  Don't ascribe our words and actions to base motives for once; try our point of view.  I've tried the war's supporters' point of view on for size, and it really makes the whole thing a lot more bearable -- I ascribed it to base motives, too, for far too long, but when looked at as if they were actually trying to do something good, it all made a lot more sense.  Paranoia is not a healthy emotion.

No, it is clear that the motivations of France, Russia, and China were anything but admirable. Remember that Dominique de Villepin rejected a second UN resolution before the Iraqis did. TotalFinaElf and other French companies had significant economic interests in Iraq, as did Lukoil and other firms. The UN itself was engaged in a massive scandal of illicit bribes, kickbacks, and concessions to the Hussein regime. It is clear that even though all parties agreed with the idea that Hussein had WMDs, they all put their economic interets first. The French had a long history of trade with Ba'athist Iraq, and they were pushing to end the UN sanctions against the Hussein regime. The arguments being presented by de Villepin were merely smokescreens to cover the French desire to constrain American power and protect one of their best customers.

I have considered the arguments of the anti-war crowd, and they are dominated by arguments that are either blantantly idiotic ("NO WAR FOR OIL!" and the like) or based on visceral hatred of either America, Bush, or both. There are some very cogent and responsible arguments against the war, but those weren't the ones being made, and even those don't have the same cost/benefit ratio as military action did.

Thing is, Bush I (and the UN) blew it when they failed to support the Shi'ite uprising following the first Gulf War.

You'll find no disagreement from me on this one.

Securing the oil fields before anything else didn't look so good, either.

And allowing them to be torched would have been a disaster, not just for Iraq, but for everyone else. Imagine the Kuwaiti oil files magnified several times over - the environmental costs alone would be staggering. It was a strategy that was absolutely necessary.

e have a serious credibility problem here, at least our President does, and without credibility the notion of people trusting us pretty much falls through the floor.

Now here's where I really disagree. The war in Iraq has made it very clear that when the President said "we will make no distinction between the terrorists and the states that sponsor them" he damn well meant it. Qaddafi already got the message, and Iran and North Korea are both feeling the heat. Not dealing with Iraq would be a long-term major problem for the US, as it would provide an Arab strongman who could continue to support terrorism with impunity.

The Middle East has long been a Gordian knot of anti-Americanism, fundamentalism, and autocracy. Sooner or later, we'd have to cut it - and after being attacked once it become quite clear that we cannot afford to wait for the next attack before we deal with this problem in a proactive manner.

every Iraqi who prefers some other form of government an usurper

We claim that any government that takes as its base the power of theology or tribal tradition to be one that usurps the God given rights of the individual to self-determination while Islamists claim that any government that takes as its base of power the rights of the individual to be one that usurps God.

Is is possible for a war to be a Just War (and a Just Cause) and also a bad idea?  Surely, Saddam's regime, by whatever analogy you want to describe it, not only had the appearance of a threat, but WAS a threat, albeit of indeterminate proportion--indeterminate because of that man's ferocity and instability and because of the unknowable future which might, eventually, lead our greatest enemies to his doorstep in search of succor.

As a threat, then, with no other qualities to redeem it and with our nation's capability, so admirably demonstrated, to remove such a regime with minimal innocent casualties, I see much to justify the invasion.  But the execution of justice requires, separately, the exercise of prudence.  If we are to condemn Operation Iraqi Freedom, let us condemn it as imprudent but praise it as the just dissolution of a profoundly evil institution.

Well I, for one, am not a Jacobin, and do not believe that all government, not being a democracy, is an usurpation.

But we use words too facilely then. We use "democracy" to mean everything from constitutional monarchy to constitutional republic to mob rule.

And we make ourselves difficult to distinguish from Jacobins.

That's a slight misreading of our founding documents. "Self-determination" is not the issue, so much as the "consent of the governed." Indeed, one imagines that the Founders would be scandalized at the idea of a civilization entirely built upon "self determination"; one imagines that, were it and its consequences spelled out for them, most Americans would be, too.

 . . . and welcome to Redstate.

And eloquently expressed.  I share that basic opinion - a Just War, though not necessarily the Right War to have at the time.

I wouldn't make too much of the cockroach line, Von, but thanks for the compliment.

I disagree; it's central to your claim that Saddam's regime was not a sufficient threat to justify war.  If Saddam had been found with a  burgeoning WMD program, an active nuclear program, and stockpiles of various nerve agents (as had been suspected) -- and viewed in light of the fact that a virtual state of war already existed between Iraq and the US (i.e., he was shooting at us and we were shooting at him) -- your opposition to removing him would appear imprudent.

As for your WMD arguments (from the linked TCS article):

A potential threat, no matter how monstrous, does not justify preemptive action; the threat must be imminent. Surprise attacks have ever been with us; the cruel complication of Technology's nightmares does not alter basic principles.

No, but they may change which principles are pre-eminent.  Kennedy blockaded Cuba:  An act of war.  He did it to prevent the Soviets from installing nuclear weapons* which, if launched, would have landed on the Eastern Seaboard with virtually no warning.  If the Soviets were installing cannons, it would hardly be justified; in light of the risk that a Soviet first strike could decapitate the US and prevent a US response (thereby undoing the logic of mutually assured destruction), however, few would today argue that it was the wrong thing.  

The guiding principle for US foreign policy must be the security and prosperity of the nation.  On occasion, this will require us to deal decisively with threats that you would deem as merely "potential."**

von

*Actually, installing more nuclear weapons.

**Indeed, your argument seems to hang entirely on the notion that there's a precise division between "potential" and "imminent" threats -- or that, if there is such a precise division, it is easily knowable in this world of imperfect information.  

And Heaven knows our governance tends to be, too. With that said, I think we can still distinguish ourselves from that merry band of idiots. Well, conservatives can, anyway. :)

We have always had a bad tendency to conflate democracy with our system of government. Look back in time, and it starts popping up early. However, just because we say one thing and mean another, does not mean that we are bequeathing on others what we're smart enough to avoid ourselves.

(Incidentally, this was the only part of the "neocon adventure" that worried me: The neocons have waaaaay too much faith in government, and I've always been a little uncertain that they'd devise or encourage enough checks and balances in any provisional government we gave Iraq.)

Shall we apply Jacobinism to Iraq, and call every Iraqi who prefers some other form of government an usurper.

Call them whatever you wish; my sole point is that it's in the self interest of an Iraqi (even the simple, pious one that you posit) that a democracy* emerge in Iraq.  

*broadly defined, the one caveat being protection of minority rights.

Indeed, your argument seems to hang entirely on the notion that there's a precise division between "potential" and "imminent" threats -- or that, if there is such a precise division, it is easily knowable in this world of imperfect information.

This distinction, though important, is one which the Just War traditin emphatically leaves to the prudential judgment of secular rulers -- which is why, in the end, I supported the war.

Your definition is too broad. The language we have used in promoting this nation-building belies our incompetence. We talk about democracy before we talk about a stable state; we talk about a kind of democracy that could include such disparate but admirable things constitutional republic or constitutional monarchy.

In short we have not thought seriously enough about what we mean by democracy.

TotalFinaElf and other French companies had significant economic interests in Iraq, as did Lukoil and other firms.

The effect of TotalFinaElf on France's economy is so minor that claiming they were against the war because of oil is just as ludicrous as saying that the U.S. went to war for oil itself.  I would argue that anti-Americanism in France was a much greater factor, though I see it as more to do with France's ego issues than anti-Americanism outright; they like America just fine, they just don't want us to tell them what to do.  Big egos, self-righteousness, and arrogance, however, were (are) in no short supply on either side of the issue.

I have considered the arguments of the anti-war crowd, and they are dominated by arguments that are either blantantly idiotic ("NO WAR FOR OIL!" and the like) or based on visceral hatred of either America, Bush, or both.

There you go again.  War protestors hate America.  I just don't see how sensible people can come to this conclusion.  Newsflash: there's a big difference between supporting America's interests (the pro-war crowd),i.e., security, power, and wealth, and supporting what America stands for (the anti-war crowd), i.e., honest dealing with the world, promotion of Christian values like peace, brotherhood, and equality, and the upholding of the rule of law (UN treaties, Geneva conventions, etc.).  Certainly there is a lot of middle ground between these camps, but I do see a big distinction in what "pro-America" means to different sides of the issue: it's not just about doing what's best for America, it has to do with American values, which often run country to our financial, political, and security concerns.  Doing what's right should come before doing what's best for us in any good American's heart.  I'm not saying that the pro-war crowd is anti-American, I'm just saying that you should check yourself before calling those who put America's interests behind its righteousness "unpatriotic".

I'm with you on the visceral hatred for Bush, though; that was definitely a factor, and it shouldn't have been -- just far too unobjective for me.  Can't say I blame people, though you should note that these are the same liberals who had the same visceral hatred for Clinton, who, let's face it, was a pretty conservative president despite his enemies on his right (who will look back on Clinton during the Kerry years with fond rememberence).  But it should be noted that for many people, anti-authoritarianism is at the base of American philosophy; witness Michael Moore's promise to go after Kerry full-force on day two of his term.  People like that, to me, are true Americans.  Adoration of authority is just, well . . . un-American.  (Q: Which country's founders were charged with sedition by the conservatives of their day?)

"we will make no distinction between the terrorists and the states that sponsor them" he damn well meant it.

So what exactly are we doing about terrorist sponsorship in Pakistan, our great ally?  Sounds like Bush is the one using smokescreens.

Given your statements in the rest of the comments, I understand your point.  We do indeed fail to adequately identify what we mean by "democracy".

But there are certain aspects of democracy that should be applied to Iraq. I do not expect an Iraqi Congress, an Iraqi president, and an Iraqi Declaration of Independence. What I do expect is representation for all Iraqi citizens. Minority rights need to be protected, as does freedom of religion. There must be a system where the government does not have a blank check to do whatever it wants.

Every poll taken in Iraq has indicated that the people there do want democracy. They had a monarchy before 1958; the Arabian Hashemite royals were installed by the British after World War I. I doubt they want to return to those days. Outside of Saddamist strongholds like Tikrit an Fallujah, Iraqis do not want a return to the Baathist dictatorship either. You mention theocracy, but only the fringe followers of Sadr desire that form of government. Even the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who's following includes most of Iraq's 14 million  Shi'as, is not an Iranian partisan and disapproves of the Teheran regime. He's the biggest player in Iraq right now, and far more liberal-minded than many in the media give him credit for.

Perhaps the solution to the current dilemma is a bicameral legislature. The upper house will be similar to the US Senate, and each province in Iraq will elect a fixed number of lawmakers, regardless of population. The lower house will be similar to the US HoR. Just a thought, and it may sound like we are forcing our "American system" on the Iraqis, but guess what - the American system is the best in the world.

I respect Prof. Fukuyama and his work, but I don't share his world view, at least as I understand it, which might not be very well at all.

His piece seems nostalgic, and presupposes a world order that fosters diplomacy, consensus, a balancing of interests. I doubt that world ever existed. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, our alliances were based not so much on shared values, but on fear of the Soviets. Now many of our former Allies fear and envy us. France is desperately looking for a counterbalance to our power, even to the point of dallying with the terrorists, but there simply is no counterpoint. The UN is a fraud and has been for decades. Diplomacy is largely a charade, although a sometimes useful one.

What's a President to do in such a world? I'll be the first to admit that The President's management of his message leading up to the war was only marginally effective, and he's paid the political price. In my view, he should have clearly stated what I think were his clear strategic objectives:

1. Radical destabilization of the Middle East.
   
   
2. Regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.
   
   
3. Insertion of military might in the region. Iraq's strategic value is obvious.
   
   
4. Elimination of WMDs in the region.

Nation building is the consequence of these strategies. I doubt that the Administration underestimated the difficulty of planting a Democracy in either Iraq or Afghanistan, but they made a calculation and determined that the strategic threat was greater than that unknown difficulty. How could these objectives have been negotiated?

No doubt, the postwar situation is extremely difficult and dangerous, but we now can get real answers about Saddam's WMDs, and we have a powerful forward base in prosecuting the War on Terror. Moreover, we've improved our negotiating position with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

At what cost? Blood and treasure, certainly. International prestige, perhaps, but how do we soberly place a value on international prestige. Did France and Germany ever cooperate because they like and respected us? Because we trod the moral high ground? I don't think so.

Prof. Fukuyama is right to question our nation building, but I think he misses the larger point.

I offer the following comments not in order to pontificate or lay down dogmatically what issues pertinent to the war should be discussed.  Rather, this is an "It seems to me..."  sort of post, based on opinions formed after reading thousands too-many pages of commentary on the subject.

So, it does indeed seem to me that Paul and Von have hit upon one of the core issues at stake: whether there exists a meaningful distinction between a possible threat and an imminent threat.  This question is of some importance on a theoretical level, but it receives its exigency from the threat, overestimated or not, of WMD as it may intersect with the threats posed by terrorist organizations and the states which enable or harbour them, as well as the palpable inadequacy of our intelligence.  

The other issue, it seems to me, is that any strategy for the prosecution of a campaign against Islamic terrorism must be comprehensive.  The sort of desultory, fits-and-starts approach of the 1990s will only prove ineffectual.  This issue, then, concerns the nature of the most prudent strategy.  The Bush administration outlined a strategy; it was not unproblematic, both conceptually and in implementation.  But what were/are the alternatives, given the fact that many of the grievances of our adversaries are religiously based and not amenable to articulation in terms that are comprehensible in our largely secularized culture?  There are questions about our past and present policies, our decadence; but there is also the issue of the hostility of many Muslims (not all, must I add?) toward the infidel other, a hostility which will not abate given the realities of immigration and globalization.  Our respective societies cannot wall themselves off from each other.  So, as I see the matter, that is the second great issue: if the Bush policy has been misguided or misbegotten, what are the alternatives, given the very real constraints inherent in our shared circumstances?

So, as I see the matter, that is the second great issue: if the Bush policy has been misguided or misbegotten, what are the alternatives, given the very real constraints inherent in our shared circumstances?

If you believe that humans -- all humans regardless of race, color or creed, lest I be misunderstood -- are essentially base creatures desiring money and fearing pain (that is, when they're not looking for sex . . . .):

(1)  A stick.  There must be real, immediate, devastating responses to terrorism and states that harbor terrorists.  Military responses must be devastating; wars must be total; total victory, not half measures, must be our goal.

Given our scarce military resources* (I had not realized how scarce until the strain of the Iraq war demonstrated it), this means that military invasions will be rare.  The battles must be chosen carefully because one battle joined means another left unfought.  (Despite the clamoring, no reasonable person believes that we have the capability of invading Iran before it gets a nuclear bomb; or invading Saudi Arabia; or invading NK; or Syria.  We chose Iraq and Afghanistan, and they are already too much.)

Allies, and collective action with undesireables (e.g., French perfidistas) are useful where a war or intervention is not ripe.  

The Bush doctrine's primary failings in this area are (1) to fail to account for scarcity, and buy into Tom Clanceyism -- the fantasy that we can do it all; (2) to lay out policies that no one believes that we have the capability of following through on; (3) to needlessly eschew allies.  A response would be to:  (1) Immediately begin reducing the scarcity -- we need a much larger military, pronto.  (2) To stop writing checks that we cannot cash (now is the time to engage Iraq -- not because we want to, but because we have no choice).  (3) To begin to try and find what common ground we may have with our putative allies (standing on principle is fine as a campaign slogan, but, as shown, it makes a lousy foreign policy.  Reagan grasped this innately.)

(2)  A carrot.  Ultimately, money will move the mountain.  The Middle East Free Trade Area must be dangled, and dangled, and then done.  It can't happen all at once, but that doesn't mean that it should start immediately.  Begin with "friendlier" regimes -- like Jordan, Morrocco.  Incorporate moderate Lebanon as a way of prying at Syria.  Push full force for Turkish integration in the EU, and encourage U.S. investment in Turkey itself.  

Finally, independent of the foregoing, we must extricate ourselves from the moral nightmare that is Saudi Arabia.  This means:

(3)  Energy independence.  I've become convinced that drilling in ANWAR -- if done correctly -- is worth the risk and environmental damage.  But this is a drop in the proverbial bucket without sound conservation measures.  Increase the MPG requirements on SUVs (Americans must stop playing with their Hummers, so to speak).  Offer tax breaks and incentives out the wazoo for fuel cell research.  (But ditch Agrifuels, which are a pork-barrel boondoggle.)  Encourage development (and stability) in other oil rich regions -- Nigeria, for example.  In other words, quit yapping and start getting serious.

Sorry this:

"now is the time to engage Iraq"

Should be:

now is the time to engage Iran

I certainly agree with 1 & 2, but IMHO 3 just doesn't go far enough if you intend it to have any effect on the current (current meaning the next 5-10 years) situation.

I'm growing more convinced that given the size of the energy requirements of the US that rationing is the only "serious" response.  

The problem isn't that SUVs are driven, its that anything is driven.  In 1997 (the most recent numbers available) there were 55M minivans, pickups and SUVs in the US that drove 800B* miles.  Assume 20mpg and you get 40B gallons of fuel (FYI a barrel of oil makes 20g of gas).  So, if we increase efficiency by 25% and all else stays the same, then we save 400M bbls of oil a year which is the production of CA for about 13 months. Cool, but the problem lies in the fact that those miles are up 27% from 1992.  So to sustain the rate of growth, mileage would have to continue to increase at that 25% rate every 5 years just to keep our fuel needs static.  And, I can't wait for the 2002 numbers to come out later this year.  I'll bet the increase is higher than that, whadya say?

I also think that people are ticked about drilling the ANWR because there are only 10.4B bbls of oil there.  That's about enough to last for 5 years of driving.  And none of these figures includes cars or commercial trucks.  So if something bad happens, we've traded pristine beauty forever, for 5 years of gas.

IMHO, the rationing of energy, and I mean all energy i.e. you must this Thursday decide between buying that doll made in China, driving to work or running that spare fridge in the garage for a week, is the only way to enforce the level of conservation required to make a dent in the problem. Plus, we may benefit in that the increased costs of shipping might drive manufacturing back to the US and might even rein in the chain stores who utilize large distribution centers connected to stores via cheap energy and massive buying power to drive smaller local merchants out of business.

Not that I think it'll ever really happen until we're farther down the road to being out of oil, but I think that's what would be required to make a dent now.

*actually its 815B, but 800 is easier to use.

 you have written, but sympathetic with the general tenor.  The details have been debated multiple times.

However, wrt to reducing dependence on foreign  oil and gas, two points.  First, as this country is repeatedly reminded, the U. S. is not the center of developmental gravity.  The nascent economies of third world countries do not have the capital to replace cheap oil with a more costly high tech energy alternative.  

Second, even in the U.S., the transition to energy independence will require much more than tax breaks as part of a suite of economic incentives.  Based on historical developments of this magnitude, it is highly unlikely to whimsical to think that market forces alone will produce the kind of cooperative joint ventures between public, private, and academic institutions that will be required to overcome the technical obstacles and address the capital requirements. Howard Dean's suggestion of a government sponsored initiative is not only a good idea but quite probably the only workable way to effect such a radical transition in a short period of time.  

I tend to agree.  I have been stumbling over the Fukuyama reversal for awhile and have still not completely sorted out my thoughts so this will be incomplete except to note that his recent article in The Australian was remarkable for the absence of his usual originality of thought, replaced with a litany of Left talking points as a disappointing substitute, almost as if the philosopher has (d)evolved into a political entity where it is easier to ignore the hypothetical alternatives that existed pre-war, but certainly conditioned the response of the Bush administration in Iraq that Fukuyama criticizes.

I note also that, unlike Fouad Ajami, Fukuyama has not accepted the clash of civilizations theory other than to acknowledge the unusually trenchant resistance of Islam to western modernity in the form of liberalism.  This seems to feed into his skepticism of nation-building.  Historical irony that an inherently difficult task must cut its teeth in a singularly truculent region of the world.

Why not just "ration" energy by allowing the market to raise prices? People will drive less if gasoline is $3.50 per gallon, or turn the thermostat down in winter (or up in summer) if their oil or electric bill is sharply higher. It is unlikely that we'll wake up one morning and have run out of energy. It's more likely that, after a period of rising prices, the market will increase production of energy alternatives, and/or energy use will decline.

I might be willing to support higher energy taxes. I know that's probably not a popular position among Republicans, but raising energy taxes is a far more market-friendy way of reducing energy consumption than issuing rationing cards. Plus, some of the money raised could be used to say, cut federal borrowing (I'm not a defecit hawk, but half trillion dollar deficits shouldn't make any Republican jump for joy; of course I only support rasing taxes to cut borrowing if they extra revenue is at least matched by spending cuts) or perhaps help fund basic research in the energy field. And no, I do not support a John Kerry-style "Manhattan Project" for "energy independence". The original Manhattan Project was a wartime necessity. We had to try and beat the Nazis to the bomb. But unfortunately we don't even know if a vast government scheme to achieve "energy independence" would even work, or indeed if such a goal is even desirable (just what's so bad about trading for some of our energy, anyway?). I know the big energy companies are none too popular these days, but I frankly trust them more to find new ways of powering American than I do Washington.

So, put me down as being in the "no" column on needing ration coupons to fill up my car.

If the EU or China become economically and subsequently militarily dominant in 75 years time, will this doctrine apply to them if they were to impose a form of government upon us?

...regardless of whether we'd like it to or not, or whether we took advantage of our own power or not.  Don't be naive.

But the corollary is that big fish tend not to eat nearly-as-big fish, in any case.  Else we'd impose appropriate governments on China and France tomorrow. :^)

The key is to take the opportunity to make the world as safe for America as we can, while we can.

Bernard Guerrero

Remember that all men would be tyrants if they could - Daniel Defoe

With all due respect to proponents of alternative energy research, I do not believe that AE is anything more than a red herring in the debate over how best to respond to the terrorist threat.  The problem is not simply the fact that our energy dependence entangles us in an unsavory neighbourhood - that is all true - but that, first of all, the current configuration of the world economy involves a high degree of mobility and cultural exchange.  That won't change, as undesirable in certain effects globalization actually is, meaning that cultural friction, and thus the greivances of the Muslim world, will endure, even if we cease purchasing crude from them.  Second, AE is decades off, at least on the scale that would be required to operate an entire civilization.  Moreover, to say nothing of the costs of research, the transition costs, from infrastructure to the required changes in transportation to settlement patterns, will run into the several trillions, at least.  Our entire economy and way of life are structured around the assumption of the availability of oil, and cheap oil at that.  Push up the price of oil, and many of our sprawling suburbs, exurbs, and even rural areas become unviable, to say nothing of the costs of transitioning to an entirely different source of energy.  Face it; our culture grew up around the automobile.  Make the use of that mode of transportation increasingly expensive, force people out of it, or even simply force the construction of infrastructure for a different mode of transportation or a radically different conception of personal mobility, and you are talking about an alteration in what is our fundamental way of life.  You are talking about civilizational change, with all that entails in terms of direct and indirect monetary costs, as well as the intangible costs associated with the end of a way of life with which virtually everyone, excepting a few radicals, is confortable.  And that's not even to mention the radical expansion of government power and economic planning required if these things are not to be permitted to occur over successive generations as the result of incremental market adaptations.

Beyond that, much of the Muslim hostility toward the West that lies at the root of this conflict is, we must say, inherent in a strand of the religion stretching back to its origins.  We are the infidel others, and many Muslims regard it as their sacred obligation to alter this state of affairs, by one means or another.  For many of these, that will mean jihad in one form or another, without regard to our policies with respect to them or our own energy requirements; and enough of such Muslims are already among us, alienated and without roots in our broader culture or way of life.  In other words, take away the enregy question, and the problem of jihadists remains, due to globalization and certain structural features or configurations of Islam.  Even if we were to succeed in implementing AE solutions, impoverishing large swathes of the Muslim world in the process, we would not escape their ire - and attempts at wrath; instead, we might succeed in enraging them further by casting them back on themselves.  That possibility, to be sure, is not a primary reason for regarding AE as less than the panacea some take it to be; rather, it just illustrates the elements of unpredictability inherent in the situation, and the impossibility of simply separating ourselves from that part of the world as a solution to the terror question.

Tlacolotl, you go to great lengths to paint both sides of the war debate with broad brushes, and this begs a question from me:  do you believe intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo was a matter of "supporting what America stands for"?  Because if you do, it puts you at odds with great numbers of the "anti-war crowd," including "true Americans" like Michael Moore, who asserted that acting to put an end to ethnic cleansing was a smokescreen.

Hypotheticals aside, both sides of the war debate represented broad coalitions of interests, partisan, ideological, and philosophical, and while conservatives oft err by talking of everyone opposed to the war as if they were a giant monolith, seeting with reprehensible anti-Americanism, you do your arguments no credit to presenting argument for the war as a matter of selfish interests.

Let the market control gas prices, absolutely.  (Indeed, the run up in gas prices that we're seeing will likely remain, because they reflect China's emergence.  This is a good thing.)  

I do not support a John Kerry-style "Manhattan Project" for "energy independence". The original Manhattan Project was a wartime necessity.

I would respectfully suggest that we are engaged in a war.

But unfortunately we don't even know if a vast government scheme to achieve "energy independence" would even work, or indeed if such a goal is even desirable (just what's so bad about trading for some of our energy, anyway?).

The argument for energy independence is one component of a bigger picture that includes geopolitical positioning, environmental issues, economic issues, and national security issues wrt power grids.  The balance of the arguments favors a transition to cleaner, more secure, more reliable, more cost-effective and independent sources of energy.  Oil is traded on the spot market without long term contracts which increases the potential for market manipulation (which is of course a conspiracy) and the introduction of random fluctuations with the usual economic impacts on business cycles.

I know the big energy companies are none too popular these days, but I frankly trust them more to find new ways of powering American than I do Washington.

Look at the history of all the grid networks - railroads, interstate, and internet - all were funded by government subsidy.  Relieving the capital burden through government backing will stimulate development of an alternative energy infrastructure that will not evolve through fiscal incentives on markets alone.  It's not a matter of trust so much as it is a matter of venture capital and a matter of coordination.  (Do we really want to re-experience another quarter century of so of private sector developmental competition that inevitably precedes the emergence of a standardized system with interchangeable components, as we have with all digital technology, from VCR's to computers and peripherals?)

$3.50/gallon?  Gas is already nearly $3/g here in the Bay area and houses in the suburbs and SUVs still sell as fast as they can be produced.  

My point is not that we should ration energy, its just that given the scale of energy use in the US, its the only thing that would have a noticebable effect on oil use in the near term.

Personally, I expect us to use more and more coal, oil and gas until we do indeed get real close to just running out.  Until then, OPEC will be careful to ensure that oil prices and production are set to keep oil as the primary vehicle fuel while ensuring that research into alternative energy sources to drive vehicles remains underfunded and distribution of such technology expensive.  Its not an ooooohhh (eyes darting around) conspiracy, its just good business on their part.

Well, maybe the figure I cited was too low. Maybe it's $4 or $5 or $6 gallon/gasoline that will induce drivers to use gas more sparingly. The point is I've seen no arguments as to why the price mechanism doesn't or won't work in the case of energy. Indeed it worked well during the 70s -- the country became far more energy efficient. And an any rate, I'm told that in fact SUV sales have been sluggish in the U.S. (the Bay area is probably the country's richest region, so perhaps prices increases do indeed need to be larger there before they start to bite). I agree with your contention about what constitutes good strategy on the part of oil producers. But I don't agree they'll be able to carry out this strategy. They weren't able to prevent energy price spikes in the 70s, and they haven't been able to do so this time around. According to everything I've read of late, world hydrocarbon production is flat out at full throttle, with hardly any spare capacity. Given China's and India's surging demand, a reviving U.S. economy, and an (eventual) recovery in places like Europe, I expect that there will continue to be significant upward pressure on energy prices. This is not an entirely unwelcome development, as the increasing prices will signal markets to send more capital into the energy sector. I heard Larry Kudlow (he was on the Ron Insana radio show a week or two ago) say this was already happening: Investments in energy are on the increase.

I would actually argue that the kind of explicit government rationing I think you're advocating would almost certainly make our predicament worse, by softening the price signals that are necessary for the market to work its magic and devise solutions to the challenges of scarce energy resources.

My recollection is that OPEC's embargo caused the spikes of the 70's and so they seem to have a very good idea of how to manipulate prices with production.  

I'd also appreciate a cite regarding production levels, since my understanding from articles like this is that there is indeed production to spare.  In fact, OPEC laments the lack of refinery capacity (which I can vouch for here in CA) that drives gasoline prices higher without a correspnding increase in oil price revenues to them.

Also, IIRC my reading, current pricing has even been shown to be lower than the rate of inflation.

crionna: the nearly eight-month old article you cite has simply been proved flat out wrong in many of its predictions. Try this more recent article from Jane's. I googled "world oil production" and the results I got were running 80% or better in favor of a significant and growing problem with oil production, and the diffulty in meeting world demand.

Now, if you're really claiming that we have lots of spare capacity, that would seem to undercut your argument that rationing is needed.

I would have thought that the reason you think demand for hydrocarbons needs to be sharply lowered (through rationing) is that we're running out of them. If you do think we're running out of hydrobarbons, then I'm in agreement with you. Or, at least I am aware that a lot of people with knowledge in this area are contending that we are indeed runing out of hydrocarbons. Unless you hold that oil/gas are the products of deep geological forces (as opposed to the decaying of biomatter), then you must agree that the supply of hydrocarbons is finite. So, to clarify, I hold the opinion that we may be running out of hydrocarbons fairly quickly, but I'm certainly not in a position to be sure one way or the other. Maybe such claims are exaggerated, and maybe not. I am skeptical of the claims that the planet is running out of hydrocarbons so rapidly that the we're facing a near-term sudden cataclysm  (the scenario which envisions hydrocarbon production falling off dramatically, say a 50% or greater plunge, in a period of one or two years).

Rather, I suspect the running down of energy reserves could well prove uncomfortably fast, causing significant economic pain, but will not happen, as it were, "overnight", and will instead likley play out over (at least) several decades characterized by higher energy prices (yes, those prices that I'm confident will send the proper market signals to prompt the economy to increase non-hydrocarbon forms of energy). Again, it is my belief that not only are these price increases likely, but that they're indeed necessary, and delaying their arrival in any way worsens the situation.

And am disappointed that my google term drew so much more poorly than yours re: para 1. Good onya.

My only point re: rationing was that in the short term, raising the required fuel economy of SUVs, turning off the lights more often and running some trucks on biodiesel will not remove us from our dependence on foreign oil.  Only rationing will cause that to happen short term.