Stacking The Deck
By Pejman Yousefzadeh Posted in Foreign Affairs — Comments (40) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Via Kevin Drum, I am treated to this editorial by Senator Carl Levin (D. Mich.), the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In the editorial, Senator Levin makes the following statement:
As the Iraqi people prepare to vote on a new constitution Saturday, the political situation in that country is highly unstable. There are troubling signs of a split in the political alliance of Kurds and Shiites that has thus far kept Iraq from complete chaos. Sunni Arab leaders, meanwhile, openly call for the constitution to be defeated. And Iraqis from all ethnic groups have lost faith in the transitional government's ability to protect them or provide basic services.
Our hope was that a new constitution would serve to unite the Iraqis, but that has not happened. As Gen. George Casey, commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee recently: "We've looked for the constitution to be a national compact, and the perception now is that it's not, particularly among the Sunni." Casey acknowledged that if a constitution were approved by the majority of Iraqis but disapproved by a strong minority of the Sunni Arabs, it could actually make the situation worse.
Our military leaders have long told us that there can be no purely military solution in Iraq and that a genuine, broad-based political settlement among the Iraqis is essential for success and for the defeat of the insurgency.
There is, however, one point on which leaders of the three main groups in Iraq agree: None of the Iraqi groups wants U.S. troops to leave precipitately. The Shiites want us to stay until Iraqi security forces are strong enough to deal with the insurgency on their own. The Kurds want us to remain for the impending future. And the Sunni Arab leaders want us to stay as a deterrent to those who might seek revenge against them for the actions of Saddam Hussein.
We must use that leverage -- the possibility of an American withdrawal -- to achieve the broad-based political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency.
I believe that if the Iraqis fail to reach a political solution by the end of the year we must consider a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces. This does not mean setting a date now for departure. It simply means conveying clearly and forcefully to Iraqis that the presence of our forces is not indefinite and that our staying there requires them to come together politically, since Iraqi unity offers the only hope of defeating the insurgency.
(Emphasis mine.) So there we have it: A conditional and preliminary plan for withdrawal.
But here's the thing: Nowhere in his editorial does Senator Levin explain why it should be considered reasonable to think that the Iraqis should "reach a political solution by the end of the year." He doesn't try to argue that there really isn't all that much separating the various Iraqi factions, that if only we threaten the Iraqis with departure, they will snap to attention, become reasonable and bury their differences. He doesn't even explain why it is that we should think that differences between Iraqi factions should be so easily forgotten or papered over after being allowed to fester under a brutal, decades long Ba'athist dictatorship.
I certainly don't think that our presence in Iraq should be "indefinite" in that I don't want the United States to have the kind of permanent presence in Iraq that we have in Europe via NATO, or that we had in West Germany during the Cold War. But at the risk of repeating an obvious statement made by myself and others, if the enemy is given any kind of timetable, it will know how long it needs to wait us out. This gives a tremendous tactical and strategic advantage to the enemy, and makes our own reconstruction efforts next-to-impossible since we will have revealed our cards.
And make no mistake: Absent any kind of explanation as to why it should be considered acceptable to believe that the Iraqi factions can bury their differences within the course of a year, it becomes reasonable to believe that Senator Levin merely picked the deadline he is imposing on the Iraqi factions out of thin air and stacking the deck in favor of withdrawal. It's a sly and clever move. But its impact will be deleterious to American national security interests, the reconstruction effort in Iraq and the long term interests of Iraq and Iraqis. Senator Levin should either be questioned vigorously as to the assumptions behind his proposals, or his deck-stacking should be identified for what it is.
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I don't think that someone who is willing to blow themselves up is going to care when America is going to leave. Their priority seems not to make soldiers leave, but to kill them. I can not say that timetables will help soothe the already psychotic or that drastically motivated.
there are people like that, who are more interested in killing Americans than getting us out of there. But there are also Sunnis who don't want to live in a Shiite-dominated Iraq, and see America helping Shiites more than America helps them.
This might not involve blowing themselves up -- just some remote-controlled IEDs killing soldiers in Humvees.
you can't really believe that it makes sense to set our foreign policy on what some group of Sunni or Shiites or Kurds wants. Our foreign policy is supposed to be our foreign policy, not that of the UN or Iraq or France et al.
We don't set our foreign policy merely to accomplish other people's goals. We try to accomplish our goals.
In this case, our goal is a stable and democratic Iraq. This is only achievable if Iraqis think that peaceful participation in the political process is the best way to accomplish their goals. If Sunnis come out thinking that violence is the best way or if Shiites think that oppressing Sunnis is best, our goal won't be accomplished. So we take other people's goals into account, as the necessary means to accomplishing ours.
Sunnis who don't want to live in a Shiite-dominated Iraq? Iraq is majority Shiite. reward? THIS IS WAR There's no upside to defeat
I am find with withdrawal being tied to specific goals being met, but leaving too soon, because we set a timetable that didn't involve actual goals would be foolhardy.
except that most of the Sunni insurgent attacks are aimed at the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police and Iraqi government workers, all of whom will be there after we leave.
if the technical term for your proposal is appeasement:
The policy of granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace.
or surrender:
To give up or abandon
Democtats? I don't think the existence of a constitution will mean a great deal to the Syrian,Iranian, Egyptian, and European commuter/terorists with necrophiliac passions. However, when the Iraq forces assume a larger and growing military role, and when they start using interrogation methods that make Abu Grahib look like a health bar, you may start to see some changes in migration patterns. it seems Levin wants an indefinite timetable. Is that anything like a squared circle?
Suppose you're a Sunni who wants to drive out the Americans because they help the Shiites and Kurds too much.
Translation: we help those who are helping us - those who get in the way tend to be dealt with more harshly. Yep, that's a God-awful horrible military and diplomatic strategy we got there.
Without a timetable, you might think that the best way to drive out the Americans is to blow up some Americans, or cause some kind of chaos to force the Americans out.
Memo: they have been trying precisely that. Hasn't worked, has it? BTW, that strategy won't work until and unless those calling for withdrawl timetables - i.e.: you - get their way.
With a timetable, you know that you don't have to kill anyone or blow anything up.
Nope, you know you just have to wait until date certain to start blowing-up the people who are left behind - as in, your fellow Iraqi citizens. There's a recipe for a stable democracy right there.
The timetables I like best are the ones that tie withdrawal to Sunni participation in the political process.
Check back after the next election - when Sunni participation is likely to exceed the turnout percentages seen in most US states.
If we had offered to withdraw more troops in exchange for more Sunnis in Anbar and Salahuddin provinces voting to ratify the constitution, that would've been nice.
Gee fellas, play nice and we'll leave. You must think we're dealing with Democrats in Anbar. Hint: we're not.
I want Sunnis to know that it's stability and not bombs that will get us out of there.
So do we - suppose al-Jazerra is going to start letting that message get out?
Also, threatening the Shiites with troop withdrawals if they act bad to the Sunnis is a pretty good idea. Shiite leaders, including those running the country, like having us around to beat up on unruly Sunnis. We've got to show them that we won't reward bad behavior by sticking around.
This is beyond pointless. So when the Sunni's blow up a bridge carrying Shiite pilgrims we should threaten the Shiites with troops withdrawls if they (the overwhelming majority population with the most to gain from a civil, stable, peaceful country) do anything in response? How does that possibly make any sense what so ever?
I believe the technical term for what you're proposing is appeasement. I believe it's a suicide pact, but to each his own I suppose.
I really did not mean to parrot streiff, upthread with that last comment.
Don't know if it's "great minds" or "Rovian manipulation sans tinfoil"...
I'm in full agreement that a timetable without goals is foolish, but goals without a timetable is pretty useless too.
For example, I don't think it's such a terrible thing to say, "By x date, y Iraqi troops and/or police will have been trained and deployed and z American troops will be withdrawn."
If the insurgency wants to wait until y date, fine. They're just going to have to deal with the Iraqi forces on that date. Someday, that's the only people they'll ever deal with when Iraqis are solely responsible for maintaining order in their own country.
The problem without publicly stating x date is - what's the timetable for achieving y - one year, five years, twenty years? With a date, if y isn't achieved, we have an objective measurement for which to hold people accountable. Military leadership can be adjusted without charges of politicization and politicians can get voted out of office based on objective measurement - failure to achieve goals within a time-frame.
None of this suggests that schedule is the sole driver of action. Obviously, for some goals, if they aren't met by x date, you can't start troop withdrawal or whatever the consequence is of goal satisfaction. Despite that, time-oriented goals are a tool of accountability, a tool for progress measurement, and a tool of management to alert the necessity to make changes in strategy. If I say we're going to begin manufacturing on a certain date and the plant isn't ready, we're not going to begin manufacturing that date. Of course, the project doesn't just stop because we missed one deadline; however, it's a pretty good bet I won't be running it from that point forward. It's also a pretty good bet that people will have to re-evaluate the decision-making that caused the failure in the first place.
This is Management 101. I don't care if it's nation-building or war - to say that the principles of results-based management can't be applied to this exercise is like liberals saying they can't perform quantifiable cost-benefit analysis on social programs or result-oriented management of public-schools doesn't work. Nonsense. EVERYTHING can be quantified and EVERYTHING can be managed - whether it's manufacturing widgets, producing high-quality students in a public school, or creating a stable democracy.
First, in Management 600 you learn that timetables aren't necessarily useful unless the time has a direct relationship to the event.
Second, in Politics 101 you learn that if you set a timetable your opponents are going to break it off in you.
So I don't see where there is a single positive benefit to accrue from setting a timetable, when in fact our real goal may be more of a Germany scenario with a long term presence of US troops, and there are a multitude of downsides.
And no, everything cannot be managed. The moment one human is injected into the equation that theory is blown to heck because you no longer have a universe populated with rational players. If nothing else, your own statement about creating students should convince you of the folly of your overarching statement. Were we, in fact, able to manage "producing high-quality students in a public school" we would have done so by now.
What he's saying is the very Core of both politics and sales. You get them to do what You want by showing them how that will get them what They want. You must create a Desire in them to do what you need them to do.
You cannot succeed if you don't take their goals into consideration.
For several years I worked as a marketing manager for a sales-driven company. Many many people confuse the two thinking that they are the same thing. At the end of the day sale's goal is to generate todays revenue; marketing's goal is to generate tomorrows revenue.
In our case, because we were sales-driven (get this quarter's numbers) the sales folks would promise customers just about anything they wanted to get the deal. We did that quite successfully for many, many years until we finally went out of business; turns out our marketing-driven competition had next year's products, we had a thousand variations of last year's.
business, country, military operation has ever succeeded by telegraphing its plans to the competitor, opponent or enemy.
In Management 101 terms, Apple has plans and timetables. They do not tell Microsoft their timetable.
Also, this isn't Management 101, this is the real world.
I'm not suggesting that disciplined management is easy or simple. No, it's not as clear-cut as manufacturing, but in everything there are desired outcomes and measurements of success - it's complicated, but they can be worked out. This is the argument that teachers make all the time - "Our job is too complicated for this. What is a 'high-quality' student anyway?" Just because the answer isn't easily accessible doesn't mean it doesn't deserve thought. What does "Success in Iraq" mean? Again, a very complicated question, but a valuable question to consider.
Nothing is done without a time consideration, even the most complicated tasks. Even in a complicated task without a established pattern for success, some markers with temporal consideration must be used if only to make a determination about continuing forward. A target without a timeframe for accomplishment is not a goal and it serves nothing.
I'll agree that setting timeframes isn't politically safe, but do you want accomplishment or do you want electoral success? I want accomplishment above all else. All "re-inventing government" strategies recognize the conflict but encourage polticians to get out behind public goals. It creates a tool for accountability of elected officials that citizens deserve. This is the positive benefit - objective measurement of accountability.
If the ultimate outcome is "permanent" engagement, a la Germany, it's time to make that clear and begin a national debate about it. Personally, I agree with such a policy, but Americans need to be able to decide if that's the direction they want the executive to pursue or not. This type of national debate has not been held - the exercise in Iraq has always been publicly presented as an temporary initiative.
Furthermore, any failures in the past are not evidence of an inability to manage, they are reflective of flaws in the system of measurement and tools that prevent feedback motivating corrective action. We don't produce high-quality students because we don't do a good job of evaluating late-process outcomes and we don't provide the tool of exit to enough students to punish schools that fail to achieve goals and encourage corrective action. Kids are stuck in horrible schools with teachers' unions saying, "we can't be objectively evaluated on our performance" and no recourse to choose a better quality school unless their parents can move to an another district. That's why we fail to produce high-quality students.
Nothing is done without a time consideration, even the most complicated tasks. Even in a complicated task without a established pattern for success, some markers with temporal consideration must be used if only to make a determination about continuing forward. A target without a timeframe for accomplishment is not a goal and it serves nothing.
Maybe in manufacturing processes but I'd again submit than in human activities we don't work that way, or at least most of us don't. When you're dating someone you could, as some of my friends did, have an identifiable timeline (usually it was getting laid by the third date). Useful, perhaps, depending on your goal.
I'll agree that setting timeframes isn't politically safe, but do you want accomplishment or do you want electoral success? Easy. Without electoral success nothing else matters. Without electoral success there is no possibility of accomplishing your goals.
Personally, I agree with such a policy, but Americans need to be able to decide if that's the direction they want the executive to pursue or not. This type of national debate has not been held - the exercise in Iraq has always been publicly presented as an temporary initiative.
Typically, we have these debates during elections. This romance with a "national debate" occurring all the time on all issues baffles me. The president is elected to govern and to set foreign policy. If the congress disagrees with his direction they have tools to change it, through funding, etc. But why any president would place his decisions up for grabs in some national gabfest makes no sense.
That's why we fail to produce high-quality students.
And I'd say we fail because we don't control who can become parents.
It sure is, and entitles Sen. Levin to an honorary position in the disciples of the octagonal square.
Everything involves human activity, even manufacturing, and complexity or human involvement should never be used as a reason to not set schedules for what we need to do. COMSTAT is a perfect example of a management technique that involves a complex human-centric operation and the use of time-oriented objective measurements for performance enhancement. Police officers do not "manufacture" public safety anymore than democratic stability is "manufactured", yet this approach has demonstrated success when properly applied. The entire exercise is predicated on the belief that behavior can be influenced - police action will change behavior in the community, accountability will change police management behavior, and so on.
Almost all people use goals and timelines everyday to influence other people's behavior - we just do it at work. My boss tells me all the time, "Work with the customer and get them to buy into the plan so we can get started on this work next month." He's given me a goal and a timeline to affect a change in someone's opinion. When he tells me that I'll get a bonus if I can bring my projects in under budget over the next year, that affects a change in my behavior pursuant to a timeline.
We don't use this as much in our interpersonal relations, but the, "We've been dating for a year and you haven't proposed, where is this going?" conversation isn't all that uncommon. The goal and timeline were in place, although unstated.
One of the goals of this war was to produce a democracy in the Middle East that could serve as a alternative model that Muslim nations would hopefully emulate. The entire foundation of this was the idea that behavior could be manipulated - people would choose democracy over sharia, free-markets over oil oligarchies, anglosphere values over terrorist extremism. We're trying to change behavior and the idea of linking behavioral-change goals to a timeline is not without precedent.
The entire exercise is predicated on the belief that behavior can be influenced - police action will change behavior in the community, accountability will change police management behavior, and so on.
But a time limit for success is not set. And you don't say, if A hasn't happened by time B we have to change what we're doing. To the contrary, you are working against a standard and you work towards that standard for as long as it takes.
One of the goals of this war was to produce a democracy in the Middle East that could serve as a alternative model that Muslim nations would hopefully emulate. The entire foundation of this was the idea that behavior could be manipulated - people would choose democracy over sharia, free-markets over oil oligarchies, anglosphere values over terrorist extremism.
True enough. This is an absolute standard.
We're trying to change behavior and the idea of linking behavioral-change goals to a timeline is not without precedent.
Yes, but it is without happy precedent (see, Vietnam, 1975)
the company wasn't showing the customer how ding what the company wanted would get the customer what They wanted.
There's a slight difference between making all sorts of promises and showing the customer what Your product can do for them and effectively telling him what the right choice is...
And I do wish I was in your shoes with being able to sell a tangible product. Selling the Army is like getting a polar bear to buy a fur coat...
Every week strategies are reviewed in light of new evidence to determine if they are working or not. Precinct commanders must articulate strategies and are called to task in monthly meetings if metrics do not reflect success. The entire system is built around the idea of constant re-evaluation of procedures if they fail to meet goals, even within the confines of a shift. It is about constant evaluation, change, and reevaluation.
Besides, I'm not even talking about setting goals for ultimate long-term outcomes, I'm talking about the intermediate steps to get there. What are the 80, 800, or 8 million things that have to happen between now and the realization of the scenario I described for Iraq? I'm sure the government has a plan to get there and they know these initial steps (I sure hope they do). I'm just suggesting that it helps to put an accountable face on it if State and the DOD actually assigned some due dates to these steps.
If my local BOE came out and said "We have this plan to make all our schools terrific.", my first question is, "Explain how and define 'terrific'", second, "How much?", and lastly, "How long?" I don't believe in applying a different standard for Iraq.
that the type of goal setting you describe here is the type that is being done because it isn't done in the context of "if it isn't done by X we're gone."
You are also confusing steps in a process with a timetable. Steps are necessary to a process. Timetables are not and in fact can be counterproductive.
Accountable face? Accountable to who? For what? As I said before we have accountability in the form of elections not arbitrary timetables.
When you let the schedule drive activity at the expense of getting it right. As I said before, just because you miss a date doesn't mean you scrap a program, but it might be reason to scrap a person or a particular process. I never suggested, or meant to suggest, that failure to meet a deadline would result in a full withdrawal. In the example I used in my original post (so many ago), if the goal isn't meant, the troop draw-down doesn't occur, but saying it's going to happen on a certain date if a condition is satisfied shouldn't hurt anything, because the satified condition is what replaces those troops.
An election is only an accountability moment if you have something on which to judge performance. Right now, I don't know what's going on in Iraq. The media is telling us it's a disaster, blogs will tell you it a process that moving forward successfully.
In less than 3 years, at least two or more people are going to stand up for the Republican nomination. I suspect one or more will say they want to continue the program of the President, one or more will say they want to continue but change something about it, and the Democrats will just say it's time to leave.
On what evidence do I make a selection? Well, if someone at the DOD said, "We'll have x troops in place and reduction in deaths by 15% within three years," I'd have something to consider. If it's successful, I can support those candidates that want to keep the program in place as-is. If not, I want to hear why people are still committed to a plan and personnel that failed to meet goals and what these other candidates believe to be the cause of failure and what they need to do to correct it. Maybe they say more troops, maybe they say more money...that's what I mean by accountable.
What's the saying about repeating the same action and expecting different results?
We did timetables in Vietnam. Hopefully we've learned from that experience.
were far from the root cause of failure in Vietnam.
What were doing in Vietnam, defeating the North Vietnamese or helping the South Vietnamese to defend themselves? This insurgency might always exist in Iraq, and even we can quell it internally, it could always flare back up with people running across the border from Iran or Syria in the future.
Are we defeating an insurgency, or are we teaching Iraq how to defend their democracy? I think a self-reliant Iraq certainly serves better as a model of democracy.
Timetables were the exact and proximate cause of defeat in Vietnam with Congressionally mandated dates for withdrawal of US forces (1973) and the cessation of US military aid (1974). If you think a timetable will not be used in the same way you haven't been following the cut-and-run caucus in the Congress.
When I use the word timetable, I'm using it interchangeably with time-focused goals.
The troop withdrawal in Vietnam wasn't predicated on anything. The troops were going to be withdrawn regardless of events. Vietnam was over before the withdrawal because there was no more plan of action. I'm advocating time-oriented goals, predicated on the accomplishment of certain things. I suspect these already exist, but I that they be made public to permit objective analysis about the progress of activity.
I never said, "We're out in three years, success or not." I do like, "We'll do this or we'll have accomplished that in three years."
I suppose that people will view this as a tool that can be used for unmitigated troop withdrawal; however, I suspect that elections have shown that people will support continued presence in the face of demonstrable success. Iraq doesn't have to be perfect, if Iraq is no different in ten years than it is today, it will be a disaster and a failure. I suspect it won't be, but I want to know what I can expect to see in a year, three years or five years so I can be a fair judge of the progress of the mission - the evaluation criteria I will use at election time.
I crunch numbers all day, I don't know anything about what emerging democracy looks like, so I rely on my agents, elected officials, to tell me what I should be looking for and what criteria I should use to judge their progress. That's why I want a set of time-oriented goals.
of results oriented goals regardless of how long it takes.
You've never said "We're out in three years, success or not." but a lot of others have. And if you go with "We'll do this or we'll have accomplished that in three years." you're moving back in the direction of Iraq-as-a-girlfriend.
I think we'd agree that we want to see Iraq stable. If in ten years, the rate of IED-related fatalities doesn't change, has Iraq become any more stable? We would agree that we want Iraq to be a democracy, everything has been great with the political timeline, but what if there was no constitution or no constitutional convention election? We want Iraq to develop economically, but what if they don't increase their GDP in five years to more than today? If these things don't improve, something isn't working. The process is failing - this doesn't mean the program is useless but the people running it aren't doing something right. Like I said, I crunch numbers all day, I don't know about emerging democracy, so if these are the wrong metrics, someone better "lead" and let me know.
This isn't Iraq-as-girlfriend, this is Iraq-as-job; Iraq-as-project - it's saying you're going to do something and saying when you expect to be done. Everything else in the world works like this. The D.O.T. says when they expect to finish construction, the Mayor says when he expects to see a reduction in crime, the Supreme Court says when they expect to issue a ruling.
Every week, I have to take the garbage to the curb. Every week, my girlfriend says she'll do it next week. If my girlfriend never hauls the trash to the curb in our lifetime, I can live with that.
This isn't a household chore, these are people's lives and we don't improve them in some way over time, we're failing them. We can't ask them to wait twenty years and things will get better, we need to be vigilant and continually monitor that we're making their lives better. This convinces people to stay with it, but we have to know we're making progress and we can't wait for it to happen. That's why the political process was on a timeline.
As such, I assume you have set a date certain to either marry your girlfriend or to breakup?
I thought quite obviously, was that there is significant risk in adopting the "customer's" goals as your own. Down that path lies destruction. People have friends, nations have interests.
Any halfway intelligent consumer (yeah, I know, where do you find them?) knows you don't have the same goals as they do. You want them to buy something. So you show them how what you want them to buy will help them get what they want.
Buy my exercise machine, lose weight with less effort.
That sort of thing. You don't really care if they lose the weight (and the consumer knows this), just that they buy the machine. But if you don't show them how the machine will help them lose the weight and get them to believe it, they won't buy it.
unspoken part, of my comment was that this is not some college course in Marketing or Management. This is the real world of hardball international relations. Any comparison to marekting or business management is hopelessly flawed.
Iraq is a project - it is not a girlfriend. Iraq is not a personal relationship. A girlfriend is not a project.
There is a picture of what Iraq should look like at the end. No matter how complex it may seem to get to this point, a process to reach that point can be defined. A timeline for the completion of steps along this process can be and should be defined as a tool to objectively measure the success of the process.
Iraq is a project and projects have schedules. Sometimes the timeline is used as tool to know when to terminate a project, sometimes the timeline is used as a tool to know when to modify the process, sometimes it used as a tool to know when to modify personnel.
As a transparent democracy, some details of this plan must be made available to the public, including time. In the interest of democratic accountability, a schedule will provide voters with a method for objective measurement of success. Failure to meet the schedule may result in political losses, but project completion is the goal of government. If voters believe that personnel changes are necessary to reach project goals, then an election has served its purpose. If the job is done within the parameters that politicians set for themselves, they will keep their jobs.
If you think this is a simplistic view, that the situation is too complex to apply this model of management, and that objective measurement is neither possible nor beneficial, I've heard it before. It is same argument made by schools and teachers unions that don't want to change their ways because "teaching kids doesn't work this way." This is the same argument that is made by bleeding-hearts that want to keep HeadStart programs running despite the fact their own scholars can't demonstrate any positive benefit of the program. This is the same argument made by non-profits that continue to beg for government grants but "just can't seem to make a dent" in whatever problem their organization purports to help.
There is no organizational endeavour that cannot benefit from applied management. None. It is complex, it is difficult, and the marginal improvement may be slight. Nonetheless, it works. Over 50 years of research in both the public and private sector demonstrate that goal-setting with temporal elements improve performance. Success is demonstrated among the most complex exercises with most difficult or unclear technology. The protestations of some war-supporters against a clear measureable goals with intended dates of accomplishment is no different than the objections made by liberals when their programs are put under the knife of objective measurement.
It has nothing to with a girlfriend. It has nothing to do with marriage. It has nothing to with a person's relationship with their parents, neighbors, friends, dogs...It has to do with accomplishing a project.
Iraq is a project.
This is my final post on this matter. I am utterly and completely convinced that all American activities in Iraq are complex and uncertain, but no more so than going to the moon, building the nuclear bomb, developing a vaccine, combating poverty, or generating economic growth. In the same manner that people declare Johnson's "War on Poverty" a failure, according to logic that says timelines are useless, well, maybe we haven't waited long enough for success. How can we put a timeline on the initiatives of the Johnson adminstration? The "War on Poverty" was a project whose process has failed over the the schedule of the last 40 years. Corrective action was deemed necessary in the early 90s with welfare reform. Time was given to produce results and it failed to so. It was time for a change.
I am open to the argument that Iraq is not like these things, that activities in Iraq are somehow different than any other public policy initiative. That it is so significantly different from other public policy initiatives like the "War of Poverty" that we should continue to pursue activities that demonstrate no positive impact OVER A PERIOD OF TIME and that it's unfair or improper to evaluate processes over time unlike every single piece of public policy that calls for cost/benefit analysis on a time horizon.
All I've heard is that U.S. policy in Iraq is not like a piece of public policy, but it is somehow analogous to the relationship that an individual has with their girlfriend. If that's the argument, I'm not buying it.
Welcome to the real world. Please enjoy your stay.
Over 50 years of research in both the public and private sector demonstrate that goal-setting with temporal elements improve performance.
How much of that 50 years of research had a murderous opposition faction actively attempting to kill you and your project team while you attempted to achieve your goals, because they knew that you'd be giving up and leaving by a certain date?
In the same manner that people declare Johnson's "War on Poverty" a failure, according to logic that says timelines are useless, well, maybe we haven't waited long enough for success.
This isn't like the "war" on poverty -- there was no risk of "poverty" waiting in hiding until we declared everyone was rich and went home before it came out and started killing everyone. No one is arguing that it's not possible to set a timeframe to judge a domestic public policy change as failure or success, because we can legislatively return to the status quo ante without the risk of plunging a country into a civil war and giving terrorist organizations who wish to kill us a safe base of operation.
Your analogy highlights the elephant in the room that your entire series of project management 101 posts fail to address. None of your examples take into account the direct adversarial dynamic of, well, war. You're spouting platitudes from business school theory land that just don't apply to an armed conflict in the real world.
All I've heard is that U.S. policy in Iraq is not like a piece of public policy, but it is somehow analogous to the relationship that an individual has with their girlfriend. If that's the argument, I'm not buying it.
If the only thing you've heard (or remembered) from this entire thread is streiff's offhand comment about his friends' dating habits, it's unsurprising that you still don't understand the risks of and objections to date-certain timetables regarding coalition forces leaving Iraq.
All I did is ask a simple question to point your hipocrisy in demanding a timeline for the very complex issue of Iraq while not demanding a timeline that only must need be agreed by 2 people, and I get a dissertation of nonsense trying to justify the hipocrisy. Well done.

But at the risk of repeating an obvious statement made by myself and others, if the enemy is given any kind of timetable, it will know how long it needs to wait us out.
There's an upside to timetables too. Suppose you're a Sunni who wants to drive out the Americans because they help the Shiites and Kurds too much. Without a timetable, you might think that the best way to drive out the Americans is to blow up some Americans, or cause some kind of chaos to force the Americans out. With a timetable, you know that you don't have to kill anyone or blow anything up.
The timetables I like best are the ones that tie withdrawal to Sunni participation in the political process. If we had offered to withdraw more troops in exchange for more Sunnis in Anbar and Salahuddin provinces voting to ratify the constitution, that would've been nice. I want Sunnis to know that it's stability and not bombs that will get us out of there.
Also, threatening the Shiites with troop withdrawals if they act bad to the Sunnis is a pretty good idea. Shiite leaders, including those running the country, like having us around to beat up on unruly Sunnis. We've got to show them that we won't reward bad behavior by sticking around.