An Uncertain Trumpet
By streiff Posted in War — Comments (19) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
One of the most frustrating features of the GWOT in general and the war in Iraq in particular is the continual bleating of critics on the necessity for involving NATO and, more improbably, Islamic nations in the ongoing combat and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Why this is supposedly desirable, I really haven’t a clue. Coalition warfare is a suboptimal arrangement even when your allies are ready and willing – few of which are extant today. Witness the dog’s breakfast created in World War II by acceding to British demands for an invasion of Italy, Churchill’s second bite at the “soft underbelly of Europe” following the Gallipoli debacle of 1915, and giving the plodding, unimaginative Montgomery the priority of effort in a strategic sideshow in the Low Countries at the expense of a direct strike at the German heartland.
Coalitions are not metallurgical alloys. A blend of national armies does not create the military equivalent of steel. Rather it produces a questionable and brittle force that as a whole is often much less capable than its individual components, creating sort of a reverse synergy. Coalitions bring grave difficulties -- politically, strategically, operationally, and tactically -- for a modest to negative contribution to the overall effort. True, it is better to have allies than to not have them, but it is better to be alone than to have uncertain allies.
Read on.
As usual, when there is heavy lifting to be done the US is left to do it alone with the notable exceptions of Britain and Australia. Usually we have a surfeit of friends ready to hold our coat, at best, and kibbitz, but we have to do the work. This is as true when our Allies’ interests are at stake (see Kosovo, Bosnia) as when our interests are in jeopardy.
Since we evicted the Taliban from power in 2002 we have been supported by our nominal NATO allies in stability operations in Afghanistan. This gave them the feeling of being useful, appeased the Scowcroft wing of our own foreign policy establishment, and freed up American troops for real work. NATO troops, as distinct from NATO SOF units, were willing to participate in Afghanistan so long as there was no real danger. This has become the rub.
NATO’s zone of operations in Afghanistan is expanding into the more dangerous southern province of Uruzgan and the Dutch parliament may balk at allowing the deployment of Dutch troops into that area. On its face my initial take was "who cares?" and "why is this a surprise?" In reality, if the Dutch don’t stand and deliver the Australian provincial reconstruction team, which is to be protected by the Dutch troops, will not deploy.
The European Union’s special representative in Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell correctly assesses the situation:
Europe will lose its prestige and credibility in Afghanistan unless more countries are prepared to send troops to dangerous parts of the country, the European Union's special representative warned on Thursday.
Francesc Vendrell was speaking ahead of a debate scheduled for January 25 in the Dutch parliament on whether to commit 1,400 more troops to the volatile south of the country, a highly contentious issue in the Netherlands.
"If the Netherlands found it impossible to send forces to the south, this would be a heavy blow for Europe's prestige in Afghanistan," Vendrell told a news briefing.
He said it would not be a blow for Afghanistan, as U.S. and other forces would fill the void left by a failure from European countries to send more troops.
"But the blow would be to Europe's credibility as Afghans appreciate the role that Europe is playing. They feel that we are there for selfless motives, but there is always the complaint that we are too passive...This perception would be strengthened if the Netherlands found it impossible to send forces to the south."
Lest this be misrepresented as a reaction to the war in Iraq it is not. NATO forces are in Afghanistan because of the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Though there is a domestic political dimension to this because the Dutch government will fall if the parliament does not approve the troop deployment, this is nothing more nor less than the simple shirking of duty and serves as our clarion call to the danger of relying upon the kindness of strangers.
As Clint Eastwood, in the guise of Inspector Harry Callahan, was prone to say, “If you want to be a lumberjack you have to hold up your end of the log.” The EU and NATO desperately want to be lumberjacks. They want the plaid shirts, they want the mackinaw, they want to carry around the chainsaw. They don’t want to get cold, catch splinters, or be inconvenienced. They are more than willing to tell us how to carry the log, but they have no desire to grab the other end of it.
It is becoming increasingly obvious to everyone, including the Euros, that they can’t have it both ways.
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An Uncertain Trumpet 19 Comments (0 topical, 19 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
You are right- the logical extension of the Steyn article is that terminating NATO is one of the few options we have to force Europe to take a long hard look in the mirror at what it has become with its additiction to the narcotic of socialist/pacifist comforts and complacency.
We would lose the "moral authority" we get from those rare instances when the NATO countries actually unite on something. I would also feel bad about leaving the Eastern Euro nations high and dry in Russia's shadow. But Russia is in its own death spiral and maybe we could do separate one-off treaties with some of the Eastern Europe countries that are willing to commit to invest in defending themselves.
Strieff makes a compelling case why there is little practical military value to us with NATO. The time has come to reconsider if continuing with it is still in our AND Europe's best interest.
I believe NATO to be militarily insignificant as well but to play devils advocate for a moment, there are some precautions we need to be aware of. One of them being, NATO gives the US a significant instrument for moral and political pressure. Europe is automatically expected to tag along in going to war, or at least in the post-conflict phase, as in Afghanistan or Iraq
I would say the worst-case scenario for America, and far more threatening than the rise of China, is a European-Russian successor to NATO: The under funded but still-formidable Russian military infrastructure, refurbished and enhanced with European capital and technology. Bringing in Russia would almost certainly entail the recruitment of Belarus and Ukraine, raising the collective EU GDP, overshadowing the United States, and making euro-for-dollar matching of American defense spending an even easier task for the EU.
the EU could eventually expand to include the known world except for us. Unfortunately I'm not smart enough to know whether this is a good or bad thing. and doesn't discount the option of individual treaties, which may be the best bet for all involved
btw great diaries this week and this one is no exception!
Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down?
A blend of national armies does not created the military equivalent of steel. I think our experience in Iraq bears this out. If anything it seems to me that the success of the coalition was greatly enhanced by the separation between British and American forces into distinct areas of control and responsibility.
Also I second Steve Foley -- your diaries and stories have been a real breath of fresh air, especially this week, and this is the best of the bunch.
Here are my father's off the cuff comments via IM after reading this story:
Good article! I think they should terminate NATO too, but that might push the EU toward Russia. Those socialists have absolutely no brains and could jump out of the frying pan into the fire. FDR really screwed us -- ever since WWII the Europeans have really thought that we would provide the guns so their only concern was butter. I think we could selectively punish though. I think we should pull our troops out of Germany and put them in Poland. That would do two things: It would punish those German [expletive] and show Russia they had better look away from Poland. In truth though, nothing has really changed from when I was a kid except the Soviet Union is gone but the characters that ran it are there waiting to be reborn. You have a Europe that is insane and doesn't realize it has to protect itself.
Any force in Europe that is not primarily driven by the US will be, from day one, nothing more than a massive marbles tournement.
The bottom line is that the EuroTrash will never come together and acutally AUTHORIZE the use of military force. The only reason NATO counts for anything is because it is run and primarily manned by US forces.
Any time I consider European "military" I remember both Patton and Schwartzkopf. "I'd rather have three German Divisions in front of me than one French Division behind me." "Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordian."
btw - Chuck Norris single-handedly started and ended both world wars. ;-)
were ever actually assigned within the NATO structure - not as a member of a national military component of NATO - but as a true purple - (and mauve) suiter member of the organization?
I ask because having been dragged kicking and screaming to that honor for one 3-year tour in the early 1980s, I arrived at the principle conclusions noted here: NATO has little intrinsic value - especially to American military interests. Note that I arrived at this and related conclusions while staring down the long barrel of an armed (and rusting) Warsaw Pact.
I am genuinely curious about posters' underlying reasons for these conclusions - having reached them myself at a time in history when NATO membership did NOT include countries it was formed to defend against, and when its mission was solely European (Read: Anti-Soviet).
Have we underwritten NATO members' defense apparatii too often and too long as 'Tanker' suggests?
Has America remained too long in a multilateral Euro-defense scheme?
Is the notion and structure of NATO too archaic for our times? Should it be undone, and something else replace it? If so, what? And what would be its charter?
The Netherlands' reluctance to participate today in Afghanistan reminds me of French and Greek refusal to integrate into the 'military' NATO schema while remaining in the political structure - until it became clear that the USSR was dead.
Can individual Euro-states be relied upon to do any heavy lifting in their own defense at home? Elsewhere (as in Afghanistan?)
Truth is that I am extremely gratified both personally and professionally to note this posting, and others' comments to it.
I confess to being a NATO contrarian. I evolved to that point while in uniform and (doubtless) because of a too intimate (but brief) association with the organization and several of its members.
I never had that experience. I came within a hair's breadth of wrangling an assignment to LANDSOUTH in Verona, Italy.
Serving only 4 years of active duty in the Corps from 91 to 95. to answer your question I suppose I arrived at my conclusion strictly by observation.
but in 30 months in Europe, divided evenly between Germany and Italy, I was on dozens of joint training exercises and never heard one good thing from any American, officer or enlisted man, about Nato duty - other than that it was a pretty cushy ride in Brussels. As I recall, the Dutch army even had a union, but the only Nato soldiers anyone respected were the Turks, and maybe the BAOR.
I`m with the majority on Nato. Even at Fulda and Nurnberg, in the mid 70`s, I honestly don`t remember seeing anyone but our guys anyway. We used to joke amongst ourselves that in the event of a Soviet attack our real mission was to get killed as quickly as possible to speed up reinforcements from the States, since nobody else would fight.
I`d certainly support a different treaty, one more reflective of the current world situation.
armies were heavily unionized. A close friend of mine was on AUTUMN FORGE and they had a Belgian ambulance platoon attached to them. On Friday night the Belgiques locked their crap up and caught a train home. They came back to the exercise on Monday.
have regretted that assignment. It may not have been professionally fulfilling, but I'm sure it would have redeemed itself in other ways.
I was in AFSOUTH in Naples, Italy. LANDSOUTH was a subordinate element.
was at AFSOUTH in Naples, Italy.
There, I had the pleasure of dealing with Greek allies (hack), Portuguese and French 'observers', Italians and Turks.
I agree that the Turks were the very best of the lot at that time. Professional. Disciplined. Serious. Punctual (a rarity in Naples, Italy) and always open for business. LANDSOUTHEAST was located in Turkey as well as a major NATO air base.
Italians were professional and tried very hard - a significant portion of the time. LANDSOUTH was located in Verona and therein resided the best kept sectre of the Southern Region of NATO: a German Army officer. The only one assigned to the Southern Region. AIRSOUTH (Turkish 3-Star) and NAVSOUTH (Italian 4-Star) were also located in Naples with their parent, AFSOUTH (US 4-Star Admiral also hatted as CINCUSNAVEUR).
The French were absent because of not being integrated into the military structure. The one French representative, a Navy Captain was a poseur.
The Greeks were not (quite) integrated into the military structure, but negotiations were perpetually underway. They once had been integrated, but removed themselves some time earlier.
While I was there the Greeks were the only one of the three regional allies (Italy, Turkey and Greece) that did not permit a NATO subordinate command within their country, yet required that their officers serve in all others. All NATO dealings were coordinated directly with the Hellenic General Staff. Now, THAT was an experience.
The Greeks were provacateurs and opportunists - seeking always any advantage that would increase their share of the 'infrastructure', and always threatening NATO priorities and activities with their rants and raves against the Turks - often over Lemnos Island.
As always elsewhere in NATO anything needing done was assigned to the American officer. Everything needing scruitinized, criticized, micromanaged was assigned to the Brit officer. Other allied officers attended to duty either with levity, severity, hostility or indifference.
Brits were an interesting element in Naples. They had no major national force earmarked for the region yet had an 0-6 level officer either as number one or number two in almost all of the critical staff elements within the AFSOUTH headquarters. With not a single ship of the line (that I was aware of) a Brit 3-Star was the deputy NAVSEA commander.
I learned that the Brit interest (and influence) in the geographic areas encompassed by NATO's Southern Region were neither completely visible nor admitted (there is a great story there - maybe several). Streiff could probably unearth some of these if it became necessary.
I had a fairly sensitive job in Naples. Often, it required developing a national consensus on some military matter or another, and ALWAYS morphed into the scene on the TV commercial where cowboys were herding cats.
There was a special breed of American officer to be found in NATO: those who wanted only to make a career of it, and wailed and qualied at the notion of being 'sent home'. Those of us who were reluctant (one-time) warriors in the organization were advised to 'watch our sixes' because these guys exercised little qualm about laying on the axe. Sad, but too often true.
At normal times depending upon one's nationality, lunch began around 1030 and ended around 1330-1400 for those sober enough to return to duty. During the mid summer months the duty day was affixed at between 0800 and 1300. Too hot, you see.
Literaly every supporting activity NOT directly under military control (PX, Clubs,etc.) were populated and managed by Italians - Status of Forced Agreement negotiated without vigor.
I could write a book on the experience - and might.
Suffice it to say we Americans were generally held in light scorn by our allies because they knew, as a certainty, that if they dropped the ball on any item or action - we would get it done. So, naturally, our allies (Turks always excepted, Brits often excepted) too often had no real sense of urgency about the command's activities.
I could go on, but already have done so long enough. You get the point. I'll leave the string with this"
NATO (No Action Talk Only)
SHAPE (Super Holiday At Public Expense)
you react:
"Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down?"
Exactly.
And . . .
Kinda like the Warsaw Pact in reverse. Eh?
Here's the link in Amazon. If your library is a member you can download the audio book for free at netlibrary.com
The book really adds flavor to the popular history, especially if you've seen "Patton," "A Bridge Too Far," or "Ike: Countdown to D-Day."
I'm always interested to hear about books that other fellow RedStaters are enjoying.
This is completely consistent with our de facto subsidy of defending Europe. As pointed out in the incredible Steyn piece this is a natural continuation of the Euro's assumption that we'll fund the guns so they can fund their own butter. I say we use this as grounds to terminate NATO. If we're going to have to forge Coalitions of the Willing in the future anyway, what's the point of NATO? I'm all for sticking a finger in the European eye as well.
Funny you should comment on Montgomery and WWII strategy. In the book I'm reading, Eisenhower's son John took Ike to task for letting Montgomery run the show in a lot of ways.