Redstate

By Pejman Yousefzadeh Posted in Foreign Affairs — Comments (11) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

Senator Joe Biden recently penned an op-ed discussing what he believes our options should be in Iraq. It is a masterpiece of opaque advocacy:

A majority of Sunni Arabs are likely to vote against the constitution, but not the two-thirds needed to defeat it. That will further embitter them.

The consequences for U.S. interests could be devastating. Sectarian violence might escalate into a full-blown civil war, drawing in Syria, Iran and Turkey and turning Iraq into a new Lebanon. Even worse, Iraqi Sunnis could forge stronger alliances with foreign jihadists, turning a swath of Iraq into a pre-Sept. 11 Afghanistan for a new generation of terrorists.

Stranded in the middle of this mayhem would be brave American soldiers, their lives on the line for a failing policy set by others.

The Bush administration's hope seems to be that Sunnis and Iraqi women will "get over it." But hope and stubbornness do not constitute a strategy. As our ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, has said, the constitution should "be a national compact that brings Iraqis together and undermines the insurgency."

Sunni Arabs have themselves to blame for sitting out January's elections and supporting the insurgency. But unless they are offered a reasonable stake in the new order, they will continue to resist it. It would be a mistake to force-feed them a constitution they cannot stomach. There is a better way.

The commentary is breathtaking. Understand that Senator Biden is upset over the fact that the Sunnis will vote against the new Iraqi constitution and will lose. Evidently, this is a bad thing because it will "embitter" the Sunnis. Well, it might. But that's the kind of thing that happens in a democratic debate. Someone loses a vote and might get a little peeved about it. That's no excuse not to hold the vote in the first place and if the bitterness and rage of the anticipated losers is sufficient to put off the exercise of democracy--simply because we don't want the anticipated losers to be "embittered"--then it is fair to ask what kind of democracy we are anticipating the creation of. Not much of one if one side without the votes can put a stop to the democratic process by promising to hold its breath until its face turns blue.

The Sunnis have been accommodated in multiple ways, of course, during the creation of the constitution. That appears not to have been enough to assuage them. Fine. You can't please everyone and at some point, it is indeed high time to move on. But Senator Biden seems to argue that you can indeed please everyone and that it is incumbent upon you to do so--no matter how much this Sisyphean exercise paralyzes the political process.

First, if negotiators don't reach reasonable compromises that bring moderate Sunnis on board, the Bush administration should support postponing the constitutional referendum until after elections for a new National Assembly are held in December, which would allow a new committee with elected Sunni members to reconsider the draft.

This would encourage the growing desire among Sunnis to participate in the political process. It would empower legitimate Sunni leaders who can sell the constitution to their community. And it could split the Sunni population from the insurgents and foreign jihadists. Moderate Kurds and Shiites, many of whom privately admit that some of their leaders overreached, will welcome the balance legitimate Sunni representation would bring to the process.

My kingdom for a definition of terms. What, pray tell, is a "moderate Sunni"? How is such an entity defined by Biden? Supposing that the referendum is put off--what happens if Sunnis decide to abstain from the December elections in much the same way that they abstained from the elections this past January? There are plenty of Sunnis who think that their January abstention was a mistake and that they should not repeat the mistake for December. How do we know that they will win the argument? Moreover, why doesn't Biden call for a referendum to take place and then note the possibility that after the December elections, the Sunnis might be able to move to make amendments in the constitution?

For this policy to work, the administration must do what it has failed to do thus far: involve the major international powers and Iraq's neighbors in a stabilization strategy. The administration should create a contact group with countries such as France, Japan, Britain and Russia, along with organizations such as the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. As constitutional negotiations resumed, the Iraqis would see a united international front and be more likely to make difficult compromises.

There are already multiple channels through which to work with "countries such as France, Japan, Britain and Russia, along with organizations such as the European Union, NATO and the United Nations." Some of those channels are even mentioned in the quote. Why create another one?

The administration must also develop a regional strategy that either forces or induces Iraq's neighbors to act responsibly. In some instances, that would require the administration to engage regimes that the United States would rather not work with. But that's exactly what we did in the Balkans to get to the Dayton peace agreement and with Afghanistan's neighbors in the "six plus two" group and the Bonn conference. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt could help temper the demands of the communities with which they have influence. Tehran and Damascus would be more likely to end their dangerous meddling if they saw the rest of the international community lining up with us. The president should immediately name a senior envoy to the region and organize a regional conference.

And once we appoint a senior envoy and organize a regional conference, what then? What exactly are we negotiating for? What is our bottom line negotiating position? What is our Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement? Biden doesn't say. I suppose we will have to figure it out once we get to the regional conference--an approach that should leave more than a few people nervous. There is absolutely no policy guidance, no statement of goals and principles and no attempt to put together a negotiating strategy in the Biden editorial. He urges the appointment of contact groups and envoys for the sake of having contact groups and envoys. He urges regional conferences for the sake of regional conference. And he provides nary a raison d'être in the process.

At home, President Bush must close the credibility chasm that is threatening the most important weapon our overstretched troops have: the support of the American people. He must convince Americans that he is leveling with them about the situation in Iraq and that he has a coherent strategy for securing our fundamental national interests and bringing our troops home.

To that end, the administration should develop concrete goals for training Iraqi security forces so that they can operate independently, building a political system that enjoys legitimacy and rebuilding basic services -- and establish a reasonable timetable for meeting these goals.

It is no longer acceptable to say that our troops will stay in Iraq "as long as necessary -- and not one day longer." The American people need -- and our troops deserve -- a much clearer picture of the way forward.

Translation: Give us a timeline. Greg Djerejian (noted here) has sufficiently annihilated this position. Read his post for all of the reasons why the presentation of a timeline would be a disaster.

The rest of the Biden editorial is mere rhetoric and is short on any concrete policy details. I understand that an editorial is oftentimes not the best vehicle for advancing specific policy details, but at the very least, we could have gotten a hint of the reasons behind Biden's proposals. The fact that he has failed to give any semblance of reasoning or justification for those proposals should alert us to the possibility that he either (a) hasn't thought the matter through carefully enough; or (b) is more interested in advancing talking points than genuinely carrying the policy process forward.